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ABSTRACT 
 
DANIEL NILSSON DEHANAS  
Believing Citizens:  
Religion and Civic Engagement among London’s Second Generation Youth 
(under the direction of Christian Smith) 
 
The goal of this dissertation is to answer the question “What kinds of citizens are 
London’s second generation youth becoming?”  The question is asked in particular 
reference to the role of religious beliefs and practices in citizenship development.  The 
dissertation is a comparative study of sixty youth from the immigrant second generation 
(age 18-25): Bangladeshis in the East End (predominantly Muslim) and Jamaicans in 
Brixton (largely Christian).  Analysis is based on in-depth interviews with youth and 
ethnographic observation in the mosques, churches, and streets of both locations.  In the 
second chapter, “civic engagement” is defined as the actualization of citizenship by 
cultivating political literacy, developing a civic identity, and participating in political 
activities.  Analysis reveals that Jamaican and Bangladeshi youth are moderately 
politically literate and have low levels of civic identity invested in “Britishness.”  
However, Bangladeshi youth have very high levels of political participation when 
compared to Jamaicans and to the British population overall, and this political 
participation increases with Muslim religiosity.  The same religiosity effect is not found 
among Jamaicans.  The remaining chapters of the dissertation progressively build an 
explanation for this political participation disparity.  It is argued that second generation 
Bangladeshis in the East End tend to adopt “deculturated” Muslim identities propagated 
 iv
by local mosques that set them apart from the culturally infused Islam of their parents.  
The pervasiveness of this form of Muslim identity in the local area provides civic 
orientation and motivation to youth, enabling collective action on issues that are seen to 
affect the global community of Muslims.  Jamaican youth, in contrast, tend to develop 
hybrid and situational identities that do not provide the same coherent basis for collective 
civic engagement.  While Brixton Jamaican-led churches are more individual-focused 
and may engage in revival-like campaigns of political activism, East End Bangladeshi 
mosques have developed a sustained vision for local civic advocacy that is buttressed by 
the regularity of community-level Islamic practice.  Therefore the most likely paths for 
youth citizenship development differ in the two contexts. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“Can Europe be the same with different people in it?”  This question is the 
subtitle of a recent book from Christopher Caldwell (2009),1 in which he writes about the 
cultural implications of Muslim immigration in Europe.  Caldwell’s Reflections on a 
Revolution in Europe harkens back to a book of a similar name from Edmund Burke 
(1790) about the French Revolution.  Caldwell believes that contemporary changes 
brought by Muslim immigrants and their descendants will be at least as far-reaching for 
Europe culturally as the secularist and democratic coup in 1789 was politically for 
France.  His primary basis for argument is that Muslims in Europe are a characteristically 
different people carrying a distinctive religious culture, and that they are beginning to 
replace Europe’s populations and institutions with their own.  As they become citizens in 
European states, Caldwell believes, these states will gradually but irrevocably shift 
beyond recognition as European. 
Islam haunts Caldwell’s prognosis for Europe.  Yet, his book remains distant from 
the daily lives of the “new Europeans” and the roles religion might have in them.  If 
Europe is beginning to have “different people in it,” more must be done to flesh out what 
Europe’s immigrants, and their descendants, are actually like.  The key question 
                                                 
1This is Caldwell’s subtitle for the European edition of the book, published by Allen 
Lane.  In North America, the subtitle is simply “Immigration, Islam, and the West” and 
the book is published by Doubleday. 
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underlying Caldwell’s analysis remains unanswered: What kinds of citizens are “new 
Europeans” becoming?   
In this dissertation I focus on a single segment of “new Europeans”: The children 
of immigrants.  This group is often called the second generation, meaning that they 
follow on from their immigrant parents who were the first generation in Europe.  I spent 
about two years coming to know second generation 18 to 25 year olds in one city, 
London, UK.  I attended their places of worship, walked the streets where they have 
grown up, and sat down with many for interviews and informal conversations.  I was able 
to study in an in-depth and qualitative way how sixty of these young second-generation 
Londoners are emerging into adulthood and becoming engaged or disengaged as British 
citizens.   
I broaden the lens beyond Muslims in this dissertation to also look at second 
generation Christians and non-religious youth.  There are probably more than one 
thousand research publications and popular books written about Muslims in Europe 
(Bujis and Rath 2003).  This dissertation contributes to that important literature.  Yet the 
European research tradition on Christianity among immigrants and subsequent 
generations is much thinner and less well developed.  The research disparity is 
unfortunate, because it results in lopsided accounts of European religion and migration.  
The majority of migrants in Europe are in fact of Christian background, if we include 
migrants moving across the intra-European borders, such as Poles and Romanians.  Even 
when only migrants who have come to Europe from outside the continent are considered, 
the numbers of Muslim and Christian migrants appear to be nearly at parity (Jenkins 
2007).  My purpose in including Christians, Muslims, and some non-religious youth in 
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this study is threefold: 1) To be more true to the varieties of religious experience for 
second generation youth in Europe; 2) To compare youth across their religious traditions, 
showing how they are influenced differently by particular strains of Islam, Christianity, 
and secularity; and, finally, 3) To be able to discern general influences of religiosity and 
broader trends that are not related to religion at all.   
Only by broadening the lens beyond Muslims can we judge whether Muslim 
youth really are an exceptional case in Europe that requires the urgent attention called for 
by authors such as Christopher Caldwell, Bruce Bawer (2006), and Melanie Phillips 
(2007).  It may be, instead, that some young Muslims’ struggles and reactions are 
common to the wider experience of migrant communities and their religions.  Or perhaps 
the answer is somewhere in between – there could be aspects of the situation of young 
second generation Muslims that are unique (as there could be for second generation 
young Christians), but these do not constitute an unreasonable or unbridgeable gulf of 
difference with the rest of Britain and Europe. 
The primary research question guiding this dissertation, foreshadowed earlier, is: 
What kinds of citizens are London’s second generation youth becoming?  I ask this 
question in particular reference to the influence of religious identities, beliefs, and 
practices on the development of youth citizenship identities and civic engagement.  The 
dissertation compares British second generation youth of two different immigrant origins, 
Bangladeshis and Jamaicans, who have been sampled from a variety of religious and 
secular contexts. 
Through the touchstone of the Bangladeshi and Jamaican comparison groups, I 
can capture something of (though not fully address) questions that are commonly asked 
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about broader ethnic populations they represent.  The most recent British Census (2001) 
found that 7.9 percent of the British population are of non-white ethnicities.  The largest 
non-white ethnic populations in Britain are South Asians2 (Pakistani, Indian, and 
Bangladeshi) who together compose 4 percent of the population, blacks (Caribbean and 
African) who compose 2 percent, and mixed race with 1.2 percent.  Bangladeshis and 
Jamaicans are large and historically important ethnic minority populations in London, as 
I will explain further in this Introduction.  These two groups will provide us with some 
leverage for understanding issues faced by Britain’s South Asian, black, and mixed race 
populations more broadly.  
The problems that black British and British South Asians face in the UK are 
legion.  As ethnic sub-populations, they are most economically deprived in the nation and 
have the lowest levels of educational achievement (Modood 2005).  Most relevant to this 
dissertation on citizenship, research studies have found that black British have the lowest 
average levels of participation in British elections.  The effect is particularly acute among 
black youth (Purdam et. al. 2002; Saggar 1998).  Initiatives such as Operation Black Vote 
are attempting to respond to this democratic deficit and to mobilize young black voters.  
It is also possible that religion could help address this issue – particularly Christianity, 
which predominates in the Black British population.  Can religion motivate and structure 
the civic engagement of Black British youth?  Or does religion more often influence 
                                                 
2In Britain, historic immigration from Asia has predominantly been from the Indian 
subcontinent.  For this reason, the general term “Asian” is typically used instead of 
“South Asian.”  I choose to use “South Asian” in this dissertation to provide clarity, 
because the term “Asian” in the American experience of immigration most often 
connotes ethnic origins in East Asia. 
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black youth into otherworldliness, alienation, or simply apathy?  These are questions to 
which we need better answers.  
Questions are also frequently asked about citizenship among British South Asian 
Muslims.3  Worries about their participation in British civic life first became widespread 
during the protests and book burnings of the 1989 Rushdie Affair (Weller 2009; Werbner 
2002).  In the wake of the youth disturbances in Oldham, Burnley, and Bradford in 
summer, 2001, the British government issued the Cantle Report which stated that South 
Asians may be living “parallel lives” set apart from the rest of Britain.  More recently, 
Trevor Phillips, Chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission,4 has stated that in 
Britain “we are sleepwalking our way towards segregation.”  The London bombings of 
7/7/2005 and subsequent terrorist attempts raise particular fears of a “home-grown” 
terrorist threat from youth in insular Pakistani and Bangladeshi enclaves.   
These issues about South Asian youth, like those about black African and 
Caribbean youth, can be framed as issues of disengagement from the nation of 
citizenship.  Some questions highlighting commonly raised concerns are: Does religion 
(particularly Islam) contribute to the ghettoizing and separation of communities from 
British national life and culture?  Is religion leading youth to take on radical and violent 
ideologies?   Or does religious influence tend to be more benign, more varied, or perhaps 
more positive when it promotes stable self-identities and practices? 
                                                 
3Because such a large proportion of South Asians in Britain have their origins in Pakistan 
or Bangladesh, a slight majority of the British South Asian population is Muslim.  Many 
British Indians and other British South Asians practice other faiths such as Hinduism, 
Sikhism, or Christianity. 
 
4Trevor Phillips has renamed Commission for Racial Equality as the Equality and Human 
Right Commission, partly reflecting a change in philosophy to more classically liberal 
notions of equality. 
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To address these questions of citizenship, I conducted sixty in-depth interviews 
with youth along with dozens of interviews with local leaders and community observers.  
All of the youth were 18 to 25 at the time of interview, placing them in a period in their 
lives that can be called emerging adulthood (Arnett 2000).  As such, many of them were 
working through the issues of education, employment, and long-term relationships that 
are common to people of this life stage.  Emerging adulthood is the time period in which 
youth are first able to vote (age 18 in Britain).  The political attitudes and preferences that 
are formed in these relatively early years of political enfranchisement can solidify and 
last over the life span.  In this dissertation I will tend to refer to the young people I 
interviewed as “youth,” simply for ease of expression.  Yet it is important to remember 
that they are in a transitional period of life, a period that falls after adolescence yet still 
somewhere between youth and adulthood.  The term “emerging adulthood” captures this 
well. 
Along with being in a certain age cohort, the youth in this study are, as previously 
mentioned, all members of the second generation.  With very few exceptions, all sixty 
youth that I interviewed in-depth were born in Britain to immigrant parents5 and are legal 
British citizens.  Second generation youth have been a focal point for much contemporary 
                                                 
5In defining the second generation as the children of immigrants, born in Britain, I follow 
an extensive research literature (e.g., Crul and Vermeulen 2003; Kasinitz et. al. 2009; 
Portes and Rumbaut 2001).  The youth I interviewed also most often thought of the 
second generation in this way, perhaps because they have heard policy and media 
discourses.  For example, without my own mention of the term, a Bangladeshi youth 
named Yasmin (introduced in Chapter 4) offered her own description: “Being a second 
generation, my connection to my ancestors has my parents between the two.”  The 
exceptions (those who were not second generation) were: one Jamaican female and one 
Bangladeshi female in the third generation, and a Jamaican female, Jamaican male, and 
Bangladeshi male who are in the 1.5 generation because they came to the UK during 
childhood.  These five exceptional cases were generally more similar than different when 
compared to their second generation peers. 
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social scientific research, partly because their integration and citizenship activities can be 
read as a barometer of the future outcomes for their ethnic groups.  While many 
immigrants of the first-generation naturally retain their closest feelings of cultural and 
family connection with their country of origin, their second-generation children are 
socialized in Britain and are educated by British schooling.  Thus the second-generation, 
more than the first, might be expected to have a cultural affinity with Britain and to 
contribute to it as a nation.  Some scholars are concerned that second-generation failings 
in integration and citizenship could herald problems that will last for generations to come 
(Timmermans 2009). 
 
Why Study Jamaicans and Bangladeshis?  Why in Brixton and the East End? 
I chose to focus my dissertation on Jamaicans and Bangladeshis primarily because 
these two groups provide for a well-matched sociological comparison.  Both have played 
important roles in London’s immigration history.  The Bangladeshi Muslims of Tower 
Hamlets constitute the largest Muslim population of any local area in Britain, and have 
played a major role in the public face of British Islam.  The Jamaicans of Brixton, while 
not as ethnically concentrated, have also been highly influential in British religious and 
cultural arenas.  Both ethnic populations are at comparable points in their migration 
histories.  Both have large populations of second generation youth.  Jamaican and 
Bangladeshi youth each face problems that are typical to inner cities, including drugs, 
gangs, socio-economic deprivation, and educational disadvantage.  Next I briefly profile 
the histories of both groups in these particular areas of London. 
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Jamaican immigration to Britain was inaugurated with the “Windrush 
Generation.”  The story of their arrival6 has become a defining episode for modern 
Britain.  In 1948, the British Nationality Act made the first legal distinction between 
citizens in Britain and those who lived in Britain’s colonies, who became Citizens of the 
United Kingdom and Colonies (CUKC).7  In the same year Britain was suffering from a 
post-war labor shortage.  Royal Mail placed an advertisement in a Jamaican daily 
newspaper for the Empire Windrush steamship, which was carrying passengers and 
commercial goods from Jamaica to Britain.  A total of 490 men and two women bought 
tickets and undertook the journey from Jamaica.  The Windrush voyage was highly 
publicized in Britain – even as it sailed, it provoked vigorous debate about immigration in 
Parliament.  When the Windrush arrived at the Tilbury Docks on June 22, 1948, the 
image of hundreds of black Caribbean passengers disembarking from its gangplank 
became a symbol of Britain’s transition into a multi-ethnic society.   
Most Windrush passengers took accommodation near the Labour Exchange close 
to the Tilbury Docks, which happened to be in Brixton.  It was from this initial settlement 
that Brixton became the heartland for British Jamaicans and a wellspring of Black British 
culture in general.  The area has long been noted for the Brixton Market that stocks 
                                                 
6I narrate the story here as it is commonly told by British historians and media.  Recent 
historiography of the event (Mead 2009) is beginning to question the number, origins, 
and destinations of those who embarked on the Empire Windrush voyage.  This recent 
work adds greater nuance and clarity to the history; yet the Windrush “story” as I relay it 
here has gained a reality and influence of its own. 
 
7Until 1948, all members of British colonies were in practice entitled to the same 
citizenship rights and participation as “native” Britons.  In fact, the first MP from the 
Indian subcontinent was Dadahai Naoroji, elected by a London constituency to the House 
of Commons in 1892 (Anwar 2001).  The British Nationality Act did not actually 
institute substantive changes to this citizenship arrangement, but was instead a precursor 
to the more significant Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962. 
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Caribbean and African foods, for the classic 1911 Ritzy Cinema building, and for its 
dynamic live music scene. 
Brixton is also known as a place of racial tensions.  The Windrush Generation 
arrived with high hopes for opportunities in the “Mother Country” of Britain.  In the 
decades that followed, the experiences of these Jamaicans and subsequent blacks in 
Britain would be marred by racist confrontations and institutional discrimination.  Racial 
tensions came to a head in the Brixton Riot of 1981.  Police had been scouring the streets 
in Operation Swamp, using a surge of “stop and search” methods to root out local crime.  
A struggle between police and a crowd involving a stabbed youth led to different 
interpretations of the incident on both sides.  Five hours of violence erupted, involving 
hundreds of injuries and destroyed vehicles and dozens of burning buildings, in what was 
called a “fireball of anger” (The Guardian 1981).  The Scarman Report (1981), published 
in the aftermath of the riot, confirmed that some police were at fault for discrimination 
and overreaching their authority.  Brixton has seen two more riots of a smaller scale since 
then, in 1985 and 1995, which also pitted black residents against mostly white police. 
 Over the years, Jamaicans in Brixton have responded to racialized British society 
in various ways.  In a seminal article, Stuart Hall (1992) outlined a history of Black 
British self-definition that moved from “West Indian migrant,” to “black identity,” to 
“new ethnicities.”  Hall’s historical account is exemplified by Jamaicans in Brixton.  
Their first years of settlement were marked by strong identification as West Indian 
migrants.  The 1970s and 1980s saw a cresting of ‘black identity’ as Rastafarianism, Pan-
Africanism, and race-based political movements provided different black responses to 
racism.  It was in this period that minorities developed a strong political consciousness, 
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and “black” political activism included South Asians alongside Caribbeans and Africans 
(Solomos and Back 1995).  According to Hall, the 1990s and onwards have signalled a 
period of “new ethnicities,” in which mixed-race identities and hybrid-ethnic allegiances 
become more common.  New ethnicities are expected to be especially prevalent in second 
and further generations, as youth have more freedom from parents’ identities and take 
part in multicultural peer groups.  In Hall’s model of transitions in black identities, 
vestiges of each previous period continue to remain.  Thus, in Brixton today, Jamaicans 
may have many cross-cutting options along the spectrum from fixed West Indian 
ethnicity to fluid new ethnicities.  
 
Figure 1.1. Electric Avenue Market in Brixton8 
 
                                                 
8All photographs in this dissertation were taken by the author from 2008 to 2010 and are 
copyrighted. 
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 Contemporary Brixton is gentrifying as young professionals are attracted to its 
arts and nightlife.  The area has likewise diversified in terms of immigration.  Numbers of 
African migrants have grown and Portuguese now constitute a sizable community, among 
several others.  Brixton struggles with poverty, hard drugs, knife crime, and gang 
violence.  Cannabis use is widespread, provoking various opinions (cannabis is legal in 
Jamaica).  Brixton is also the setting of variegated spiritualities, from many modest 
storefront churches to a well-known mega-church, from spiritual practices loosely based 
in West African Vodun to a staunchly Salafi mosque.  Brixton has been and continues to 
be a place of many and varied influences.  It has a busy and vibrant street life that 
Jamaican second generation youth described to me as “loud” or a place of “hustle and 
bustle.”  Brixton is much more a place of movement than stability. 
The East End of London, now home to Britain’s largest Bangladeshi population, 
has also played stage to migratory movements.  Yet these movements have taken a 
somewhat different form than in Brixton.  East End migration has generally resembled a 
succession of “waves” rather than a mix of simultaneous currents.  East End immigrant 
communities have each retained a relatively solid character in their first generation or 
even first several, with low rates of intermarriage.  The less permeable nature of these 
communities can be attributed, at least in part, to religion. 
The immigration history in the East End began with French Huguenots, 
Protestants fleeing persecution from the Catholic monarchy in the middle of the 
Eighteenth Century.  Huguenots took occupations primarily as weavers: The upper 
windows that allowed light for their looms can still be seen on Fournier Street.  Although 
an enclave community at first, the French Huguenots assimilated within a few 
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generations.  They are now remembered largely in names, e.g., the actor Laurence 
Olivier.  After the Huguenots, there was a migration of Irish to London, escaping the 
potato famine of the mid-1800s.  A sizable number settled in the East End.  It was next 
that Jews, fleeing Russian pogroms, arrived in the late Nineteenth Century.  In this same 
period Jack the Ripper murdered his hapless female victims in overcrowded East End 
slums, and William Booth, touched by the area’s poverty, founded the Salvation Army.  
The Jewish population of the East End swelled to over 100,000 by the turn of the 
Twentieth Century, and the area took on the informal designation of “New Jerusalem.”  
Anne Kershen (2005) notes that for these successive waves of immigrants it was religion 
(though not necessarily religiosity) that provided cultural stability and the institutions of 
community life. 
Bangladeshis can trace their history in the East End to lascars9 who worked on 
ships that landed at the London docks.  Many of these sailors came from the Sylhet 
region, an area with good river links down to Bengal’s main ports (Eade and Garbin 
2006).  However it was the fateful combination of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 
(1962) and East Pakistan’s independence as Bangladesh (1971) that led to a substantial 
wave of Bangladeshi immigration.  The 1962 Act restricted what had been a very 
generous British policy of admitting all members of Commonwealth lands, as it instead 
required immigrants to prove  employment, economic independence, or armed forces 
service.  A rush of Bangladeshis entered Britain under the more generous policy before 
the bill was passed.  The largest numbers came from the Sylhet region of Bangladesh, 
due to lineage and patronage connections with the earlier generations of lascars (Gardner 
                                                 
9Lascar: A sailor.  The term, originally from Persian, was used by the British for the 
South Asian seamen who manned the ships of the Empire. 
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1995).  It is because of a process of chain migration – Sylhetis progressively bringing 
family members and others to join them – that the composition of the East End 
Bangladeshi population today is predominantly Sylheti (Gardner 2002). 
 
Figure 1.2. Brick Lane in The East End 
 
 
The Bangladeshis had arrived for economic opportunities, and many began by 
working in textiles.  Others started restaurants or small shops.  Bangladeshis would over 
time come to account for the vast majority of “Indian” Restaurant owners in Britain.  
Brick Lane in the East End became the heartland of settlement, with many businesses and 
organizations beginning there.  The Brick Lane area gained such a visible Bangladeshi 
character that, with the support of local entrepreneurs, it was dubbed Banglatown in the 
late 1990s (Carey 2004).  In 1997 an arch reminiscent of those in many Chinatowns (but 
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in a more Bengali style) was erected at the entrance of the Brick Lane, which has earned 
the reputation of Britain’s heartland of curry houses.  The area has been portrayed 
frequently in literature, most notably in Monica Ali’s acclaimed Brick Lane (2003) and in 
Salman Rushdie’s highly contentious The Satanic Verses (1988).  
Like Jamaicans and other blacks in Brixton, the Bangladeshis of the East End 
have recently been targets of racism and discrimination.  In 1978, white racists murdered 
the 25 year-old textile worker, Altab Ali.  A demonstration of thousands of Bangladeshis 
and others carrying the young man’s coffin made a powerful statement against racism.  
Today, a sculpted gate at Altab Ali Park stands in memory of the incident.  As virulent 
racism continued to threaten the Bangladeshi community, young men formed groups to 
oppose racist violence.  Young Bangladeshi males in the area took on tougher personas 
and formed petty gangs to defend their areas.  These ‘gangs’ have now taken on lives of 
their own, with some involved in the local drug trade (Dench et. al. 2006; c.f., Alexander 
2000).  Bangladeshi youth have been affected by broader British and global youth 
culture.  Many listen to the hip hop of 50 Cent or Lil Wayne as much as their Jamaican 
peers.   
According to Gardner and Shukur (1994), the other common Bangladeshi 
response to British racial exclusion has been to take on strong identities as Muslims.  
Indeed, while Bangladeshi and Sylheti identities are important for the first generation, 
and a form of black politics may have had unifying potential in the 1980s, today Muslim 
identity is the most widespread and valued (Modood 2005).  In the East End area, the 
East London Mosque is the largest and most well known mosque propagating strong 
Muslim identities.  Ed Husain (2007), who grew up in the East End, argues that this 
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mosque primed him for the development of an aggressive Islamist identity, which he has 
since abandoned.  Others situate Husain’s biography in religious developments of the 
1990s, which they say are no longer relevant (Birt 2007).  Yet whether benign, 
dangerous, or positive, it is clear that globally-oriented, revivalist streams of Islam are 
growing in their influence in the East End.  These forms of Islam are showing particular 
traction among the young, both male and female (Glynn 2002). 
The East End, like Brixton, is an impoverished area which struggles with issues of 
crime and delinquency.  Yet it is gentrifying as well.  The Canary Wharf development 
transformed acres of abandoned dockland warehouses into a business complex with some 
of the sleekest skyscrapers in Britain.  This massive business development, along with the 
thriving artistic scene on the North half of Brick Lane and in Shoreditch, are major 
economic drivers for many urban renewal projects.  The upcoming 2012 Olympics in 
East London promises to add yet another chapter to the East End’s history of cultures, 
conflict, and competition for resources.  The potential influence of Olympic investment 
on the wellbeing of second and further generations of Bangladeshis is, for the moment, 
difficult to discern. 
 
How I Studied Second-Generation Youth 
The sixty young people I interviewed for this dissertation are from inner city areas 
of London.  I met and interviewed all of the Jamaican youth in Brixton, South London, 
and all of the Bangladeshi youth in Tower Hamlets in East London.  Tower Hamlets is 
ranked as the third most deprived borough out of 354 in England, while Lambeth (where 
Brixton is located) is ranked the 19th most deprived (Government Office for London 
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2010).  My youth interviewees were all born into immigrant families, and typically come 
from humble socio-economic backgrounds.  The average Bangladeshi youth I met was 
living in cramped social housing conditions with parents, siblings, and perhaps extended 
family.  Many Bangladeshis told me that their parents were currently unemployed or 
suffer from serious health conditions or work injuries.  Most of the Jamaican youth I 
interviewed had been raised in single-parent households.  Some were estranged from one 
or both of their parents.  Jamaicans and Bangladeshis both spoke of the ravages of drugs 
and delinquency among friends and schoolmates in their generation.   
The aspirations and likely life outcomes of my interviewees varied widely.  Some 
were attending university.  Mike, a Jamaican mixed race youth, was about to enter a 
prestigious law program at the London School of Economics.  For others, university or 
even a stable career was impossible to imagine.  Some of the young men I interviewed 
were ‘hustling’ to make ends meet.  Others had chosen to live on modest means to devote 
themselves to intensive religious study and prayer.  Yet others were putting careers on 
hold to plan and start families.  Rubina, a 19 year-old Bangladeshi woman, is a university 
student who has ambitions to become a well-known Muslim writer.  Samia, of the same 
age and ethnic background, attends a basic work skills center in the hope of shedding 
alcoholism and scraping her life back together.  
My research in these inner city areas of Brixton and the East End (specifically 
Spitalfields and Whitechapel) began when I explored each area on foot.  I spoke with 
shopkeepers and community contacts to gain a better orientation in the two research sites.  
I read academic studies of both sites and kept up with British news media.  Through these 
initial months of research I was able to identify the religious and community institutions 
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in each site that are the most influential with local young people.  These institutions 
would be key to my analysis of whether and how religion can motivate second-generation 
youth into civic engagement or perpetuate disengagement. 
I then began visiting the local institutions I had identified, focusing on churches 
and mosques.  I chose two Jamaican-led churches in Brixton, which I attended for in-
depth case studies: the large Brixton Seventh Day Adventist Church and a Neo-
Pentecostal megachurch called Ruach Ministries.  In the East End, I chose two case-study 
mosques: The prominent East London Mosque on Whitechapel Road and the traditional 
Bengali Jamme Masjid on Brick Lane.  I attended many mosque congregational prayers 
and special events.  From all religious institutions I built a network of contacts with 
congregants and leaders, observed events carefully, and took in-depth fieldnotes to which 
I would refer later. 
I found my sixty youth interviewees in two different ways.  Twenty of them were 
young people who I met naturally through attending their churches and mosques.  For 
example, Mike, mentioned earlier, is someone I met as we stood in the foyer of Ruach 
Ministries waiting for the youth service to begin.  These twenty youth from “religious 
contexts” gave me a detailed view into how particular religious institutions influence the 
young people who regularly attend them for worship.   
I recruited the other forty youth interviewees from “secular contexts.”  To do this, 
I simply wandered the streets, markets, libraries, and other public places of Brixton and 
Whitechapel-Spitalfields, meeting young people who might fit my demographic, and 
recruiting those who did to join my research study.  I met Mahmoud while I was 
shopping at the large Sainsbury’s grocery store in Whitechapel.  I met Chanel simply by 
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introducing myself to her on the streets of Brixton.  The strategy for the forty interviews 
from “secular contexts” was to continually develop fresh contacts from a carefully varied 
set of places.  By doing this, I built a sample that more accurately represents the full 
Bangladeshi and Jamaican youth populations than could have been possible by following 
referrals through social networks.  The sample from secular contexts, then, is a diverse 
cross-section of “ordinary” youth.  I developed it for a different purpose than religious 
contexts sample, which places sharper focus on youth actively involved in religion.  By 
using the two samples in tandem, I achieve more depth to analyze religious influences 
and breadth to contextualize these within the overall population.  
I conducted most of the interviews in public places such as coffee shops, libraries, 
or park benches.  I paid each youth £10 of participation incentive.  Each interview lasted 
one or two hours and was recorded on a digital recorder.  I designed the interviews to be 
semi-structured, meaning that I tended to ask the same questions in the same order yet 
had flexibility to let the conversation flow more naturally and to continue with follow-up 
questions.  In many cases, I kept in touch with interviewees over time.  I use some of my 
later conversations with these key informants to refine my analysis.  Overall, the youth 
interviews provide the main basis for my findings about religion and its role in second 
generation youth civic engagement.  My ethnographic observations in churches and 
mosques contribute the institutional side to my analysis and help to put the interviews in 
broader social context. 
The final component of my research process was a set of about twenty 
“perspective interviews” with religious and community leaders and other key observers.  
These included interviews with at least one pastor, imam, or youth worker directly 
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involved with the young people in each of the religious institutions I studied.  I also 
conducted interviews with a select group of local and national level figures.  Some of the 
perspective interviews I conducted were with “ordinary” locals, such as shopkeepers and 
teachers.  Although these interviewees are not well known on the British national stage, a 
number of them – such as Brixton CD sellers Reggie and Vernon introduced in Chapter 3 
– are astute observers of their local areas and offered insights that would drive my 
thinking further. 
 
Plan of the Dissertation 
In the next chapter I provide a baseline comparison of the kinds of British citizens 
Jamaican and Bangladeshi second-generation youth are becoming.  I find that both 
groups have similar levels of political knowledge which compare positively to the British 
population overall.  Both groups have relatively low levels of identification with 
Britishness and British citizenship.  In these first two dimensions of citizenship – 
knowledge and identification – the ethnicity and religiosity of youth seems to make not 
much, if any, difference.  However, both religion and ethnicity do appear to have an 
influence on political participation, the active practice of citizenship.  Bangladeshis are 
much more active than Jamaicans in several aspects of participation, with Bangladeshis 
who are highly religious being the most active of all.  The chapters that then follow each 
unfold part of a progressive explanation for the surprisingly high degree of difference in 
political participation. 
In Chapter Three, I investigate how churches in Brixton and mosques in 
Spitalfields-Whitechapel contribute to the socialization of young people into citizens.  In 
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this chapter I present the case studies of two churches and two mosques, varied enough to 
capture a significant amount of the religious diversity in each of the two local contexts.  
Through observing religious practices, studying the language used in sermons, and 
speaking with youth and religious leaders, I am able to compare how religious institutions 
help shape the citizenship identities of youth.  I find that generational differences between 
youth and their parents are often strengthened by patterns of practice in religious 
institutions.  I also find that young people are encouraged into different understandings of 
the religious self in the East End compared to Brixton, with a much more communally-
oriented self presented in the mosques and a more individualistic, subjective self in the 
churches.  These divergences in religious imagination have implications for the ability of 
community-level political efforts to be mobilized (or even conceived of in the first place) 
in the two contexts. 
 Chapter Four considers the influence of identity and culture on second-generation 
youth.  Almond and Verba (1963) provided a foundational work on culture and politics 
with their comparative study of several political cultures in the 1960s.  Among 
Bangladeshis, I find the most prevalent cultural phenomenon is a “deculturation,” in 
which the apparently “impure” influences of Bangladeshi culture are brushed away in 
favor of a more totalizing vision of Islam.  Muslim identity is nearly always valued first 
and foremost.  I do not find the same sort of comprehensive cultural or identity patterns 
among Jamaicans.  Instead there is a fragmentation of cultural influences acting in 
various directions in the Brixton Jamaican and black community.  Jamaican youth more 
often take situational and hybrid approaches to identity, enabling them to better navigate 
their diverse environments.  Common identity and the reaction against traditional culture, 
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then, provide fertile ground for political mobilizations in the East End, whereas the 
various forces at work in Brixton do not consolidate into a single trend or position. 
 In Chapter Five, I investigate actual religious mobilizations for civic and political 
change.  I profile a march and rally against youth violence led by churches from a 
Jamaican Christian denomination, and a Bangladeshi Muslim event during Ramadan that 
raised funds to combat hunger and poverty.  The chapter uncovers specific social 
mechanisms that are building blocks of Jamaican Christian and Bangladeshi Muslim 
efforts to effect political change. 
 Chapter Six brings the various strands of explanation together into a conclusion.  I 
reflect briefly on how Black British political participation may have the potential to 
increase, and on why a Bangladeshi community highly mobilized around Muslim-related 
political issues can in fact be a mixed blessing.  I conclude with profiles of three 
promising second generation individuals who are opening a new chapter in civic 
engagement, through their campaigns to become Members of Parliament. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
YOUTH AS CITIZENS:  
APATHETIC, ALIENATED, OR ATOMIZED? 
 
What makes a good citizen?  What are the aspirations and ideals of citizenship in 
Britain?   
According to Prime Minister Gordon Brown, British citizenship should include 
feeling a sense of patriotism, acknowledging a particular history of Britain, and aspiring 
to certain “British values,” such as liberty and fairness.  In a speech to the Fabian Society 
before becoming Prime Minister,10 Brown placed his emphasis on identifying 
“Britishness” as the nation’s “common glue… which welcomes differences, but which is 
not so loose, so nebulous that it is simply defined as the toleration of difference and 
leaves a hole where national identity should be” (Brown 2006). Good citizenship, when 
viewed with this lens, is built upon a shared foundation of national identity. 
Another image of good citizenship is that of the “politically literate” citizen.  Sir 
Bernard Crick, the acknowledged authority on British citizenship for much of the past 
decade, is well known for developing the concept of political literacy over the course of 
his career.  ‘Political literacy’ might first bring to mind someone who keeps up with 
current events, perhaps avidly reading Foreign Affairs or regularly watching Question 
Time.  However, Crick’s conception of political literacy is broader than this.  He has 
written that a politically literate citizen is one who can recognize the political side “of any 
                                                 
10Brown first stated these views before he became Prime Minister, in a high profile 
speech to the Fabian Society and a debate featured in the intellectual, Left-leaning 
magazine Prospect. 
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human situation” (Crick and Porter 1978).  This means that “whether in a school, factory, 
voluntary body or party” a politically literate person will be equipped to read the political 
dimension of the circumstance and respond to it.  In his major government policy report 
in 1998, Crick set Britain’s agenda for developing political literacy through citizenship 
education.  Since its implementation in 2002, citizenship education has accounted for 
about 5 percent of the secondary school curriculum in England and Wales (O’Toole, 
Marsh, and Jones 2003).  Good citizenship, if viewed in terms of political literacy, is 
about being informed, articulate, and reasoned in one’s engagement with civic life. 
A third image of citizenship is that of the “participating citizen.”  Much work on 
citizenship participation builds on Almond and Verba’s seminal research in The Civic 
Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (1963).  Almond and Verba 
studied the political cultures of five nations with large-scale surveys.  Their ideal of a 
state was one that had a civic culture – a combination of positive elements in the political 
environment and participation from citizens.  The authors wrote very positively about 
Britain, arguing that: 
The political culture in Great Britain also approximates [this idealized situation 
of] civic culture.  The participant role is highly developed.  Exposure to politics, 
interest, involvement, and a sense of competence are relatively high.  There are 
norms supporting political activity, as well as emotional involvement in elections, 
and system affect.  And the attachment to the system is a balanced one: there is 
general system pride as well as satisfaction with specific government 
performance. (Almond and Verba 1963, p. 315, emphasis added.  Quoted in 
Whiteley 2003) 
 
Participating citizens are those who willingly take action in order to influence the 
political system.  Voting, campaigning, picketing, or writing a letter to a newspaper 
editor are among the prototypical actions associated with this kind of citizen.  According 
to Almond and Verba, British political participation in the 1960s was widespread, 
 24
heartfelt, and supported by positive cultural norms.  Another term used to denote this 
ideal today is the “active citizen” (Crick 1998).  If understood in light of Almond and 
Verba’s work, good citizenship is largely about this kind of active participation in the 
political process.  
There are, then, at least three common visions of what is most important for good 
citizenship in Britain: civic identity, political literacy, and political participation.  We can 
bring these three ideals of citizenship down-to-earth with measurable benchmarks.  In 
doing so, we gain leverage in our understanding of second generation youth as citizens.  I 
employ civic engagement in this dissertation as the composite concept to encompass 
these three dimensions of citizenship.  Thinking of civic engagement in this 
multidimensional way provides for a richer understanding of the alternatives and styles of 
citizenship among youth, because some youth might be high on one civic dimension 
while low on another.  I will explain the specific measures for each of the three 
dimensions of civic engagement in the “Data and Measures” section later in this chapter. 
My use of civic engagement in such a broad and encompassing way follows the 
precedent of Kisby and Sloam (2009).  These authors acknowledge the close 
etymological kinship between the words “civic” and “citizenship.”  They use a dictionary 
definition of civic as “Of, pertaining to, or proper to citizens…. public spirited.”11  I 
understand civic in this same way.  By engagement I mean the “actualization” of a 
person’s citizenship.  In other words, engagement refers to the aspects of citizenship that 
are observable and measurable.  There are, of course, many abstract ways in which a 
                                                 
11This definition is from the Oxford English Dictionary (2009).  I have only quoted part 
of definition used by Kisby and Sloam, for the sake of both simplicity and greater focus 
in definition. 
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citizen could contribute to society, such as through her career or family life.  Yet in the 
term civic engagement I refer to the aspects of a person that are unmistakably civic – the 
aforementioned dimensions of civic identity, political literacy, and political participation.  
 
Figure 2.1: Major Citizenship Concepts in this Dissertation (Citizen-Side)12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter initiates my discussion of civic engagement and focuses primarily on 
the dimensions of political literacy and political participation.  I also begin a discussion 
of civic identity that I will continue in more depth in Chapter Four.  In this chapter I 
                                                 
12By ‘citizen-side’ concepts, I am referring to the ways in which individual citizens 
interact with, identify with, and contribute to the state.  In many cases, these ‘citizen-side’ 
concepts can be thought of in terms of responsibilities.  Because citizenship is about a 
person’s relationship to the state, the other part of the equation is ‘state-side,’ referring to 
the rights, legal freedoms, and other benefits gained from living in the state.  Studies of 
the state-side of citizenship in Britain are typically based in the work of T. H. Marshall 
(1950).  Although this dissertation is primarily concerned with citizen-side concepts, it 
will necessarily consider the responsibilities of the state in this mutual relationship. 
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introduce two young men I interviewed, Mike and Hamid, discussing some of their views 
on civic identity and on politics.  I then briefly review major British academic 
perspectives on youth civic engagement.  Next, I compare the full set of Jamaican and 
Bangladeshi youth I interviewed in terms of political literacy and participation, 
presenting these comparisons in clear data tables.  Finally, I circle back to Mike and 
Hamid in order to illustrate some of the general tendencies and findings that are evident 
in the particular examples of their lives.  
The main goal of the chapter is to provide a baseline comparison of how Jamaican 
and Bangladeshi youth differ in their expressions of British citizenship.  Fitting with the 
overall aims of the dissertation, the discussion in this chapter will be particularly attuned 
to religious sources of civic difference.  Over the course of the chapters that follow, I will 
build a progressive explanation of sociological reasons for why youth differ in the ways I 
observe here, which in certain cases will involve the influence of religion. 
 
Two Young Men 
At 6’3”, eighteen year old Mike13 is a tall fellow.  Mike is mixed race, with a light 
brown complexion.  When I first walked into Ruach Ministries, a predominantly black 
church in Brixton with Jamaican leadership, I almost immediately noticed Mike’s 
towering presence.  We stood in the crowded atrium as we waited for the doors of the 
youth service to open.  With an unhesitant smile, Mike reached out his hand to introduce 
himself.  I soon learned that he is half Jamaican and half Greek Cypriot.  It was a 
fortunate coincidence – I had lived in Cyprus myself as a child.  We started to talk about 
                                                 
13All of the names of youth in this chapter have been changed to protect their anonymity. 
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the beaches of Cyprus and the warmer weather there (“Seems a million miles from 
London!”).  As the doors opened, we found seats together in the youth service. 
My interview recruitment often worked in this way.  I would visit a religious 
service to observe and learn from it, meet someone informally, and then arrange an 
interview to take place afterwards.  In this case, after the youth service Mike and I went 
across the street to have our conversation over a meal at a Jamaican restaurant.  We both 
ordered the spicy jerk chicken and settled into a relaxed interview that would last almost 
two hours.   
Mike is a charming person who describes himself as a bit shy, but comes across 
with natural confidence and sincerity.  He thinks of himself as mixed race: “I don’t really 
‘act black’ like black people do or ‘act white’ like white people do.  I’m definitely mixed 
race.  And people can tell that” he said.  “I’m interested in other people’s cultures, and I 
think that really comes by being mixed race.”  His Jamaican and Greek Cypriot sides are 
both significant to him, mainly through the influence of his parents.  He can see 
something of both sides of his family in his personality.  Mike thinks of himself, racially, 
as both black and as white.  But black is more prominent “because in this country, people 
cast you as black.”   
However, Mike’s first and foremost identity is as a Christian.  He says this means 
“having a personal relationship with God, in Jesus.”  In fact, Mike had gone through 
major changes in his faith in the year before our interview.  A friend had invited him to 
the Ruach Ministries youth service.  Since attending Ruach and regularly reading the 
Bible for himself, Mike had grown much more serious about his faith.  He now goes to 
the Ruach youth service each week and says that the preaching gives him something to 
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change or apply to his life “every single time.”  He spoke with amazement at the spiritual 
atmosphere of the youth service: “I have felt the power of God more in that place than 
anywhere else.” 
Mike is very thoughtful and articulate when talking about religious, ethnic, and 
racial identities.  I found it most interesting, however, to talk about the aspect of his 
identity he was least passionate about – his national identification with Britain. Mike 
does not think of himself as British.  “I’m not going to say I’m British,” he told me, “I’m 
not a very patriotic person.”  I knew that Mike was born in Britain, that he grew up in 
London, and that he has British citizenship.  So I asked what this citizenship means to 
him: “Not much,” he told me, “Only the fact that I live here.”  Mike went on to explain 
that if he lived in the U.S. he might think of himself as an American.  “But British culture 
is a weird one.”  
Mike did choose to describe himself as “English” (rather than British).  He ranked 
this in last place out of nine components of his personal identity.14  In explaining why 
Englishness was relatively low in his affections, Mike told me:  
As I said, I’m not very patriotic.  I support England, I guess, in the soccer15 and 
stuff like that.  But I’m not very English.  I’m not a very English person.  I see 
what English people do in general.  They go out to the pub and stuff.  I don’t 
really do that.  There is definitely like a distinct polar opposite between what I’m 
influenced by in this top part [the core of my identity] and being English. 
 
                                                 
14I will describe the identity ranking portion of the interviews in depth in Chapter 4.  
Mike’s own choices to describe his identity, beginning with his highest ranked, were: 
Christian, Mixed Race, Londoner, Greek Cypriot, Jamaican, Black, White, Caribbean, 
West Indian, and English. 
 
15Mike used the word “soccer” rather than the usual British word “football,” almost 
certainly because he was speaking to an American interviewer. 
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At times during the interview, Mike seemed to feel indifferent towards Britishness and 
Englishness.  At other points – as seen here – he distanced himself significantly from the 
cultural content of these identities, speaking of them as the “distinct polar opposite” to 
how he understands himself. 
Some of the same themes emerged in my interview with Hamid, a twenty-two 
year-old Bangladeshi.  I first met him on the Queen Mary University campus.16  Hamid 
has a thin build, a gentle face, and a very easy smile.  He is quite intentional about his 
Muslim appearance.  He keeps a beard and wears a prayer cap, attempting to dress 
“Islamically.”  Hamid arrived at the campus by bike.  Seeing him other times in the 
subsequent months, I would learn that Hamid always keeps his bike close at hand.  He 
likes to be ready to cycle in response to meetings, events, and text messages sent from 
friends all around London. 
We met for our interview in late December, the time of year in England when 
darkness falls early.  Hamid and I chose to talk at the Queen Mary University physics 
building because it was near the campus prayer room.  The early darkness meant that the 
maghrib and isha’a prayers came very near each other.17  We went first to the prayer 
room where Hamid and five of his fellow students joined together in the maghrib prayer.  
He and I then walked to the Physics building to begin recording our interview.  About 
                                                 
16My usual practice in this dissertation is to anonymize locations such as universities.  I 
include Queen Mary University by name in this chapter because I will refer to a “prayer 
room controversy” there, which is well known. 
 
17Maghrib and isha’a prayers are the fourth and fifth in the day.  These prayers are 
determined by sunset and by nightfall, meaning that they fluctuate with time of year.  For 
male Muslims, prayers are ideally performed together in congregation. 
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halfway through the conversation, we took a brief intermission to allow Hamid to leave 
for the isha’a prayer, returning later to finish the interview. 
Hamid, like Mike, thinks of faith as an integral part of his life.  He told me that 
“Islam is a complete way of life, and being Muslim is something that I really hold onto 
daily.”   Also much like Mike, Hamid went through a significant religious change during 
his young adult years.  He says that as a teenager he constantly got into trouble and was 
expelled from school.  “I used to get away with murder,” he told me – and then quickly 
added: “I don’t mean [murder] literally!  You know how the media can twist things.”   As 
he said this to me he laughed.  Yet his comment resonated in my mind, as it was a gut 
reaction from someone who knows media distortion to be a commonplace danger for 
those of his faith. 
Hamid says his life began to turn around when he listened to a tape from black 
American convert Sheikh Khalid Yasin18 about the purpose of life.  He reflected on the 
preacher’s message and then “it was during Ramadan that I really started to get rid of 
some bad habits and take Islam more seriously.” 
Hamid had an interesting way of thinking about how Britishness and Islam fit 
together in his identity.  He says he is inspired to “be like a bee and to take in the good 
from all the flowers” (see Surah 16 of the Qur’an).  By this he means that he can take the 
best of both worlds.  Hamid says that being British is a good thing for him “because I’m 
                                                 
18Sheikh Khalid Yasin is often considered a radical sheikh in Britain due to his preaching 
on particular topics relating to non-Muslims and to homosexuality.  Yet Hamid should 
not necessarily be viewed as guilty by association from listening to this sheikh.  A large 
number of the Muslim youth I interviewed respect figures such as Sayyid Qutb and 
Maulana Mawdudi – major ideologues of Islamism – for their pious writings.  Yet these 
youth would not necessarily be willing to take forward the full implications of these 
intellectuals’ programs of thought.  In this case, it was the religious revivalist message of 
Sheikh Khalid Yasin that struck a chord with Hamid. 
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allowed to pray, I’m allowed to keep my beard, and at the same time I’m allowed to do 
certain things that I probably wouldn’t have the chance to do otherwise.”  Yet he also 
sees some aspects of British culture that are in conflict with his own views and actions.  
“British culture and Muslim culture are very different in a lot of aspects,” he told me.  
The differences that came to his mind were “drinking alcohol… the dress sense, and 
some of the foreign policy.”  Although he was very generous and diplomatic in our 
conversation, it was clear that Hamid also saw certain aspects of British culture as the 
“distinct polar opposite” (in Mike’s phrase) of his own Islamic way of life. 
Hamid, like Mike, was willing to identify himself as English (in addition to 
British).  Yet in this case he was not referring to symbols particular to the English nation, 
such as the national football team.  When Hamid identifies with the English he simply 
means the English language.  He told me: “[I relate to] English because I speak the 
English language most of the time.  English is my first language.  I actually speak more 
fluently in English than I am in Bengali, having been born here.  So yes, English, in the 
books I read.  Everything’s, like, English.”  Elsewhere in the interview Hamid contrasted 
his own native English with the struggles his parents have with the language.  His identity 
as an English speaker is something in which he takes pride. 
We have established that cultural identification with England or Britain was 
mixed at best for Hamid and Mike.  Hamid values British legal freedoms and 
communicating in the English language.  Mike supports England in football.  But neither 
of them, it seems, articulate values, cultural traits, or a history that would serve as a 
“common glue,” in Gordon Brown’s sense of the term.  In fact there are cultural or value-
laden aspects of Britain that both young men find personally objectionable – such as 
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foreign policy (for Hamid) and pub going (for Mike).  At most, a cultural Britishness or 
Englishness can be accepted in a piecemeal fashion, just as a bee would pick and choose 
the best pollen from a variety of flowers. 
If Mike and Hamid’s engagement with cultural Britishness as an identity is a bit 
lukewarm, then the views they express on political participation in Britain are icy cold.  
When we reached the section of our interview about politics, Hamid told me several 
times that he does not trust British politicians, nor does he think or act very politically 
himself.  “I find [politics] a dirty game.  The amount of lies, the amount of spin, the 
amount of stuff that happens in politics – it’s not something I enjoy” he said.  Later he 
expressed this view in more vivid terms: “There’s not a political bone in my body.”  
Hamid believes that his distaste for politics is characteristic of Muslims in general: 
“Muslims tend to be apathetic when it comes to politics,” he said.  Similarly, Mike has a 
negative stance on British politics.  He thinks that any potential he has for political 
involvement “doesn’t make that much of a difference.”   
One possible interpretation of Mike and Hamid’s words is that they demonstrate a 
generalized apathy – an apathy inclusive of national identity, political participation, and 
perhaps also political literacy.  After all, Hamid’s own self-diagnosis is that he is 
“apathetic when it comes to politics.”  I will now further explain the possibility that 
British second generation youth are apathetic, along with two of the other possibilities 
available in the current academic literature. 
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Perspectives on British Youth Civic Engagement 
It is commonly acknowledged that, at least on some dimensions, a large 
proportion of British youth today are disengaged from civic matters.  Difficulties and 
disagreements arise when attempting to specify which dimensions are problems, why 
these are problems, and how youth disengagement should actually be understood.  Is it 
apathy, alienation, or atomism? 
If voting in government elections is considered the “bread and butter” of British 
political participation, as it traditionally has been, then evidence suggests that British 
youth have an ascetic political diet.  The overall adult turnout for the 1997 British 
national elections had reached a post-war low, at 77 percent.  Yet participation from the 
segment of youth (age 18 to 24) in that election was far lower, at 55 percent.  Youth 
participation then took a further nosedive in the 2001 election, to 39 percent.  The youth 
turnout continued to dip in 2005, to 37 percent, even though the overall adult figures for 
election turnout were making a modest upturn.  At the time of writing, the next general 
election has been scheduled by Prime Minister Gordon Brown for May 6, 2010.  There is 
currently little optimism about seeing renewal in the youth vote. 
The low election turnout results for youth are in some cases compounded for 
ethnic minority youth.  Several studies have found that people of black African and 
Caribbean origin have the lowest election turnouts in Britain (Purdam et. al. 2002; Saggar 
1998; Anwar 1998a), as well as the lowest rates of voter registration (Saggar 1998).  
Young people are less likely to be registered or vote than other adults.  The youthful age 
profile of black ethnic minorities in Britain thus produces a particularly low election 
turnout in this population segment (Purdam et. al. 2002).   
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Yet the national election studies listed from Purdam et. al., Saggar, and Anwar 
have actually found relatively robust electoral involvement from South Asians in Britain.  
In all of these studies, Indians had the highest rates of voter participation among all 
groups in Britain, including white British.  Although Bangladeshis and Pakistanis did not 
have such high rates, their participation did not appear to be as troubling as those of 
Africans and Caribbeans.  The results of adult electoral participation from Saggar (1998), 
for example, were Indians 82.4 percent, whites 78.7 percent, Pakistanis 75.6 percent, 
Bangladeshis 73.9 percent, black Caribbeans 68.7 percent, and black Africans 64.4 
percent. 
Even if these results bolster confidence in South Asian political participation, 
other research and policy work has raised concerns about the citizenship practices of 
Muslim South Asians in particular.  The Cantle Report (2001) on the riots in Northern 
English industrial towns questioned whether South Asian Muslims have been leading 
“parallel lives” that separate them from British civic life.  The Commission for 
Community Cohesion, created to respond to these issues, has produced several reports 
over the past decade.  These reports raise concerns about South Asian Muslim views and 
practices of citizenship.  For example: 
Muslim communities appear to have low levels of civic participation and 
volunteering, mixed attitudes towards integration and (fairly small) minorities who 
do not feel loyal or patriotic towards Britain... but this may reflect demographic 
rather than faith-specific factors.  (Commission 2004; quoted in Bail, forthcoming) 
 
If this observation is correct, then British Muslims in the aggregate can be expected to 
score poorly on all three of the dimensions of civic engagement that I measure in this 
study –national identification, political literacy, and political participation. 
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 Taking youth civic disengagement in Britain as a problem, several possible 
descriptions of the situation have been offered.  The most common among politicians and 
media in Britain is the view that youth are apathetic towards politics.  Generalized youth 
apathy is the presumtion in Bernard Crick’s spearheading of the ideas of political literacy, 
active citizenship, and civic education.  Crick has sought to intervene in the socialization 
of youth through these initiatives, deterring them from apathetic tendencies.  Pirie and 
Worcester (1998) also believe that British youth are apathetic, and understand this in 
generational terms, arguing that Millenials are the first “apolitical generation.”  Pippa 
Norris characterizes the 2001 election turnout as an “apathetic landslide” (2001).  She 
does not necessarily see apathy as a problem inherent to age or to a certain generation.  
The poor voter turnout was “less a dramatic crisis of British democracy, nor widespread 
public cynicism, and more the inevitable consequence of a media which, during the run-
up to the 2001 election, focussed on the election result being a ‘foregone conclusion.’” 
 Youth political apathy might have any of various causes, such as negative media 
influence, age, or generation.  Regardless of its causes, there are logical manifestations of 
apathy that one should expect to observe.  The hypothesis of youth apathy is that youth 
will show low levels of national identity, low levels of political literacy and interest, and 
low levels of actual practices of political participation.  Youth who are truly apathetic are 
disengaged from and disinterested in citizenship at all levels. 
Researchers David Marsh, Therese O’Toole, and Su Jones (2007; 2003) have 
criticized the youth apathy perspective, however.  They conducted their own inductive 
study of how British young people, age 16 to 25, define the political.  Based on open-
ended focus groups and interviews, they conclude that youth consider a very broad set of 
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actions and themes to be political, with many of these themes not well captured by 
traditional ballot-box politics.  In their initial study and subsequent ones (e.g., O’Toole 
and Gale 2009), researchers from this team have argued that youth do have opinions 
about government policies, yet at the same time do not believe their voices will be taken 
seriously.  Far from being apathetic, youth are increasingly alienated from British 
political institutions and processes.  In this youth alienation perspective, the onus is 
placed on politicians and policy makers to listen more closely to youth and to re-
enfranchise them, because “political literacy cuts both ways” (O’Toole, Marsh, and Jones 
2003).  The causal mechanisms for disengagement are most often sited in institutions, 
historic processes, and the political system, rather than in the content of youth culture or 
the character of young people themselves (Griffin 2005).  Academic consensus in Britain 
has moved towards the alienation perspective on the problem of youth civic engagement, 
with several key studies arguing along similar lines (e.g., Henn et. al. 2002; Sloam 2007; 
Purdam et. al. 2002; Fahmy 2005).  Government policymakers are also increasingly 
taking this view.  The Power Inquiry report (2006), lead-authored by Baroness Helena 
Kennedy, declares that distrust of politicians and alienation from the political process are 
the key issues in Britain and that there is simply a “myth of apathy.” 
If youth are alienated from conventional politics, then they will not necessarily 
have low levels of national identification or of political literacy.  Instead, a lack of faith in 
the political system and political actors will lead to low levels of political participation 
regardless of their political literacy and identity.  In other words, the hypothesis of youth 
alienation predicts low political participation, but does not have specific predictions of 
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the other two dimensions of civic engagement.  This hypothesis, along with others, is 
listed in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1: Hypotheses of Youth Civic Engagement 
 National Identity Political Literacy Political Participation 
Apathy Low Low Low 
Alienation Any level Any level Low 
Atomism Any level Any level Any level; Primarily 
individualistic practices  
 
 
A third and final perspective on youth civic engagement can be found in Pattie, 
Seyd, and Whiteley’s book Citizenship in Britain: Values, Participation and Democracy 
(2004).  This book is based on the Citizen Audit, a large nationally representative survey 
of Great Britain carried out in two waves, one before and one after the 2001 general 
election.  The co-authors studied British citizens of all adult ages (not only young adults).  
Like other researchers, they find relatively low levels of participation in the 18 to 25 age 
demographic.   
Pattie and colleagues’ most intriguing argument for the present discussion is that 
British citizens have become more atomized in their engagement with politics over the 
past few decades.  They measure 17 civic behaviors, including voting and campaign 
activities, along with less ‘conventional’ forms of politics such as boycotting products or 
organizing a group of “like minded people” around a common cause.  Their list of 17 
civic behaviors clusters into three categories: communal, individual, and communicative.  
Pattie and co-authors state in the conclusion that: “This book could have been entitled 
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‘The Atomised Citizen’ since this reflects many of the trends we are observing in 
contemporary Britain.  The rise of individualistic forms of participation at the expense of 
collectivistic forms characterises this process.”  For example, the authors note the rising 
popularity of “cheque-book participation” through boycotting products, purchasing 
products, and financially supporting charities with good brand recognition, such as 
Oxfam or Christian Aid.  This style of participation, based on individual ethics and 
convenience, contrasts with more collective participatory actions in labor unions or 
political parties, which have seen sharp declines in membership in Britain.   
Although Pattie and colleagues’ observations about the atomized citizen are 
meant to apply to British adults as a whole, they may have particular relevance to youth.  
Their observations mirror other work that emphasizes the rise of a life politics that 
contrasts with emancipatory politics (Giddens 1991), the deepening of contemporary 
ethics of authenticity in political and life choices (Taylor 1992), and the greater 
individualization of young people’s connections with the state, especially in terms of the 
labor market (MacDonald 1997).19 
If youth are indeed atomized in their civic engagement, we should not necessarily 
expect low levels of engagement, but rather a particular pattern in engagement styles.  
The hypothesis of youth atomism posits that youth will primarily participate in individual-
level activities, while their engagement in collective forms of participation will be 
minimal. 
 
                                                 
19See Sloam (2007) for a focused and concise review of these potential trends among 
young citizens. 
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Data and Measures 
 My research sample is composed of a total of 60 young people, 24 of whom are 
Jamaican and 36 of whom are Bangladeshi.  I sampled about one-third of these youth in 
religious institutions and two thirds from systematic recruiting in secular contexts, as 
explained in the Introduction.  Because I used religious institutions for some of my 
recruiting, the sample that results has a greater proportion of religiously active youth than 
could be expected in the Bangladeshi and Jamaican youth populations overall.  Even 
though this is the case, the youth from the secular contexts subsample (16 Jamaicans, 21 
Bangladeshis) should approximate a representative picture of the overall populations.  
Sometimes in my analysis that follows I will refer to the complete sample (from both 
religious institutions and streets) and sometimes to the systematic sample of youth that I 
systematically recruited from varied secular contexts.  
 My main goal in analysis is to determine whether religion has an influence on 
civic engagement and, if so, to specify which ways it does.  To determine this, I compare 
youth who have “high religiosity” with those who do not.  I am interested in whether 
there are any causal relationships – if being religious (or becoming religious) tends to 
cause youth to have different citizenship outcomes than the youth who are not religious.  
The logic here is simple: Youth will most often develop their levels of religiosity before 
they express themselves as citizens, because religious development typically progresses 
throughout childhood and adolescence, while the practice of citizenship develops most 
significantly after reaching legal voting age (age 18 in Britain).  Therefore if relationships 
between religiosity and citizenship are found, they are very likely to work in the direction 
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of religiosity causally influencing civic engagement.20  I will now explain, in turn, how I 
measured religiosity and the three component parts of civic engagement. 
 Religiosity: My measurement of religiosity is important to the way that I conceive 
and carry out the analysis.  I attempted to define high religiosity in the same way that my 
youth interviewees did.  To do this, I needed to discern the symbolic boundaries in my 
two fieldwork sites that separate religious people from others.  This distinction was 
extremely easy to make among the Bangladeshi Muslim youth of Spitalfields and 
Whitechapel.  When youth admitted to me that they were not very religious, they almost 
always used the term “not practicing.”  The main standard of Muslim practice in the East 
End (virtually unanimous among my interviewees) is praying five times a day.  Those 
who did not pray five times a day knew that they were on the deficient side of an 
acknowledged common standard among local Muslims. 
 Discerning the boundary that marks high religiosity among Jamaicans was 
considerably more difficult.  Some youth I interviewed could speak in powerful flights of 
Christian oratory, yet had not been to church in a long while.  Others attended religious 
services every week, but had very little to say about religious matters.  I settled on weekly 
attendance as the standard for high religiosity among Jamaican youth.  I did so because 1) 
the measurement of this is considerably clearer than making gradations of theology or of 
                                                 
20The U.S. nationally representative National Study of Youth and Religion finds a strong 
level of continuity in religion from parents to teenage children (Smith and Denton 2006).  
It in turn finds substantial continuity from teenage years into the emerging adulthood 
years of 18 to 25 I am studying here (Smith and Snell 2009).  Religious tastes are usually 
established early, though religious practice may fall off to some degree in teenage years.  
The age of political consciousness, in contrast, begins around the time youth are able to 
vote (age 18 in Britain) and develops most significantly through the emerging adult years.  
The sequence of religious development followed by political development is not static 
nor is it universal, but it is reasonable to expect that youth religious development will 
more often shape youth civic development, rather than the other way around.  
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the importance of faith and 2) as a measure of religious practice, it is more comparable 
with the Muslim five daily prayer standard.  One might argue that attendance once per 
week is hardly as much evidence of high religiosity as five daily prayers.  However, 
because religious norms are not as strong in Brixton as they are in the East End, regular 
church attendance is a significant and relatively demanding step.  For most of the 
Jamaican youth attendees I interviewed, weekly attendance meant a substantial time 
commitment each weekend in church activities that might, for example, include a 
morning service, community lunch, and then a later youth service.  
 After defining high religiosity as five daily prayers for Bangladeshi Muslims and 
weekly church attendance for Jamaican Christians, I was able to classify the complete 
sample of youth as high, medium, or low religiosity.  In total, the proportion of high 
religiosity to medium/low religiosity was about the same for Jamaicans (14 to 10) as it 
was for Bangladeshis (21 to 15).  Therefore the complete (non-representative) sample had 
enough cases for a viable qualitative analysis.21 
 As described in the beginning of this chapter, I conceptualize civic engagement as 
having three component parts: civic identity, political literacy, and political participation.  
I measured these three components and I separately compare high religiosity youth and 
other youth across all three. 
                                                 
21Low religiosity youth were those who showed little or no interest in matters of religion.  
These ranged from atheists and agnostics (3 Jamaicans) to those who may have some 
cultural or family connection to religion but are not practicing it now (3 Jamaicans, 1 
Bangladeshi).  Medium religiosity was the residual category between low and high – all 
youth who pray sometimes, attend church sometimes, and talk with some connection to 
faith, but do not show the consistency to be classified as high religiosity (4 Jamaicans, 14 
Bangladeshis).  
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Civic Identity: This component of youth citizenship was the most qualitative and 
subjective.  I used two sections of the interview to investigate the civic identities of 
youth.  The first was an identity section in which I had youth rank and compare various 
components of their identities.  The second was a section at the end of the interview when 
I asked all youth “What does British citizenship mean to you?”  In this chapter I will only 
report the essentials of the analysis of these components of civic identity, expanding 
considerably on the analysis in Chapter Four.   
 
Table 2.2: Political Literacy Measure 
From Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley (2004) 
 
 
Political Quiz (True or False) 
 
1. The minimum voting age is 21. 
 
2. Britain has separate elections for European parliament and British parliament. 
 
3. The number of members of parliament is about 100. 
 
4. Britain’s electoral system for Westminster is based on proportional representation. 
 
5. No one may stand for parliament unless they pay a deposit. 
 
6. The House of Lords has equal powers to the House of Commons. 
 
7. The European Union (The E.U.) is composed of 15 states. 
  
 
 
 Political Literacy: To measure political literacy, I replicated an authoritative 
measure from Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley (2004) in their Citizen Audit.  Their measure is 
a seven-question true-false quiz on British politics, shown in Table 2.2.  All of the 
answers on the quiz have remained consistent since it was devised by Pattie and his 
colleagues, except for question 7, which states “There are 15 countries in the European 
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Union” (True or False).  The answer to this question was True at the time that Pattie and 
colleagues asked.  But due to accession of several countries to the EU including 
Romania, Latvia, and Bulgaria, the question was False when I interviewed youth in 2008-
2009.22 
Political Participation:  I also replicated Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley’s (2004) 
measurement of political participation.  They include 17 questions on different ways in 
which citizens might get involved, shown in Table 2.3.  These questions can be grouped 
into three main clusters of civic actions: Contact (1 to 5), Collective (8, 9, 14, 16, 17), 
and Individual (the remaining questions). 
I made one change to the usage of Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley’s questions on civic 
engagement.  They had prefaced the questions with the statement: “Which of these have 
you done to influence rules, laws, or policies in the last 12 months?”  This introductory 
question could be helpful for emphasising only actions that are motivated by a 
civic/political purpose.  Unfortunately, some of my pilot interviewees found this 
language confusing.  I made the decision in these early interviews to de-emphasise the 
starting text.  I would still read it to my interviewees, but I would say “It is okay to 
include any time you have done this in the last twelve months.”  Because I asked a more 
generous and open-ended version of this question, it should be expected that the resulting 
levels of civic engagement will be inflated in comparison to the Pattie, Seyd, and 
                                                 
22This is a valid question, of course, both when asked by Pattie and colleagues and when I 
asked it.  However, if a respondent did not know the answer, the logic of guessing an 
answer may be somewhat different in both cases.  It might seem better to guess ‘False’ 
because the question asks about an exact number of nations – this would lead to being 
incorrect in Pattie and colleagues’ research, but correct in mine.  In other words, the 
chances of guessing correctly on question 7 appear to have increased in my research, 
meaning that the comparability of results for question 7 should be treated with some 
caution. 
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Whiteley levels.  However, I maintain that because of the potential confusion of their 
introductory question, Pattie and co-authors’ respondents likely underestimated their own 
involvement in actions that are civic or political. 
 
Table 2.3: Political Participation Measures 
From Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley (2004) 
 
 
During the last 12 months have you done any of the following to influence rules, laws, or 
policies? 
 
1. Contacted a politician (for example, a member of parliament or a local councillor) 
 
2. Contacted an organisation (for example, Shelter or Oxfam) 
 
3. Contacted a public official (for example, a person from housing or social security 
offices) 
 
4. Contacted the media 
 
5. Contacted a solicitor or judicial body 
 
6. Worn or displayed a campaign badge or sticker 
 
7. Signed a petition 
 
8. Taken part in a public demonstration 
 
9. Taken part in a strike 
 
10. Boycotted products 
 
11. Bought certain products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons 
 
12. Donated money to an organisation 
 
13. Raised funds for an organisation 
 
14. Attended a political meeting or rally 
 
15. Voted in a local government election 
 
16. Participated in illegal protest activities 
 
17. Formed a group of like minded people 
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Results 
 Civic Identity: When I asked second generation youth about being British or about 
what their British citizenship means to them, the responses were quite consistent.  By far 
the most common response to these questions was “I was born here” – locating Britain as 
the place of birth and thus justification for membership in British society.  Very often, 
youth would also speak of British citizenship as a source of legal rights or life 
opportunities.  Rare was the young person who spoke of Britain as a source of their 
cultural identity or common history.  The responses of second generation youth to these 
questions of civic identity tend to resemble those of Mike and Hamid, as they contain a 
certain ambivalence to the cultural and political markers associated with Britishness and 
with the British state.  I will examine these issues of loyalty and identity in significant 
depth in Chapter Four. 
Political Literacy: Are second generation youth knowledgeable and articulate 
citizens?  Table 2.4 shows how well second generation youth scored on each question 
and in total on the seven question political knowledge quiz.  The results are given for 
youth as a whole and are broken down by ethnicity, and then by religiosity within 
ethnicity.  As one can see from the table, second generation youth in my sample did 
remarkably well compared with citizens in Britain at large.  The youth outscored the 
average British citizen on most of the questions and overall, demonstrating a level of 
political knowledge that is close to the group Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley highlighted as 
most politically knowledgeable in Britain: high income middle aged men who are highly 
educated and in professional or managerial positions.  Nearly one-half of the youth in the 
complete sample for which I have full results (26 of 56) would be considered “politically 
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knowledgeable” by Pattie and colleagues because they answered at least 5 questions 
correctly. 
 
Table 2.4: Jamaican and Bangladeshi Youth Political Literacy, by Religiosity 
  
British 
National 
Sample 
  
 
2nd-Gen.  
Youth 
Average 
 
Jamaican 
Low/Med 
Religiosity 
 
Jamaican 
High 
Religiosity 
 
Bangladeshi 
Low/Med 
Religiosity 
 
Bangladeshi 
High 
Religiosity 
 % correct % correct % correct % correct % correct % correct 
 
Minimum British voting Age 
is 21?  FALSE 
  
 
91 
 
94.5 
 
67 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
British and EU parliament 
elections are separate?  TRUE 
  
75 66 78 75 47 79 
Number of Members of 
Parliament is ~100?  FALSE 
  
60 72 67 73 
 
85 65 
Natl. elections by proportional 
representation?  FALSE 
  
43 47 11 54 
 
69 45 
Must pay deposit to stand for 
parliament?  TRUE 
  
59 27 22 36 31 20 
Equal powers for House of 
Lords and Commons?  FALSE 
  
62 72 56 62 62 95 
EU is composed of 15 States?  
FALSE 
  
35 70 67 57 85 70 
Average Correct (out of 7) 
  
 4.29 3.67 4.51 4.69 4.69 
 
 
 Why do these second generation youth perform so well in a quiz of political 
knowledge?  One overall factor may simply be their proximity to the British Government, 
due to living in London.  News on political issues may seem directly relevant, or more 
understandable, because Westminster is not far away.  Another factor may simply be age 
and education.  These youth were closer in age to a time when they learned political facts 
in school, making these easier to remember than they would be for many older adults.  
Some of the 18 to 25 year olds I interviewed had taken A-Level exams or university 
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courses in politics, and unsurprisingly these young people usually scored well on the 
political knowledge test. 
There is reason to treat these results with caution.  The sample size of youth is 
small and thus cannot be seen as a wholly reliable indicator of political knowledge.  
However, taking this objection seriously, it is nonetheless clear that second generation 
youth score rather well in terms of political literacy. 
 Table 2.4 breaks down youth into subgroups.  Overall Bangladeshis score better 
on the political quiz than Jamaicans, though not remarkably so.  To understand the basis 
of this ethnic difference, we should first determine if there are religious effects. 
As youth have been broken down further into categories of religiosity, we can see 
that, for Bangladeshis, religiosity appears to have absolutely no relationship with political 
knowledge.  Someone who prays five times a day has no more likelihood of being 
knowledgeable in politics than someone who does not.  In contrast, for Jamaicans high 
religiosity does seem to match with higher levels of political knowledge.   
 There are at least two possible explanations for this difference.  First, maybe there 
is something different in terms of the religious environment of church in comparison to a 
mosque that boosts political knowledge – perhaps a greater emphasis on politics in 
sermons, for example.  Or, to take this in the opposite way, there may be influences with 
a greater power to disengage youth from political knowledge if they spend time on the 
streets of Brixton and away from religious institutions.  Levels of violent crime and drug 
use are higher in Brixton than in the East End, for example.   
 A second explanation, which I find more compelling in this case, is that church 
attendance for Jamaicans is partly a proxy for social class.  The young people that I met 
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at Ruach Ministries, such as Mike, were most often either middle class or had middle 
class aspirations.  The Jamaican youth I recruited from the streets tended to be from 
lower income and class backgrounds.  The class disparity can partly be explained in this 
way: The well-known churches of Brixton (e.g., Ruach Ministries and Brixton Seventh 
Day Adventist) attract attendees from throughout London, who come for the preaching or 
for the connection with a larger Jamaican or black community.  While most Jamaicans 
living in Brixton have lower incomes and social class, a much greater proportion of the 
Jamaicans in church on a Sunday are of relatively high class and income.  Social class 
can be highly related to political knowledge.  In the case of these young people, religion 
may simply be a proxy for class.23 
 The relationship of religion and class in the East End is not the same as it is in 
Brixton.  The Bangladeshi youth I came to know through interviews were, almost without 
exception, from families that are considered poor by UK standards.  The typical 
Bangladeshi youth I met in an East End mosque was local and relatively poor; the typical 
Jamaican youth I met in a Brixton church was middle class and not local.  The class 
effect, then, was not present in Bangladeshi youth.  Instead, the overall strong scores for 
Bangladeshi youth on political knowledge may have something to do with the civic 
culture of the East End.  It is an issue we will examine more in the pages ahead.   
In summary, second generation youth as a whole are not disengaged from news 
and information on government.  They have relatively high levels of political knowledge, 
which may in part be the result of proximity to Westminster, student age, or in some 
                                                 
23This is not to say that there is no religious effect present.  For example, religious 
services may help to shape working class youth to have middle class aspirations, due to 
the peers they encounter there or the messages of hope and life success that some 
churches propagate. 
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cases social class.  Regardless, there is no clear indication that religion or religiosity has a 
substantial role in political knowledge, except perhaps as a mediator of some other 
primary cause. 
Political Participation:  Thus far, we have seen that London second generation 
youth have low levels of identification with Britain, but that their levels of political 
knowledge about the nation are near those of the average citizen, if not higher.  The 
moderate to high level of political knowledge among youth is a hopeful sign. 
 Yet with political participation, we begin to see a different story.  Results of 
political participation are shown in Table 2.5.  The table compares Jamaican and 
Bangladeshi youth, and breaks them down by religiosity.  There is also a comparison to 
the British population overall.  
As will be clear from a quick glance at the table, the levels of political 
participation among Bangladeshi second generation youth are consistently higher than 
those of Jamaican youth.  There could be many possible explanations for this disparity.  
Because this dissertation focuses on religious explanations, I will primarily address the 
possibilities of religious causes in this chapter.  Further into the dissertation I will address 
the broader set of possibilities for difference between the populations. 
First, we should look at a key civic indicator in any democratic nation: Voting.  A 
full 73.8 percent of the British population in the Citizen Audit Survey said that they had 
voted in a local government election within the past year (in their case this was 2001).  
Second generation youth do not compare well to this quite high national figure.  About 
51.6 percent of Bangladeshi youth who were of eligible age claimed to have voted in a 
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local election in the last year.  Yet, remarkably, only 9.1 percent of eligible age Jamaican 
youth also claimed to have voted. 
 
Table 2.5: Jamaican and Bangladeshi Youth Political Participation, by Religiosity 
  British Natl. 
Sample, 
restricted* 
  
 
Jamaican 
Low/Med 
Religiosity 
 
Jamaican 
High 
Religiosity 
 
Bangladeshi 
Low/Med 
Religiosity 
 
Bangladeshi 
High 
Religiosity 
 % yes % yes % yes % yes % yes 
Individual      
Voted in Local Gov Election 74 0 18 57 47 
Signed Petition 47 55 25 64 80 
Campaign Badge or Sticker 24 22 8 31 58 
Donated Money to an Org. 64 55 77 77 100 
Raised Funds for an Org. 30 22 36 31 74 
Boycotted Certain Products 34 11 36 31 63 
Bought Certain Products 33 33 15 31 53 
      
Contact      
Contacted a Politician 17 22 8 31 42 
Contacted an Organization 12 11 39 39 68 
Contacted a Public Official 31 33 15 85 68 
Contacted the Media 9 11 15 31 53 
Contacted Legal 
Professional 
20 22 0 39 21 
      
Collective      
In a Public Demonstration 4 22 38 21 15 
In a Strike 3 0 0 8 0 
In a Political Meeting/Rally 6 0 17 0 28 
Protested Illegally 2 0 0 0 0 
Formed Like-minded Group 5 22 9 15 16 
      
N (# of respondents) ** 3120 9 14 13 20 
Note: Differences of 20 points or more are shown in bold underline. 
 
 
The low percentages of voting among the youth I interviewed are further 
accentuated because, for most youth interviewees, the past 12 months had included a 
significant and very high profile election: The election of the Mayor of London.  The 
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Mayor of London is the most powerful directly elected figure in Britain (because the 
Prime Minister is selected through an indirect democratic process).24  The Mayor of 
London election in April 2008 looked to be a tight race between Labour incumbent Ken 
Livingstone and Conservative Boris Johnson (who was the eventual winner of the 
election).  In fact, I spoke with the Youth Pastor of Ruach Ministries, Mark Liburd, at 
length about the Mayor of London election in our interview.  In a youth service that I 
attended, I heard Pastor Mark encourage his young people to vote in the election, as he 
talked about the platforms of the major candidates succinctly without showing favoritism.  
Yet Pastor Mark’s appeal for voting did not have observable results – none of the six 
youth I interviewed from his congregation had voted in the Mayoral election.  I happened 
to schedule my interview with one of these youth, Rhona, for the evening of the actual 
day of the election.  Rhona is one of the young leaders of the congregation, and was 
always connecting with people or helping run the youth service at Ruach when I saw her 
there.  I asked if she had been able to vote.   “No,” she said, a bit embarrassed, “because 
I’ve been at college the whole day and I couldn’t get out.”  She was not really sure where 
to go to vote, “Where is it though?” – unaware that her designated polling location is in 
the ward in which she lives.  
From talking with other non-voting youth about why they did not vote, the 
reasons of being busy, finding voting inconvenient, or not having enough information 
were often mentioned.  As such, the results confirm the earlier work of Purdam et. al. 
                                                 
24The Prime Minister is not directly elected.  Rather, Members of Parliament (MPs) are 
elected by their constituencies, usually on the basis of the party they represent.  The party 
which achieves the majority MPs is then able to form the government and place its party 
leader as Prime Minister.  In the event that no single party achieves a majority, a coalition 
government may be formed from parties that together amount to a majority, or a new 
election may be called. 
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(2002), who found inconvenience to be a major reason for missing an election.  Other 
reasons I heard from interviewees for not voting included not being interested in politics 
or not thinking that voting makes a difference.  These views were somewhat more 
widespread among Jamaican youth than Bangladeshis, a likely contribution to the large 
differential in voting numbers.  I found it interesting, though, in the specific case of 
Rhona, that the Youth Pastor’s example and encouragement to vote had not been enough 
to motivate a young leader in his congregation.  Voting rates are clearly a problem for 
Jamaican youth in Brixton.  It seems that, if churches are trying to encourage this element 
of political participation, the results have been muted at best. 
But voting, however important, is only one of many ways to engage as a citizen 
and in politics.  Some other the measures of political participation are quite obviously 
connected to mosque or church attendance.  When I asked youth about whether they had 
contacted an organization, the religious attendees were more likely to do so, especially 
mosque-goers.  This is unsurprising, due to the close ties many organizations have with 
mosques, or in the cases that youth interpreted contacting an organization to include their 
religious organization itself.  Likewise, a full one-hundred percent of youth who are high 
religiosity Muslim youth reported that they have given to charity in the last year.  Plastic 
charity boxes are ubiquitous around East End mosques, and zakat, a form of regular 
charitable giving, is one of the Pillars of Islam.  Likewise, high religiosity Jamaican 
Christians also gave of finances to organizations at much higher levels than their less 
religious peers, as they had both more opportunity and inclination to do so in their 
churches. 
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Beyond contacting organizations or giving money to them, however, there were 
many civic engagement activities in the questionnaire that are less obviously related to 
attendance at a religious institution.  Addressing these, first among Jamaican youth, the 
religiosity pattern is not initially clear.  In some cases, youth who are highly religious 
were more active (e.g., boycotting products, taking part in demonstrations, attending 
political rallies).  In other cases, the youth who did not show a regular religious 
commitment were more active (e.g., signing a petition, purchasing products for ethical 
reasons, contacting an official).  We are working with very small sample sizes here – 
only 14 Jamaican youth who are highly religious, and 9 who are not – so there are not 
enough cases to make a clear judgment on any item.  However, it can be said that in the 
aggregate of the data there is no general trend, and no overall basis to argue for a positive 
or a negative effect of religiosity on the civic engagement of young Jamaicans.25  
For Bangladeshis, in contrast, the influence of religiosity on civic engagement is 
positive, strong, and fairly consistent.  The data set for Bangladeshis is larger than for 
Jamaicans, though still too small for statistical tests of significance.  Instead of statistical 
tests, I use the guideline of 20 percentage points in difference as a general measure of 
substantial effects in the data.  All 20-point differences are labelled in the table in bold 
and underline.  For almost half of all political behaviors (8 of 17), the proportion of high 
religiosity Bangladeshi youth involved is at least 20 points higher than for those who are 
not as religious: Contacting an organization, contacting the media, wearing a badge or 
                                                 
25One possible exception here may be taking part in a demonstration.  Of the interviewees 
I spoke with who had taken part in demonstrations, all five who were highly religious had 
been involved in demonstrations that were directly church sponsored.  Two had been part 
of the 2008 Seventh Day Adventist LIVE March against gun and knife crime (I profile 
the 2009 LIVE March in Chapter 5). 
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sticker, signing a petition, boycotting products, purchasing products, fundraising, or 
taking part in a political rally.  In some of these cases – such as boycotting products or 
wearing campaign badges – the effects are dramatic.  
Also significant is the fact that high religiosity affected voting behavior 
negatively, even if this effect was modest.  Seen in the light of many other positive 
citizenship behaviours – such as wearing campaign badges or raising funds – it seems 
strange that voting would not also share in the positive religiosity effect.  In a few cases, 
youth may have abstained from voting out of Islamic principle.26  Much more likely, 
however, is a simple alienation or apathy regarding voting.  Yet the fact that highly 
religious Bangladeshi youth engage so frequently in campaigning activities but not in 
voting appears, for the moment, to be in tension. 
To summarize the results to this point, 1) Second generation London youth have 
low levels of cultural identification with Britain, yet 2) reasonably high levels of political 
knowledge.  3) Bangladeshis have higher levels of political participation than Jamaicans 
and 4) among Bangladeshis higher religiosity appears to influence youth into greater 
participation.  Religiosity does not have an observable relationship with political 
participation among Jamaicans.  Finally, 5) the positive effect of Muslim religiosity on 
political participation does not extend to the most crucial conventional political activity: 
voting. 
                                                 
26Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), for example, is an Islamic social movement active in the East End 
of London and elsewhere in the UK that advocates total separation from the British 
political process, because the process is not Islamic.  HT discourages voting in British 
elections.  The recently proscribed organization Islam4UK, formerly known as al-
Muhajiroon, also argues that voting in British elections is prohibited in Islam. 
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Having reviewed these results, it is now possible to begin a consideration of the 
three hypotheses of youth civic engagement introduced earlier in the chapter.  The first 
hypothesis was youth apathy.  The evidence does not provide a basis for arguing that 
second generation youth as a whole are apathetic towards citizenship and politics, as they 
have a relatively strong performance on measures of political literacy.  Certainly some 
second generation youth are apathetic towards public affairs.  Yet it seems that youth in 
general are fairly well-informed about the British political system and how it works.  This 
indicates there is a widespread interest in issues that are political, even among some 
youth who do not directly avow this interest or translate it into participation. 
Are youth instead alienated from politics?  For most youth I spoke with, 
satisfaction with the British political process and trust of politicians was low.  This was 
often true of youth who demonstrated significant political knowledge.  Alienation from 
British politics, then, remains as an explanation for at least some youth who show low 
levels of political participation.  
The third hypothesis was that although some youth will engage in substantial 
civic behaviors, they will largely confine these to more atomistic activities.  A first glance 
at the evidence does seem to confirm this hypothesis.  For all subcategories of youth in 
Table 2.5, the strongest levels of participation were on individualistic measures.  The 
weakest were collective.  The particularly strong individualistic measures were those 
relating to personal financing of a cause, which Pattie and colleagues have called 
“cheque-book participation.”   
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Table 2.6: Brands that Bangladeshi Youth Boycott, with Frequencies 
 
  Reason Given 
Starbucks XXXXXXX Israel link 
Coca Cola XXXX Israel link 
Danone XXXX Denmark link 
Marks & Spencers XX Israel link; child labor 
McDonalds XX Israel link 
Primark clothes XX Unethical labor 
Animal-tested prod. X Unethical practice 
AOL X Israel link 
Bangladeshi shrimp X Unethical labor 
DKNY clothes X Israel link 
Nandos restaurants X False claim to be halal 
Nestle X Denmark link [sic] 
Next clothing X Israel link 
Sky Television X Israel link 
Tesco groceries X Israel link 
Waitrose groceries X Israel link 
N = 32 
 
 
 
Table 2.7: Brands that Jamaican Youth Boycott, with Frequencies 
 
  Reason Given 
Animal-tested prod. X Unethical practice 
Calvin Klein X Blurred gender ads 
Genetically modif. X Unethical practice 
Name brand clothes X Unethical labor 
Rowntree candies X Racism 
Selfridges X Blurred gender ads 
Tate & Lyle Sugar X Racism 
Timberland X Racism 
Tommy Hilfiger X Racism 
Top Shop / Top Man X Blurred gender ads 
Von Dutch clothes X Racism 
N = 23 
 
Yet a closer look at youth civic behaviors is necessary before concluding that they 
are indeed primarily atomistic.  A useful way to address this issue is to investigate in 
greater depth a particular behavior that may seem to epitomize atomism – the consumer 
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behavior of boycotting products.  In the interviews, I asked youth to tell me specifically 
which products they choose to boycott.  I summarize their self-reports of boycotting in 
Tables 2.6 and 2.7, marking the frequencies each boycotted product was mentioned with 
Xs.  
Jamaican and Bangladeshi youth each mentioned a substantial number of different 
products which they boycott.  The fact that Bangladeshis listed more is in large part 
simply the artifact of sample size, as there were about one third more Bangladeshis in the 
sample for which I have complete data on this question (32) than there were Jamaicans 
(23).  More important than the number of listed products are the frequencies that products 
are repeatedly listed.  Seven Bangladeshi youth separately told me that they boycott 
Starbucks.  Bangladeshis also clustered around boycotts for Danone, Coca Cola and, to a 
lesser degree, the department store Marks & Spencers and the clothing store Primark.  
What appears at first to be an individualistic behavior – one’s shopping choices – in fact 
seems to have an underlying collective nature.   
When I asked Bangladeshi youth the reasons for boycotting these particular 
products, the collective organization of boycotting became more apparent.  Easily the 
most common reason Bangladeshis chose to boycott products was the alleged connection 
of these products to financing Israel, and more particularly with what they consider to be 
Zionist activities against Palestinians.  Second in frequency was boycotting products 
connected to Denmark because of the Danish Cartoons Affair.27  My conversation with 
                                                 
27The Danish daily paper the Jyllands-Posten published a set of highly controversial 
cartoons portraying the Prophet Muhammad, which led to anger and protest in many parts 
of the world.  For a thorough analysis of the Danish Cartoons Affair, see Klausen (2009). 
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Hamid, the young man introduced at the beginning of this chapter, provides a good 
example:   
Hamid: I’ve boycotted certain Israeli products.  I don’t know what your view is 
on Israel, but certain products.  I mean, Israel – I see so much injustice there, a lot 
that’s happening and while it’s not being portrayed in the media, [Palestinians 
are] not even getting support.  Things like they’re not even being allowed to get 
medicine because of the blockades.  And I think the least we could do is boycott 
the funds because the Israelis, they do get a lot of funds from big businesses.  And 
I think even companies like Coca Cola.  So I try and boycott these things.  One 
person said to me, it’s like you’re paying a penny for an Israeli product, that 
penny will eventually turn into a bullet and that bullet will actually kill a 
person….  Also other things, like the Danish – what happened with the cartoons.  
I decided to boycott Danish products. 
 
Daniel: How do you know which products to boycott? 
 
Hamid: Research on the Internet.  But Israeli uses certain barcodes a lot of the 
times.  So you see – there’s a website on there, it’s called InMinds.com about 
Israeli products or companies that fund Israel. 
 
Similarly, Rubina is one of many young Bangladeshis who boycotts Starbucks 
due to its alleged ties to Israel.  She told me “a lot of [Starbucks’] money goes to the 
Jewish people to kill the Palestinians.”  I wondered why she thought this to be true.  She 
said: “Even though I don’t know for sure if, you know, it does, there’s a lot of Muslim 
websites I’ve gone on….  Because the Internet anyone could throw anything on it, you 
know, so you don’t know what to trust.  But I say if I’m doubting it, I’d stay away from 
it.”  In addition to Internet sources in general, other youth told me that they knew 
products to boycott because friends had sent them a text, an email forward, or had 
notified them through Facebook. 
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Figure 2.2. A “Boycott Israeli Goods” Campaign Sticker at a Pedestrian Crossing on 
Whitechapel Road. 
 
 
 
Bangladeshis’ predominant reasons for boycotting products – due to ties to Israel 
or Denmark – are collective on two levels.  First, the behaviors are collectively organized 
through information and communication technologies.  And second, they are collectively 
motivated, because youth who think of themselves as members of the Muslim ummah are 
resisting threats to their collective identity. 
The highly collective response of Bangladeshi Muslim boycotting can lead to 
strange results at times.  For example, I had the following exchange with Zarena, who 
spoke first about the clothing company DKNY and then about Nestlé, the food company 
based in Switzerland: 
Daniel: Have you boycotted certain products? 
 
Zarena: Yes – DKNY because they support the Israelite country in war and a 
percentage of their profit goes to Israel, and they’re at war with Palestinians who 
are Muslims.  So I don’t want to support that.  Nestlé’s for a while because of the 
Denmark…. 
 
Daniel: Oh ok.  How are they connected to that? 
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Zarena: Yes, I heard that Nestlé’s were. 
 
Daniel: Because Nestlé’s is – Are they Danish?  Are they from Denmark? 
 
Zarena: I have no idea.  But I just got texts! 
 
This exchange demonstrates the highly collective nature of these boycotts.  Far from 
being an educated individual consumer choice, boycotting Denmark and Israel is a 
collective effort that sometimes involves responding to unsubstantiated claims.   
Salma, another young Bangladeshi woman, told me that boycotting is quite often 
based on “rumors.”  She said “everyone will just email you.  Like all my friends, they’ll 
hear it from other friends and it just gets passed through email really.”  For example 
“there was a thing about Walkers Crisps having alcohol in them,” which turned out to just 
be a rumor: “I went on their website and they tell you all the ingredients!”  Yet, the high 
level of sensitivity to collective Muslim issues can lead youth to take a cautious stance to 
products.  In Rubina’s words: “If I’m doubting it, I’d stay away from it.” 
As seen in Table 2.6, not all of second generation Bangladeshi youth boycotting is 
a collective response to a political issue like the boycotts of Israel and Denmark.  In some 
cases, youth choose to boycott companies that allegedly engage in unethical practices 
such as the use of child labor or the misrepresentation of their products.  The overall 
structure of Bangladeshi youth boycotting, however, is predominantly collective in 
nature. 
Jamaican youth also boycott a wide range of products.  These boycotting 
behaviors do not cluster around any single product more than once.  Jamaican youth 
apparently choose products to boycott out of their individual decisions of conscience 
rather than in response to collective mobilization efforts. 
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At times Jamaican youth boycotting decisions can be highly personal and 
idiosyncratic.  For example, Clarise told me about several brands she boycotts in reaction 
to a recent trend in “blurred gender” advertising: 
Well like Calvin Klein, right now they’re promoting this whole line.  It’s like 
they’ve blurred gender.  So it’s like when they have their male models, they look 
very feminine and then when they have their female models they look very 
masculine.  And I notice Selfridges is doing the same thing.  I don’t believe in that 
because to me that means that you, you’re not identifying that a woman is a 
woman and a man is a man.  And so you also promote homosexuality which I… 
it’s not that I’m against the [homosexual] person, I just don’t believe in that act.  
So that’s why I don’t buy from certain shops, like Top Shop and Top Man – 
They’re also carrying that whole thing as well. 
 
Clarise’s reason for boycotting Calvin Klein, Selfridges, Top Shop, and Top Man is one 
she developed out of her convictions on appropriate representations of gender.  Like most 
Bangladeshi Muslims, her decision to boycott is rooted in religion.  Yet the fact that other 
Jamaican youth did not cite blurred gender as a reason indicates that Clarise’s choice to 
boycott is an individual one. 
 Similarly, Michelle told me that she boycotts a significant range of products as a 
response to the racist policies of their companies.  She spoke about Tate & Lyle, the 
British sugar brand, “in South Africa, they were supporting Apartheid, so I’m thinking I 
need to get away from these people!”  Michelle also boycotts Timberland, Tommy 
Hilfiger, and Rowntree Candies due to their alleged racism.  It might seem that racism is 
a significantly collective reason for boycotting.  Yet Michelle is virtually alone in citing it 
as a reason for boycotts – only one other Jamaican youth, Thaddeus, mentioned racism as 
a reason for boycotting.  Thaddeus cited a different company that he boycotts as racist, 
Von Dutch Jeans. 
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 In comparing Bangladeshi and Jamaican youth, I am not making a statement on 
the relative weight of racism or Zionism as collective issues.  Instead, the examples 
illustrate that the political action of boycotting is organized in a collective manner among 
Bangladeshis while it is an individually developed choice among Jamaicans.  I am 
convinced by Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley’s analysis that the overall British population’s 
political behavior has taken a trend towards atomism.  Such atomism appears to be 
mirrored in Brixton Jamaican young people’s political actions.  Yet atomism is not a 
viable description of how East End Bangladeshi youth participate in these political 
behaviors, as there are clearly collective mobilizations behind them. 
  
Revisiting Mike and Hamid 
Early in this chapter I profiled Mike and Hamid, and the attitudes they express 
towards British culture and politics.  Both showed relatively low levels of cultural 
identification with Britain and, at least on the surface, seemed to be disinterested in 
taking political action themselves.  Now that we have reviewed more general statistics in 
political activity among Jamaican and Bangladeshi youth, we can return to Mike and 
Hamid to see if they will help us to put flesh on those numbers.  
 Mike, the Jamaican youth introduced early in this chapter, had told me that any 
political action he might take “doesn’t make that much of a difference.”  When I asked 
him about specific political actions that he has taken over the past year, his reasons for 
this attitude became more apparent.  He said he would not contact a local politician 
because “my local politician is Labour, and I’m more Tory for some reason.”  He went on 
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to elaborate why he thought his difference of party affiliation rendered any local political 
contact ineffectual: 
You know the recent fight on the embryo rule?  ….They’re mixing like embryos, 
human embryos, with cow things. For Labour, that was the only party, Gordon 
Brown said, that is going to whip.  Which basically means you have to follow the 
Labour position.  So, because my local MPs is Labour, will [contacting him] 
make a difference? 
 
Mike’s question was a pointed one.  His explanation of British politics revealed 
considerable sophistication, as he was keeping current with Parliament debates on laws 
regarding human embryo use in science and he had strong political (and religious) 
convictions to bring into these debates.  Yet the political system, as he understands it, 
stymies any chance for his influence because the unified Labour whip position is 
seemingly unchangeable.  Mike’s description of the British political system is a far cry 
from the optimism Almond and Verba observed among Britons in the 1960s, who 
expressed “general system pride as well as satisfaction with specific government 
performance.”  Mike continued to explain his grievances with the British political system 
[emphasis original]: 
The thing is, when you’re living in this country, the laws that will affect you are 
already going through and will be implemented.  So it’s kind of weird like. You 
have to vote based on a manifesto that they have beforehand, and then you 
experience it during their term.  And because their term starts here [uses a hand 
gesture to motion the start], it’s not going to make that much difference.  I mean, 
maybe local councils are more, there’s more of a place where you can have your 
opinion expressed in a more effectual way.  But I wouldn’t do that myself. 
 
Mike’s disaffection with the British political system stretched beyond 
relationships with political representatives to encompass other forms of conventional 
politics.  His level of political participation is low across almost all measures.  He does 
not claim to sign petitions, wear campaign badges, boycott products, or purchase 
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products for political or ethical reasons, for example.  Mike’s only forms of ‘political’ 
participation were those that took place firmly within the bounds of his church.  He gives 
money to the church, fundraises for it, and says that he has “organized a group of 
likeminded people” to attend the church regularly.  In fact, his church, Ruach Ministries, 
is the only voluntary organization in which Mike is involved.  Mike did say that he would 
be interested in voting, but, as he had just turned 18 recently, there was no way to 
evaluate whether this desire would transfer into practice. 
Overall, Mike has no discernible involvement in politics outside church because 
he feels alienated from the British political system.  Interestingly, as quoted earlier, he 
demonstrates a high level of political literacy when he expresses this alienation.  In fact, 
on the British political knowledge quiz, Mike correctly answered five out of seven 
questions.  His performance on this measure put him in the category Pattie and co-authors 
define as “politically knowledgeable.”  As someone entering the London School of 
Economics to study law, Mike’s ability to reason and argue in political terms is likely to 
increase. 
Beyond low expectations of the British political system, there may be another 
dynamic at work.  British sociologist David Martin has captured well the conflicted 
attitude to civic engagement that I saw in Mike – deep convictions about political issues 
that are juxtaposed with political inaction.  Martin (2005: 134) describes how evangelical 
and Pentecostal Christians, such as Mike, tend to approach the moral and political reform 
of their societies:  
The paradox of evangelicalism (of which Pentecostalism is included for present 
purposes) turns on the way it embodies secularity and seeks a more thorough 
sanctification.  Evangelicalism is the most expansive element in contemporary 
Protestantism and yet as it seeks [a] deeper appropriation of faith at the individual 
 65
level it erodes the idea of a Christian society by dismissing the uncommitted 
majority as not Christian.  Given that the democratic state increasingly reflects the 
comparative indifference of the majority, evangelicalsm in principle abandons 
[the state]…. The ‘ideal type’ of evangelicalism has to be constructed in terms of 
the restriction of religion to a voluntary sector unable and unwilling to propose 
[political] norms.28 
 
In other words, evangelicalism is an extremely change-minded religious movement.  It 
has hopes for deep individual-level heart changes that culminate in the transformation of 
society.  Yet, when confronted with societies where the vast majority is indifferent to 
their faith message, evangelicals can become deeply cynical about the actual potential for 
political and societal change.  Therefore, most evangelicals in the West compartmentalize 
their influence to the voluntary sector (especially to their local church), or in some cases 
they may campaign on a small set of moral touch point issues.  The evangelical faith – 
which overflows with ambitions for societal transformation – ironically tends to accept a 
highly circumscribed, and therefore secularized, role in society.29  Thus, Mike, who has 
strong convictions about the embryo bill in Parliament, is unlikely to express his 
convictions outside of his own Christian circles.  Beyond simple alienation due to 
weaknesses in the British political system, it may be that Mike is disengaged from 
political action due to the constraints of his religious imagination for social and political 
change.  In David Martin’s words, Mike has “abandon[ed] the state.” 
                                                 
28It may be helpful to note that Martin is comparing the evangelical mentality of born 
again conversion and personal faith to what Max Weber called the “church” mentality, 
where one is automatically born into a national church which extends across the whole 
society.  Those with a “church” perspective might be expected to be more trusting and 
optimistic about political level change. 
 
29The original definition of ‘secularization’ refers to the differentiation, or 
compartmentalization, of religion into a smaller and smaller domain of authority as its 
previous responsibilities are absorbed by the state, the market, or particular institutions 
(Casanova 2006). 
 66
 Hamid, the Bangladeshi youth introduced earlier, also expressed a highly negative 
view of politics.  He had gone as far as to say: “There is not a political bone in my body.”  
As we began to talk through potential forms of political participation, I realized that 
Hamid was much more involved and knowledgeable of politics than I could have 
expected. 
 Hamid’s political literacy is quite high.  On the political knowledge quiz he 
correctly answered six of seven questions, placing him in the “politically knowledgeable” 
category.  He told me that he regularly watches Question Time30 on television.  Although 
he primarily spoke negatively about British politicians and media (using words such as 
“spin” and “politics [is] a dirty game”), it was clear from our conversation that he keeps 
abreast with current affairs and the workings of the political process. 
Most of Hamid’s civic and political actions arise out of his involvement in 
voluntary organizations.  Hamid takes an active role in so many organizations that he had 
trouble listing them all: He is a leader in the ISOC (campus Islamic societies) for the 
London region, volunteers at Ummah Welfare Trust and InterPalestine (two Islamic 
humanitarian aid NGOs), helps arrange Islamic courses with a local organization, assists 
at an educational trust, helps produce a Muslim children’s magazine, and is active in his 
locality with a Bangladeshi neighborhood association.  From listening to Hamid’s wide 
range of involvements, I could understand why he needs a bike to rush from meeting to 
meeting.  The contrast could hardly be greater with the singularity of Mike’s voluntary 
involvement, set exclusively within his church. 
                                                 
30Question Time is a weekly television program on BBC One.  The program features 
politicians from the three main political parties as well as other public figures who 
answer audience questions on a given topic.  
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 Hamid’s many voluntary engagements form the bulk of the context and 
motivation for his political participation, which has been extensive.  He had recently 
contacted politicians, including local councillors, to involve them in events sponsored by 
organizations with which he volunteers.  He regularly gives to charities and fundraises, 
wears campaign badges, signs petitions, boycotts products, and purchases products for 
ethical reasons.  When he is angered by a portrayal of Muslims in a media source, Hamid 
writes a letter or email to the editor.  “It probably seems like it’s gone to deaf ears a lot of 
the time,” he said, “because a lot of times we get media which is very negative and very 
unfair.”   
 Hamid had recently become involved in a charged political issue at Queen Mary 
University, where he is a student.  A “prayer room controversy” had emerged between 
the university and some of its Muslim students.  Hamid told me that the room where I had 
witnessed him and fellow students praying, just minutes earlier, had been designated a 
Muslim prayer room for the entire previous academic year.  Hamid said that this decision 
made good sense, because Queen Mary has the largest number of Muslim students of any 
British university.  The Muslim students who prayed in the room appreciated the freedom 
to keep Qur’ans and other religious books available there.  But, Hamid told me, in the 
current academic year: 
Funnily enough, some of us come back and find it’s been made into a multi-faith 
room.  We can’t keep our books there.  We can’t have it after six, and stuff.  So 
now, that’s really affected the work of the Islam Society. 
 
The Queen Mary Islamic Society was at that time campaigning to re-designate the 
prayer room as Muslim-only.  Across the Queen Mary campus I had seen prayer room 
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campaign posters (the posters featured Spiderman in an Islamic prayer position).  Hamid 
described the campaign’s strategy and its challenges thus far: 
Hamid: We tried all the political avenues, all the legal avenues.  Like over a 
hundred letters were written by different [Islamic Society] members.  We tried 
many things which are in our power, but it seems like it’s not working. 
 
Daniel: Ok, so you tried writing letters…. 
 
Hamid: Petitions, meetings, emails to [the new university Principal]. 
 
Daniel: Ok.  Did you do things like protest? 
 
Hamid: Not yet, we wanted to avoid that… 
 
Daniel: Or how about going on strike and saying, I’m not going to class… 
 
Hamid: We wanted to avoid this because we thought, you know, there’s peaceful 
methods of doing it and don’t want to have a hindrance on the relationship we 
have.  Our pressure’s not working so we might have to think of Plan B…. To 
maybe take it into protest and stuff.  Let’s see. 
 
Hamid had recently contacted a legal representative to discuss legal ramifications of 
some of these further alternatives. 
 The two cases of Mike and Hamid certainly cannot represent the diversity of civic 
attitudes and practices among Jamaican and Bangladeshi second generation youth.  Yet, 
as some of the more articulate young people I interviewed, these two young men help to 
illustrate some of the broader trends observed in the overall data.  Both Mike and Hamid 
express relatively low levels of identification with ‘Britishness’ as a cultural or civic 
category.  Yet this apparent weakness in civic identity does not translate into political 
apathy, as both young men maintain a strong working knowledge of current affairs and 
the political system. 
 Mike and Hamid both express negative attitudes toward British politics.  For 
Mike, this appears to be out of alienation from a system in which he has little faith.  For 
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Hamid, his disaffection with politics seems instead to be an effort to avoid being tainted 
by the corruption he perceives in the system. 
 Mike has not found many outlets for political participation, as he is not involved 
in civil society organizations beyond his church.  This was more generally true of the 
Jamaican youth I interviewed.  Some Jamaicans were apathetic towards politics and some 
(like Mike) alienated from it.  Others, like Clarise who boycotts “blurred gender” 
products, are engaged in political activities.  Yet each person’s political activities are not 
widely shared, meaning that these youth largely mirror the British trend of atomism and 
individual cheque-book participation. 
 Some Bangladeshi youth were apathetic and some were alienated.  The trend of 
atomism was not very frequently observed among Bangladeshis.  Yet, overall, 
Bangladeshi political participation is much higher than that of Jamaicans.  And the level 
of participation is higher still among highly religious Muslims.  Hamid’s case illustrates 
well an important phenomenon in the civic engagement of East End Bangladeshis: it 
tends to be an engagement not in the conventional process, but rather in political 
alternatives. 
 Hamid participates in political activities in an alternative sphere of Muslim 
organizations, such as his university Islamic Society and Islamic humanitarian NGOs.  
He is not taking part in what have traditionally been the major organizations in British 
politics, such as political parties or unions.  When Hamid engages with a secular 
organization, his motives tend to be expressly Islamic – such as writing a letter to a 
newspaper about the representation of Muslims or sending a petition about the prayer 
room to the Queen Mary University administration.  Hamid does not wish to be 
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associated with, or tainted by, politics.  Yet he is at the same time a highly politically 
literate person who can recognize issues of conscience and knows how to take action in 
various situations.   
The emphasis on an alternative politics, exemplified in Hamid’s case, was more 
broadly characteristic of Bangladeshis as a group.  It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that 
while religious involvement motivates East End Bangladeshi youth to participate in a 
parallel world of Islamic institutions, it does not also make them more likely to vote.  We 
will explore in the next chapter some of the religious institutions in which second 
generation youth are forming their approaches to citizenship and politics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
SHAPING CITIZENS:  
MOSQUES, CHURCHES, AND YOUTH CIVIC SOCIALIZATION 
 
It was one of my first visits to Brixton, in November 2007.  I had braved the 
chilly London afternoon air wandering the local streets and markets.  Now at the end of 
the workday, I made the circuit back towards the main strip of Brixton.  I crossed 
Windrush Square, the central green space that commemorates black immigration to 
Britain.  After walking by the popular Ritzy Cinema, I rounded the KFC on the corner 
and headed towards the Brixton tube station. Dozens of Caribbean, African, and other 
workers in coats and scarves were queuing for their buses home.  Nearing the tube 
station, I noticed a thin covered shopping passageway that cut directly through the 
building to my right.  The sign above said “Reliance Arcade.”  
The Reliance Arcade is a long passage lined with independent booths on each 
side, selling items like greeting cards and flashy LED mobile phone accessories.  As soon 
as I stepped into the arcade I was greeted by the familiar sound of African American 
Gospel music blaring from speakers on the right and about ten yards down.  The music 
came from a booth with the sign “The CD Bar.”  Literally set up like a bar for CDs, the 
booth had headphone stations for customers who could lean against the bar to sample hip 
hop, reggae, R&B, or Christian music before making their purchases. 
There was a black youth leaning on the bar.  He seemed to be second or third 
generation, and at first I thought he was a music customer.  But as I walked past I realized 
he was there for quite a different reason.  He was receiving spiritual advice.  Behind the 
 72
bar stood the CD seller, named Reggie,31 who I was soon to meet.  Reggie was mentoring 
the young man on a private matter and spoke with a knowing compassion.  As I walked 
by I overheard Reggie give words of counsel about sexual temptation and the spiritual 
dangers of living in “the World.” 
I relate this experience to introduce Reggie, the CD seller, who I came to know in 
the early weeks of my dissertation fieldwork.  Reggie is a tall man in his mid 30s of 
Nigerian origin, with a warm and easy air about him.  He always wears a tan Kangol flat 
cap.  I would come to see Reggie as an example of what Elijah Anderson (1999) calls an 
“Old Head,” an adult role model that youth in Brixton can look to when facing the moral 
dilemmas of street life.  Reggie sees himself much in this way.  He would tell me later 
that he thinks of his job as a CD seller as a setting for Christian ministry.  Reggie is 
known to have a knack for bringing almost any conversation around to ultimate questions 
of life, death, judgment, and Jesus.  
The main streets of Brixton teem with a diversity of spiritualities.  Older 
dreadlocked Rastafarian men roam the sidewalks, gathering in groups at the benches of 
St. Matthews Park, sometimes speaking out words of worship to Haile Selassie.  An 
African man stands near the tube station silently distributing business cards for a local 
witch doctor psychic.  Black Muslims stroll in family groups towards the Brixton Mosque 
and its religious primary school.  Evangelists for many causes – Christianity, Falun Gong, 
or a recent conspiracy theory – can often be seen belting out messages in the main 
intersection by the KFC.  A pair of middle-aged women on the street corner encourage 
each other that the Lord is faithful. 
                                                 
31In this chapter I use pseudonyms for the names of all people I met in research 
fieldwork, with exception of religious leaders. 
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Figure 3.1. The Universal Pentecostal Church on Acre Lane32 
 
 
 
In Streets of Glory (2003), Omar McRoberts writes about the Four Corners 
neighborhood in Boston as an example of a “religious district,” because it contains such a 
larger cluster of storefront churches within a small radius.  Brixton would make the short 
list of places in London that could be considered its religious districts.  The Spitalfields-
Whitechapel area in the East End of London, my other case study area, would also make 
such a list.33  Both places are host to various churches, mosques, or religious charities in 
                                                 
32Although this is not one of the churches I selected for research, its daily storefront 
window Bible passage exemplifies the forthright street presence of some Brixton 
churches. 
 
33Other potential religious districts in London include Finsbury Park, Southall, and 
Newham – the last of these which Greg Smith (1996) argues has London’s highest 
geographic concentration of places of worship. 
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converted buildings, and street cultures that are highly assertive in spirituality, especially 
considering Britain’s privatized religious norms. 
  
Figure 3.2. Whitechapel Road in the East End34 
 
 
 
In this chapter I will investigate how religious institutions shape youth citizenship, 
focusing on two churches in Brixton and two mosques in the East End.  My emphasis 
will be on the particular visions of the citizen that are upheld by each place of worship. 
Few studies in Britain have addressed the religious shaping of believers into 
particular kinds of citizens.  An important exception is Nicole Toulis’ book Believing 
                                                 
34Note the turbaned man carrying the picketing sign with the words “Allah is Lord of the 
Universe” (top center). 
 75
Identity (1997), an ethnography of a Pentecostal New Testament Church of God (NTCG) 
congregation in Birmingham, England.  The Birmingham King Street NTCG 
congregation is predominantly first generation Jamaican and largely female.  Yet rather 
than viewing race, ethnicity, or generation as their common ground, “their identity as 
Christians serves as the basis for their interaction with others in British society.”  
Members of the congregation view themselves and each other as “spiritual citizens.”  
This identity allows the congregation to avoid “debates about how, and on what terms, 
African-Caribbeans may be included in the British nation, for [their] inclusive spiritual 
nation is not premised on racial differentiation.”  The members of the NTCG 
congregation feel a satisfying sense of spiritual affirmation and civic belonging. 
In a related manner, Peggy Levitt in God Needs No Passport (2007) investigates 
how spiritual perspectives shape the practice of citizenship, creating citizens with 
different degrees of tolerance for religious pluralism.  Therese O’Toole and Richard Gale 
(2010) have observed that religion provides British youth (primarily young Muslims) 
who engage in politics with more globally oriented “grammars of action.”  Hussain and 
Bagguley (2005) investigate what they call “citizenship identity” noting that first 
generation Pakistani Muslims in Britain tend to think of themselves more as temporary 
“denizens” whereas the second generation identifies with the rights and opportunities of 
being British citizens.   
 I further develop the concept of “citizenship identity” germinating in the work of 
Toulis and others.  Citizenship, in a legal sense, entails rights granted by the state, usually 
accompanied by concurrent civic responsibilities.  My definition of citizenship identity is: 
“Constructed subjective membership in an imagined community of citizens, providing 
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one’s frame of reference for civic engagement.”  This definition builds on Benedict 
Anderson’s (1983) thesis that identities are formed in reference to “imagined 
communities.”  Communities, whether imagined or directly experienced, provide the 
cultural resources and constraints for civic imagination and engagement.  Citizenship 
identities are not necessarily spiritually or religiously based, but religions are important 
sites of their production because they so often confer transcendent narratives of 
membership. 
I will continue to substantiate the concept of citizenship identity over the course 
of this dissertation.  In this chapter I investigate the moral directives and congregational 
cultures of religious institutions to discern the kinds of citizenship identities they 
cultivate.  I also, if briefly, look beyond cultural and identity aspects of institutions, to 
consider the structural side of the influences they have in respective local areas.  
Constance Flanagan and her colleagues (2007) build from the work of Michael Walzer 
(1989) to observe that schools are like “mini-polities” from which the opportunities and 
resources of school-citizenship are templates for state-citizenship.  The same may be true 
of religious organizations (see Foley and Hoge 2007).  For many young people, religious 
organizations will have a more long-standing influence as mini-polities than schools will, 
simply because religious involvement can extend beyond school age to continue 
reinforcing civic habits over time.  The citizenship identities which institutions propagate 
(which are cultural) and the resources they offer for civic engagement (which are 
structural) should in reality be mutually constitutive, and thus the discussion of both at 
the end of this chapter will necessarily be intertwined (Sewell 1992). 
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Before delving into the analysis of particular churches and mosques, we will 
return to the CD Bar in Brixton.  It was there that a conversation early into my fieldwork 
gave me a first view of how to select religious institutions as case studies. 
 
The Religious Scene in Brixton 
On the cold November day that I first walked past the CD Bar, I had noticed that 
Reggie and the young man were engaged in a private spiritual conversation.  I left the 
Reliance Arcade, returning ten minutes later to find Reggie alone. 
I approached the CD Bar and introduced myself to Reggie.  We struck up a 
conversation about music, culture, and Jamaican young people in Brixton.  After a few 
minutes we were joined by Reggie’s colleague and boss Vernon, age 30, who is a 
stockier man of Jamaican origin.  Vernon is something of a foil to Reggie.  He began to 
lose his Christian faith in early adulthood – around the same age that Reggie had a born 
again faith experience.  Vernon’s winsome personality and ironic sense of humor make 
him a good match in conversation with Reggie’s relaxed yet steadfast evangelical zeal.  
Vernon laughs often, with a hearty bellow of a laugh.   
I piqued Reggie and Vernon’s interest when I explained my sociology research 
with second generation youth.  Ten minutes into our conversation I asked if I could 
record it with my digital recorder.  They agreed.  Then Reggie surprised me by pulling 
out his own larger, more advanced digital recorder: 
 Reggie: Yeah, I've got one here as well. [places his digital recorder on the bar]   
 Daniel: Well, look at you!    
 Vernon: Mine's bigger than yours! [All laugh]   
 Reggie: Yeah, but I won't record you all.   
 78
 Daniel: Your [recorder] is probably a little higher level than mine.     
 Reggie: Nah, nah. 
 
Daniel: But actually it's got good quality.  So don't let that change what we're 
talking about or anything.  And even if there's nothing useful, I'm just gonna keep 
[it] on. 
 
I began by asking general questions to gain an orientation of the religious 
landscape in Brixton.  Vernon – himself a Jamaican from the second generation – was 
only five years beyond my chosen demographic.  The three of us had a very animated and 
wide-ranging conversation for more than an hour, speaking loudly to hear each other 
above the Gospel and R&B tracks playing on the CD Bar’s speakers.  Reggie, who was 
tending the bar at the time, occasionally took a moment to sell a customer a CD.  
Vernon told me about his own experiences growing up in a Jamaican-led church 
that was mostly influenced by first generation immigrants.  He spoke of these types of 
churches as “very Victorian.”  This was because “women were expected not to wear 
trousers or jewellery, expected not to relax their hair or manipulate it or change the 
texture.”  Vernon continued: 
I think it’s an old fashioned approach to Christianity.  Where you're supposed to 
be separated and, you know, “come out from among them.”  And you're supposed 
to look different from the world.  This whole thing about “the world!”  People in 
the world looking a particular way.  You know they're very bejewelled, they're 
dressed up in the latest fashion.  So the approach to Christianity was very 
conservative.  That as a Christian you should dress “modestly.”  Which is a word 
that is very often mentioned in the Jamaican church. 
 
Vernon spoke with considerable sarcasm about the protective environment of the church 
in which he grew up.  It was a place that required its congregation to dress “modestly” in 
order to shelter youth from the “bejewelled” influences of the outside world. 
In Vernon’s view, churches of this more conservative variety have difficulty 
retaining the younger generation.  He had himself felt his church was too strict and close-
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minded.  He stopped attending as a teenager.  I asked if there are churches today that 
more effectively tap into youth culture.  “It’s a big thing now,” Vernon said, “influenced 
by Americans like Kirk Franklin,” a gospel music artist.  In fact, Kirk Franklin was about 
to perform a major show that weekend at London’s largest music venue, the O2 Arena.  
Vernon and Reggie agreed: “He’s a massive influence” on youth. 
When I asked about which particular churches in Brixton successfully attract 
young people, Reggie and Vernon immediately thought of a local megachurch called 
Ruach Ministries.  Vernon explained how this church had a much more relaxed and open 
atmosphere than conventional first generation churches: 
When I was going to church you would wear a suit and tie every Sunday and go.  
It was showing reverence to God.  And nowadays, churches like Ruach are very 
youth oriented.  They allow youth to come as they are.  You can come in jeans if 
you want.  You don't have to dress up.  They say “it doesn't matter how you come.  
Just come to church.” 
 
It seemed that Vernon had identified an important distinction in the congregational 
cultures of black British churches – the difference between the first generation West 
Indian churches that emphasize reverence and modesty, as compared to the more youth 
oriented churches that may better reach and retain the second generation. 
 As we continued to talk, a Trinidadian man with his hair up in a raised dreadlock 
style approached the CD Bar.  He spent some time listening to music on the bar 
headphones, and then joined our conversation about Brixton youth.  Speaking in a lilting 
island accent the man expressed pessimism about the state of black youth in Britain.  He 
did not believe there are viable role models for young people: “You know who youth 
look up to?” he asked, rhetorically, without pausing for an answer: “50 Cent, [the 
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American rapper]…. As a black youth in England, you have nobody who you can say 
you aspire to be.” 
Reggie agreed with this negative take on the circumstances of black British youth.  
As an indefatigable evangelist, he explained the issue in the spiritual terms of the 
“doctrine” that young people hear preached by rap and hip hop artists like 50 Cent: 
Reggie: To the very impressionable youngsters and the gullible ones, they are 
spewing out a doctrine that is a little dodgy.  Because, you know, they’re talking 
about – 
 
 Vernon: It’s just culture Reggie. 
 
Reggie: – [imitating a rapper] “Yeah, we’re popping the champagne!  You know 
what guys, I’m driving my Ferrari!”  And then they’re moving from there and 
they’re saying “You know what, I got money!  You want money?”  
 
Reggie objected to the “big money” lifestyle of some black music artists, and to its 
influence on youth.  I noted the irony that posted behind him on the back wall was a list 
of the top ten grossing black music artists worldwide (all of them American).  In fact, 
Reggie is a bit like a teetotaling bartender: He sells CDs from millionaire musicians, yet 
he remains wary of the “doctrine” of conspicuous consumption many of them preach.  
The Trinidadian man standing with us began to talk about how the “big money” 
lifestyle can transfer into black churches in Britain.  He mentioned the recent moral 
downfall of a Caribbean pastor elsewhere in London.  The pastor had been diverting 
funds for his personal use: “A Ferrari pop up in the yard, a Porsche.  His daughter was on 
the director’s board, the wife, everybody.” Reggie and Vernon immediately recognized 
this style of scandal.  As Reggie put it, “you’re living in a mansion, you have incredible 
power.”  It is easy for successful pastors with power and charisma to be lured into 
exploiting the trust of their congregations. 
 81
Our conversation at the CD Bar had established a general pattern in Black British 
churches.  If the more traditional and first generation dominated churches over-emphasize 
austerity, then churches at the other end of the spectrum – more contemporary churches 
with a large youth segment – face the opposite danger of excess and conspicuous 
consumption. 
As we neared the end of our conversation, Vernon drew some of the threads 
together to provide his view of the main problem facing Black British youth: 
 Vernon: We must ask ourselves why is it that our children are so affected, so 
influenced by 50 Cent?  There's nothing wrong with 50 Cent saying what he's 
saying – 
 
Reggie: – There's something wrong with it, but it's not really the root of the 
problem is it? 
 
Vernon: Yeah.  Why is [a black young person] so, so vacant that he's occupying 
his mind so much with 50 Cent to become so influenced by it?  And that's a 
question for our community.  He should be in sports, he should be doing his 
homework, he should be going on some kind of trip somewhere, or in the arts.  
You know what I mean?  And be doing so many other things like so many other 
black children are doing in the city. 
 
There is a deeper problem among black youth, according to Vernon.  It cannot simply be 
blamed on indulgent black musicians or flashy wayward pastors.  Reggie offered his 
opinion: “The root of the problem starts with the family institution.”  Vernon was not so 
sure about this.  But he believes that finding a solution is the collective responsibility of 
the black community.  “The Asians have their lobbying group, the Muslims do,” he said.  
But for some reason the black community had not been able to organize as effectively 
around these issues. 
 “What we need to do is pray!” Vernon joked, bursting into a raucous laugh.  
“Black mothers are always on their knees praying for their kids,” he continued, “we need 
political and financial industry.”  For one reason or another, there has been limited 
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advocacy on the issues that are shaping black youth.  Vernon thinks that more direct 
political action is the best way forward – which might mean taking a leaf from the 
lobbying successes of South Asian Muslims. 
 
Case Study Churches and Mosques 
 Our conversation at the CD Bar set me in a good stead for identifying case study 
churches in Brixton.  In the months that followed, I visited several churches in Brixton as 
well as mosques in the East End where I did participant observation.  I attended each 
religious institution during a service or prayer time, took detailed fieldnotes, met youth 
and other people from the congregation, and informally met lay religious leaders or 
clergy.  The full set of religious institutions that I visited for these initial observations is 
listed in Table 3.1.   
From these first participant observation visits, I went through a gradual selection 
process to choose two churches and two mosques for in-depth case studies.  My criteria 
for selection are broadly based on the selection logic that Nancy Ammerman has used in 
her multi-congregational studies (2005; 1996).  I sought out congregations that 1) were 
large enough to be influential, exerting a substantial influence on second generation 
young people and 2) captured something of the variation in the local area’s religious 
institutions.  The primary basis of variation, shown in Table 1, was between “traditional” 
churches that largely carry over the preferences of first generation adults from their 
countries of origin, and more “contemporary” institutions that due to style or offerings 
have made substantial inroads among second generation youth.  This traditional-
contemporary continuum was the main difference Reggie and Vernon had identified, and 
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was a clear distinction I could discern in my initial months of participant observation.  
The distinction is of great importance to religious institutions’ relationships with, and 
influence on, second generation youth. 
 
Table 3.1. Religious Organizations Visited for Participant Observation  
The four case study organizations are each marked with a star (*) 
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* Ruach Ministries 
 
 
Universal Church of the Kingdom of 
God (UCKG), Brixton 
 
 
 
* The East London Mosque 
 
 
Darrul Ummah 
 
 
In actual practice, this selection process was at times quite simple and 
straightforward.  It was clear from the beginning that two particular religious institutions 
are highly influential and youth oriented: Ruach Ministries and the East London Mosque 
(ELM).  Each of these institutions is estimated to draw about 4,000 worshipers during its 
main religious services day each week (Friday for ELM, Sunday for Ruach).  Even if the 
4,000 total is overly optimistic, Ruach and ELM undoubtedly draw weekly numbers in 
the thousands, making them exceptionally large congregations for London and Europe.  
The East London Mosque is probably the largest mosque in Europe in terms of weekly 
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attendance.  Ruach Ministries is one of a set of dynamic and growing African or 
Caribbean led churches in London, and it is the fourth largest church in Britain (see Table 
3.2). 
 
 
Table 3.2. Megachurches in Britain 
With estimated weekly attendance (Peck 2006) 
 
 
1. Kingsway International 
    Christian Centre (KICC) *  10-
12,000 
2. Kensington Temple   5,500 
3. Hillsong Church    5,000 
4. Ruach Ministries *  4,000 
5. Glory House *   3,000 
6. Holy Trinity Brompton   2,500 
-. Jesus House  *   2,500 
-. St. Thomas', Sheffield  2,500 
9. New Wine Ministries  2,100 
 
* = African or Caribbean led church;   = Based in London 
 
Sometimes the selection process proved more difficult.  At one point, I considered 
selecting the Brixton branch of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (UCKG), a 
highly successful Pentecostal denomination that is known as the IURD in Brazil.  The 
UCKG has a unique basis of operations compared to other British churches: It has 
established “Help Centres” that are open 24 hours each day, providing prayer, spiritual 
advice, or other assistance to anyone who wishes to visit.  All of the UK church branches 
also hold four religious services every day of the week with particular themes (e.g., 
Monday is about financial problems, Tuesday spiritual healing, and Wednesday personal 
development).  I attended the Brixton UCKG church for its largest Wednesday service, 
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and learned that it has a substantial segment of youth as well as highly developed youth 
programs. Unfortunately, after a long process of persistent communication with the 
central church office of the UCKG, I was not allowed further access to the Brixton 
congregation for research.  London branches of the church have been embroiled in 
various controversies over the past decade.35  Although these issues were completely 
unrelated to my intended research with the youth ministry, they may be the reason for the 
cautious gatekeeping I experienced in my interaction with the church hierarchy.  My 
experience was not dissimilar to Sophie Gilliat-Ray’s (2005) failed attempts to access the 
“closed worlds” of four Deobandi Muslim seminaries in Britain. 
As my knowledge of Brixton deepened, I realized that the UCKG would not have 
been the ideal case study pairing with Ruach Ministries even if access was granted.  Both 
churches can be classified as Neo-Pentecostal, and it was important to broaden my 
research to include other potential forms of youth religious experience.  I chose to attend 
the Brixton Seventh Day Adventist Church as a more traditional church pairing with 
Ruach.  Seventh Day Adventism is the largest Christian denomination in Jamaica, and the 
denomination is thriving among British blacks.  Because many second generation 
Jamaicans will be brought to traditional churches by their parents, this particular church 
allowed me to tap into a common experience for Jamaican youth. 
I likewise chose the Jamme Masjid (Great Mosque) on Brick Lane as a 
complementary case study to the East London Mosque due to its traditional first 
                                                 
35The most high profile controversy for the UCKG church was its alleged lack of 
intervention to help eight year old Victoria Climbe, who died from her parents’ abuse in 
2000.  The girl had brought problems to the attention of a UCKG pastor.  In a much 
smaller controversy at the time I was doing research, the UCKG was planning to renovate 
a historic theater in Walthamstow, but received significant opposition from local 
residents because they believed it is a cult or a “health and wealth” ministry. 
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generation influence.  The mosque is located at the center of the Bangladeshi “heartland” 
in London on Brick Lane, a street famed for its Bangladeshi curry houses.  This mosque 
is one in which many Bangladeshi youth first learn to pray and attend Qur’anic recitation 
and Arabic classes.  Like the Brixton Adventist Church, it maintains transnational ties 
with the country of origin, serving as an ethnic community hub in its local area. 
I will now profile each of the two churches and two mosques in turn.  My goal 
will be to elucidate the citizenship identities they communicate through their religious 
messages, and the practices and resources that might constrain or enable youth 
citizenship, in ways both overt and subtle. 
 
Brixton Seventh Day Adventist Church: The Dutiful West Indian Citizen 
Some residents of Brixton may be unaware of the large Brixton Seventh Day 
Adventist Church.  It lies just North of the large Tesco grocery store on Acre Lane, but is 
nestled within quiet residential streets that have rows of identical Victorian terraced 
houses.  The Adventist church is in a building originally constructed by the Church of 
England in the early 20th Century.  As has become a common story in Britain, the original 
Anglican congregation aged and declined, providing the Adventists with an opportunity 
to buy the Victorian style building.  Today the main sanctuary does feel like a historic 
church.  It is well kept and spacious, with seating for the choir behind the podium and 
many rows of dark wood pews for the congregation.  The room is carpeted in a regal red 
color.  New flower arrangements are regularly provided to match the seasons.  It was in 
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this sanctuary that the Brixton church hosted Prime Minister of Jamaica Bruce Golding, 
himself married to an Adventist, to speak from the pulpit in May 2008.36 
Adventists celebrate Saturday each week as their Sabbath, or day of worshipful 
rest.   At the Brixton church the main worship service takes place on Saturday morning, 
followed by a community lunch, and then an Adventist Youth Service (AYS) in the 
evening.  From attending these services and events various times, I would estimate that 
the church reaches a maximum of about 300 attendees on a regular week.37  Members of 
the Brixton Seventh Day Adventist Church know it simply as “Brixton.”  Their 
affectionate nickname conveys the church’s intention to represent the best of what 
Brixton is (or should be) about. 
Jamie Gittens is the youth pastor at Brixton Seventh Day Adventist Church, a role 
that she holds in a voluntary capacity.  Jamie’s parents came to England from Trinidad.  
When I met Jamie to interview her about youth work at Brixton, she was in her late 
twenties.  She wears glasses, has her hair back in a ponytail, and has a gentle manner 
about her.  Jamie joked with me that the young people at the Brixton Seventh Day 
Adventist Church can never guess her age, usually guessing older, but sometimes a bit 
younger. 
Jamie said she had first started volunteering as the youth leader because: “I've 
seen that my generation's left.  They're all gone.”  For one reason or another, all of her 
                                                 
36At the time of writing, the speech given by the Prime Minister of Jamaica at Brixton 
Seventh Day Adventist Church could be viewed here: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1xgOyLoK78c 
 
37I also attended the church during a revival campaign when the numbers can swell to be 
substantially larger, but the new attendees at these campaigns are not necessarily 
representative of the regular congregation. 
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childhood friends of the same age either left for another church or drifted away from faith 
altogether.  “Now that I'm 28,” she continued, “my passion is that as that next generation 
comes out they don't do the same thing.” 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Brixton Seventh Day Adventist Church 
 
 
 
 
The Brixton Adventist Church has a Sabbath School class for teenagers.  There is 
also a more loosely organised set of events for youth in the church which include people 
in their 20s or early 30s, which is largely organized through Facebook.  The Adventist 
Youth Service (AYS) on Saturday evenings is, in reality, only for “youth” in name.  I 
attended the AYS several times, and each week it seems to function as a somewhat 
smaller transplant of attendees from the morning service who are choosing to spend their 
whole day in church activities.  The attendees at all services at the Brixton church are 
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almost all black.  At least sixty percent are female.  The largest specific demographic 
within the church is composed of older, first generation, West Indian women.  Women 
wear nice dresses and many wear church hats, while most men wear suits.  As Jamie had 
mentioned, although there are children and adults in the church, there is a noticeable 
vacancy of young people in their upper teens and twenties. 
I asked Jamie why, in her view, young people so often leave the church when they 
reach their late teens.  She thinks that generational issues are a big part of this issue.  
“Sometimes young people can be very sensitive about comments on their dress,” she said 
implying that the modest and fairly formal dress code can be a barrier.  I noticed myself 
from attending the church that I never saw anyone wearing earrings or other jewellery, 
including young women.  Jamie believes that there is a generation gap within the church.  
She has tried to help heal the divide when possible.  She once held an event where 
members of the different generations were gathered together to air their differences “but 
no one would talk.  It didn’t really work.” 
Most of Jamie’s work is with the regular teen Sabbath school class, and she 
remains optimistic overall that youth ministry can make a difference.  She was aware of 
my research on citizenship.  I asked her about the main goals of her ministry work with 
youth.  She expressed these partly in civic terms: “First and foremost is on a spiritual 
level, that they become closer to God,” she said, “And second of all, that they become 
active citizens of the church.  And by that, they’ll also be developing their talents that 
they’ve been given and use that in the community” [emphasis added]. 
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The core of citizenship, according to Jamie, is located in the church as an 
institution.  It is through involvement in this institution that youth develop skills that they 
can apply to national citizenship more broadly.   
Jamie explained to me further what she means by “active citizenship of the 
church” and how this can carry over as the use of “talents… in the community” beyond 
the church walls.  Being part of the youth ministry at Brixton SDA “helps you become a 
good member of society.”  In her own experience: “I wouldn't be able to do presentations, 
or write songs, or write poems, or do public speaking if it wasn't for the skills that I 
developed when I was younger from the AY38 youth program.”  Youth ministry is a place 
in which useful skills can be developed that one can apply to the benefit of society. 
How well are Jamie’s civic goals for youth actually accomplished by the youth 
work and general ministry of the church?  To answer this and related questions I visited 
Brixton Seventh Day Adventist regularly for participant observation. 
The first Saturday Sabbath that I visited the church, I planned to attend the pre-
service Sabbath School, although I was arriving slightly late.  As I approached the 
building, a street evangelist paced back and forth outside the church.  He was preaching a 
message of repentance and the End Times to convict passers by and draw them inside.  I 
smiled politely as I walked in.  Immediately upon entering the church sanctuary I was 
greeted by a charming middle-aged women wearing a white dress and a black and white 
scarf.  She discreetly funnelled me to Sister Alma’s class for newcomers, already in 
progress.  The sanctuary space had been divided into perhaps half a dozen Sabbath 
                                                 
38AY stands for Adventist Youth.  The Adventist Youth Service that takes place in the 
evenings at Brixton is part of a well-resourced curriculum and strategy for youth work 
developed by the British Adventist Church. 
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School classes.  Groups sat on pews in different areas of the room to study the Bible 
together. 
Sister Alma is an elderly West Indian lady, with a voice that is both kindly and 
stern.  She was wearing a dress and a large church hat, which perfectly matched in 
peacock blue.  Sister Alma regularly teaches the newcomers’ class.  I sat down alongside 
about ten others who were new to the church.  The Bible study was, in large part, Sister 
Alma’s own spiritual instruction to us.  She executed this with aplomb.  When she 
checked for questions at the end, one woman sitting in our section raised her hand to 
speak.  The woman said that she had attended Pentecostal churches in the past and asked 
if there was any difference.  With a motherly concern in her tone of voice, Sister Alma 
explained that the Adventist Church takes very seriously the authority of the Word of 
God.  She mentioned spiritual practices that might happen in a Pentecostal church, such 
as speaking in tongues, and chastened our class that we should recognize these as 
inappropriate in a church setting because (paraphrasing 1 Corinthians 14:33): “God is not 
a God of disorder.  He is a God of order.” 
In the several weeks that I attended the Brixton Adventist Church for observation, 
the theme of orderliness came across consistently.  Adventist services were very carefully 
structured.  Following the service plan, different members of the congregation stepped to 
the podium to lead singing, make announcements, or to give a musical performance.  
This service structure also provided a sense that the service was a family enterprise, as 
many different members of the congregation of different ages and were responsible for 
leading different sections from the podium.  Before and after the service, when friends or 
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acquaintances met they would shake hands and share the common greeting of “Happy 
Sabbath!” 
Services at the Brixton Adventist Church regularly make mention of the West 
Indian origins of the congregation – usually using this term rather than “Caribbean” or 
the more specific “Jamaican” (though Jamaicans do compose the largest single ethnic 
group in the congregation).  For example, early into the first service I attended, an Elder 
came to the front to initiate the service.  He reminded the congregation of the importance 
of being punctual: “They say there’s a ‘West Indian Time.’  Well, there is no West Indian 
time.  There are no excuses for being late to church.”  
The model of a good young citizen that is expressed by the church has a particular 
ethnic character – it is a good, young West Indian citizen.  This is because the 
descriptions, models, and injunctions expressed in church for what is good and right for a 
young person to do are frequently expressed as West Indian values.  There is a cultural 
specificity to good citizenship within Brixton Seventh Day Adventist Church. 
The church’s West Indian values are combined with a strong emphasis on being 
Adventist.  Seventh Day Adventists accept the foundational Christian beliefs in Jesus 
Christ as Lord and Savior, as outlined in the New Testament.  In their scriptural 
hermeneutic, they believe that Old Testament Law is likewise incumbent upon believers 
to follow.  Adventists are distinctive from most other Christians in their attempt to carry 
on the Old Testament Jewish tradition of beginning Sabbath at sundown on Friday and 
celebrating it throughout Saturday.  In an effort to uphold the Mosaic Law in scripture, 
Adventists do not drink alcohol and maintain a careful diet.  Several members of the 
congregation told me that they try to avoid processed foods, while some were vegetarian.  
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Based in the importance placed on detail in dates and laws by the Adventist founder, 
Ellen White, there is a frequent message of readiness for the End Times and Jesus’ return 
to judge the world.  The strong emphasis on following particular practices as a minority 
within the larger stream of Christian tradition can have the effect of “ethnicizing” 
Adventism.  By this I do not mean that Adventism becomes a distinct ethnic identity in 
its own right, but rather that the symbolic boundaries of Adventism further facilitate the 
ethnic distinctiveness of West Indian identity. 
The emphasis on Adventist distinctions was frequently expressed in church 
services.  On one communion Sabbath that I attended, Head Pastor Hamilton Williams 
preached about the meaning of the communion meal, as established by Christ himself.  
Pastor Williams is a tall and broad-shouldered Jamaican man of middle age, with glasses 
and a meticulously shaven head.  He speaks with great force and verbal dexterity, 
intermixing frequent quotes from the King James Bible with his own words that have a 
potent Biblical tenor (e.g., “the martyrs were torn asunder!”).  In this particular sermon 
about communion, Pastor Williams took pains to communicate that at the Last Supper 
Jesus and his disciples “had just eaten bread and unfermented wine.”  He made it 
unequivocally clear that drinking wine and other alcohol is not a permissible indulgence 
in one’s earthly life.  Jesus himself said, in the theme verse of the sermon: “I will not 
drink henceforth of this fruit of the vine, until the day when I drink it new with you in my 
Father’s kingdom” (Matthew 26:29).  The sermon’s resounding message was one of the 
delay of gratification.  It is necessary to maintain discipline and patience until it is time to 
be reunited with the Lord. 
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The requirements for self-control, patience, and modesty, as I have conveyed, 
were communicated often in the Brixton Church both as tenets of Seventh Day Adventist 
faith and as traditional West Indian values.  One example of these values being taught in 
reference to youth was through a skit in one evening AYS service.  Entitled “Imitation of 
Life,” the skit was performed by young people from the congregation, largely in their mid 
to late twenties.  The skit stars a young man in the role of Johnny, who is growing up in a 
stereotypical Adventist West Indian family.  It is based on the scripture verse Proverbs 
22:6, which says “Train up a child in the way he should go: and when he is old he will 
not depart from it.”   
At the beginning of the skit, Johnny is a teenager and a good member of his 
family.  He passes an important exam at school.  He prays devotedly: “Dear Lord, the 
only real peace that I have is in You.”  His West Indian mother may be a bit overbearing 
in her faith – when Johnny faces a difficult situation, she advises him to “just praise the 
hurt away!”  Johnny’s father is perhaps too neglectful – he sits at the kitchen table in his 
bathrobe to read the newspaper, often forgetting his own children’s names.  These adult 
characters, portrayed by youth actors, received much of the laughter from the young 
people in the audience.  But the overall message was serious: Johnny lived in a relatively 
happy and secure family. 
Johnny goes away to university and falls in with the wrong crowd.  He spends his 
time with three young men who portrayed as delinquents: A Rastafarian, a youth in the 
pan-African movement, and another friend who is into hip hop.  “Just forget what your 
mummy tell ya,” they say.  Soon Johnny is smoking weed with these friends and skipping 
his classes.  To uproarious laughter from the audience, he starts to take on Rastafarian 
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mannerisms, yelling out expressions like “Jang Rastafari!”  Johnny, while on a drug high, 
writes a letter to his mother that reveals the depths of his condition: “Dear Mum, I have 
decided to become a Rastafarian.  Christianity is no longer a thing that I do.  Re-spect!  
Stay blessed in Selassie.”  As the skit closes, Johnny remains estranged from his parents.  
A narrator quotes again the Proverb about training up a child.  Perhaps Johnny’s parents 
had not done enough for him. 
After the evening AYS service ended, a middle aged West Indian woman asked if 
I had liked the skit.  I told her yes, I thought it was funny and had a good message.  “Oh, 
you understood it?” she replied, “You know, that really can happen!” 
The Imitation of Life skit communicates well Brixton SDA Church’s approach to 
socializing its youth into good believers and citizens.  The Proverb of “Train up a child in 
the way he should go” that bookends the skit conveys the church’s highly pedagogical 
and family-centric approach young people.  The skit also reveals the main peril that the 
church perceives to this socializing mission: A permissive youth culture that can steal 
away young people from Christian faith, life achievements, and parents.  The use of 
Rastafarianism, Pan-Africanism, and hip hop as competitors to the Adventist faith 
showed the particular symbolic boundaries by which the church defines itself in 
opposition to others. 
The kind of citizenship modelled in the Brixton Seventh Day Adventist church is 
a dutiful citizenship that honors the place of family and of traditional values.  It is a 
citizenship with the particular ethnic tinge to it, as it is hoped that youth will locate 
themselves in the heritage and values of the West Indies.  Not always distinct from these 
cultural values are the doctrines of Seventh Day Adventist Christianity, which are 
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considered the ultimate guidelines to an upright life as a citizen of church and greater 
society.  An ideal youth “graduate” of the Brixton Church, then, will be a dutiful 
Adventist West Indian citizen.  There is much to hold together in this model of 
citizenship.  It faces the challenge of being heavily reliant on intergenerational 
transmission.  As Jamie had suggested – and as the relative lack of youth involvement in 
the AYS service makes clear – the transmission process has been a tenuous one.  
 
Brick Lane Jamme Masjid: The Dutiful Bangladeshi Citizen 
The religious building that now houses the Brick Lane Jamme Masjid (Great 
Mosque) was originally constructed as a French Huguenot church in 1743.  The building 
is frequently noted as an architectural symbol of Britain’s multicultural and 
multireligious immigrant history.  The substantial rectangular brick structure stands on 
the corner of two streets – stately Fournier Street lined by tall Georgian town houses, and 
energetic Brick Lane blazing with the neon signs of its curry restaurants.  A sundial 
placed high on the external wall of the religious building bears the inscription Umbra 
Sunnus, or “we are shadows.”  Huguenots originally placed the inscription there as a 
reminder of the fleeting nature of earthly life.  The phrase also captures well the historic 
transience of immigrant communities through these streets.  
The Huguenots who built this place of worship in the Eighteenth Century were 
fleeing persecution from Catholic France.  Although initially facing exclusion from 
British society as well, they incorporated and intermarried within only a few generations.  
The building spent a decade in the early Nineteenth Century as the home of a Christian 
missionary society to Jews, and then became a Methodist Chapel in 1819.  By the end of 
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the Nineteenth Century, the Jewish population of the East End had grown rapidly, in 
large part due to the pogroms that followed the 1881 assassination of Russian Tsar 
Alexander II.  Jews purchased the Brick Lane building, and it functioned as the 
Machzeike Adass Great Synagogue from 1898 until the 1970s.  At one time there were 
more than 100,000 Jews living in the East End of London.  Yet as members of this 
community also incorporated into society or grew more affluent, they moved to other 
parts of London.  Bangladeshis, who began settling in the East End in significant 
numbers in the late 1960s, purchased the building to convert it into a mosque in 1976. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Brick Lane Jamme Masjid 
 
 
 
 
The same building on the corner of Brick Lane and Fournier Street, then, has been 
a Huguenot church, a Christian missionary society, Methodist chapel, Jewish Synagogue, 
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and Bangladeshi mosque.  Throughout the years, as Anne Kershen (2005) notes, it has 
been an important center of both religion and community life.  The building has come to 
represent the part religion can play in rooting immigrant communities in their new home, 
providing them with spirituality and a secure community space that may facilitate their 
successful incorporation. 
The religious building on Brick Lane is Grade II listed, meaning that its historic 
structure is protected in British law.  When converting the building into a mosque the 
pews were removed and prayer carpeting was inserted.  Rooms in the basement were 
repurposed as areas for wudu, or Islamic ceremonial washing.  The most evident change 
to the exterior has been the erection of a tall silver minaret at the corner of the building in 
2009.  Some structural changes have been made in the layout of internal rooms, but the 
building for the most part retains its historic character.  The large main prayer room on 
the ground floor is covered in a sea of aquamarine prayer carpeting.  This carpeting abuts 
beautiful massive dark oak doors from the Eighteenth Century.  As Bangladeshi men bow 
down to pray, they worship beneath glorious golden candelabra-style chandeliers. 
The leadership of the Brick Lane Jamme Masjid referred me to Sajjad Miah, a 
mosque Vice President, for my questions about second generation youth.  On the day I 
had arranged to meet Sajjad I entered the mosque to find him gathered with the 
leadership board in their main office.  There had been an incident of pick-pocketing at the 
mosque only minutes earlier and the board was arranging their response.  Sajjad is a 
Bangladeshi man in his sixties, slight in frame, with glasses and closely shaven grey 
beard.  He was visibly preoccupied by the pick-pocketing situation.  We realized it would 
be better to postpone the interview to the following week.   
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I found Sajjad the next week at the mosque office again.  We ascended the dark 
oak central staircase in the center of the building.  Carrying our two English teas, we 
entered a large and bare multipurpose room upstairs to sit down at a foldable table for the 
interview. 
I asked Sajjad to describe his experiences of coming to Britain and living here.  
He arrived as a teenager in 1967 with his father.  As is true of most Bangladeshis in his 
generation, his original intention was to stay in Britain temporarily and for economic 
reasons:  
My initial understanding was that after short while we'll go back to the 
Bangladesh.  We'll go back to the Bangladesh after a few years or so.  There was 
no intention of settling here in the beginning.  But by the time passed, my other 
brother and sister and my mother came to this country.  By then we realized that 
[laughing] we'll not be able to go back to the Bangladesh! 
 
His early years in Britain had been exciting times.  There was a real pioneering 
spirit among the men who first arrived to take jobs.  At first they would join together for 
prayer in houses and various places.  Sajjad was part of the process of purchasing the 
building on Brick Lane, which was at that time a synagogue with declining membership.  
He told me: “The Jewish people knew that this building would be used for a mosque, and 
because of that it would be used for a religious purpose.  So they gave us a discount.”  
Yet the times were also challenging for Sajjad and his Bangladeshi compatriots.  
In the 1970s, skinheads were harassing the growing number of Bangladeshi residents 
around Brick Lane.  Sajjad had helped to form the Bangladeshi Youth Association to 
organise young men to protect the community.  The youth association also bought 
snooker tables and other recreational equipment to help men pass the time.  Over the 
years, many of the wives of these men arrived and the single men got married.  Sajjad 
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had himself started a family in Britain.  His five children now range in age from ten to 
thirty. 
Sajjad has taken an active part in major phases of Bangladeshi history in the East 
End of London.  He told me that he has witnessed changes in the Brick Lane area, 
especially in relation to youth.  The main difference between youth in the 1970s and 
today is that they are now involved in “drugs and anti-social behavior” to a much greater 
degree.  Sajjad says that some virtuous young people are trying to bring their wayward 
friends “to the community.”  But in many cases, these youth are continuing to smoke or 
drink alcohol, sometimes in open defiance of their elders.  The main problems Sajjad 
perceives – the substance use, the delinquency, and the generation gap – are almost 
identical to the issues raised in the Seventh Day Adventist skit “An Imitation of Life.” 
At the root of these problems, according to Sajjad, is that “nowadays the youth 
don’t care about Bangladesh.  They are more London or English.”  His comment 
interested me, because at that time I had been asking second generation youth how they 
prioritize their identities.  I asked Sajjad himself about which components of identity are 
most important to him.  He considers “Bangladeshi” to be his core identity.  He follows 
this with Muslim second, and Sylheti (his region in Bangladesh) third.  Sajjad spoke with 
great enthusiasm about the natural beauty of his country of origin.  In his heart, 
Bangladesh remains his home. 
The Brick Lane Jamme Masjid maintains continuity with Bangladeshi way of life.  
Sajjad told me that the primary purpose of the mosque is to be a “place for the 
community.”  It is also, of course, a place of worship.  For Sajjad the Bangladeshi 
cultural and Muslim religious functions of the mosque are closely fused together, if they 
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can be distinguished at all.  The mosque inculcates an image of the good Bengali and the 
good Muslim through its khutbas (sermons).  First generation fathers may bring their 
children to teach them to pray at the mosque, and religious socialization of children 
occurs through years of prayer, khutbas, and the social closure of community 
relationships.  The mosque also reaches a youth segment directly through its separate 
classes for 10 to 15 year-old boys and girls to learn to read and recite the Qur’an.  Sajjad 
estimates that about a hundred youth take part in these classes, where “the imams give 
speeches on what is right and wrong.”  The mosque endeavours to teach young people an 
integrated vision of the good Bangladeshi Muslim – a kind of model citizen of the local 
community and also of Bangladesh. 
The Brick Lane Jamme Masjid is embedded in the Barelwi tradition of Islam.  
This means that it tends towards Sufi spirituality and cultural traditions of South Asia.  
The Barelwis of Bangladesh venerate the great Sufi saints, called pirs.  These saints, such 
as Shah Jalal, first brought Islam into the Bengal frontier.  The Brick Lane Jamme Masjid 
maintains spiritual practices and styles of worship infused Bengali traditions.  For 
example, each year it celebrates mawlid, the birthday of Muhammad, through communal 
singing.  Some Muslims of the East End consider such Barelwi traditions to be actions of 
shirk (idolatry).  Indeed, it is impossible to imagine a Bangladeshi mawlid being 
celebrated at the more theologically austere East London Mosque. 
The cultural continuity of the Brick Lane Jamme Masjid has meant that it is 
deeply appealing for many men who have immigrated from Bangladesh, especially older 
men.  According to Sajjad Miah, the mosque has space for up to 4,000 worshipers in 
prayer.  In my estimation attendance rarely exceeds 1,000 for the main Friday jumwa 
 102
congregation.  There is, nonetheless, a steady of stream of men entering and leaving the 
mosque on Fridays and around the prayer times every day.  Most of the men I observed at 
these times were older bearded men in traditional flowing Bangladeshi clothes and prayer 
caps.  It was very rare to see a young person at the mosque of my research demographic 
of age 18 to 25.  When recruiting young people to interview for the dissertation, I would 
try to approach anyone who could be of the right age.  In one early attempt I walked up to 
a man leaving the Jamme Masjid, who turned out to be in his thirties: “Oh no, mate,” he 
said, in an attempt to be helpful, “There are no youths here.  What you want is the East 
London Mosque.” 
One reason for the relative scarcity of young men at the Brick Lane Jamme 
Masjid is that the khutbas are only given in Sylheti, the regional language of most East 
End Bangladeshis.39  This language choice is the natural one for the community that the 
mosque has traditionally served.  Yet because the sermons are not also spoken in English, 
they may be perceived as somewhat out of touch by second generation youth, who while 
also being Sylheti speakers have grown up in the language and culture of Britain.  In 
addition, youth older than age 15 have no organized activities available to them at the 
mosque.  The strong influence of first generation parents on the mosque may jar with the 
desires of youth for more freedom and independence from their parents at this age. 
Through continued effort of recruiting young people leaving the Brick Lane 
Jamme Masjid, I managed to recruit and interview three who fit within my research 
requirements.  Two of these young men expressed no real affection for the mosque.  They 
                                                 
39Although it shares words in common with Bangla (the most widely spoken language in 
Bangladesh) Sylheti is a fully grammatically distinct language rather than simply being a 
regional dialect. 
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told me that they were simply there because of its proximity to where they lived, and 
each was, in fact, more involved in the East London Mosque.  The third youth was a 20 
year-old named Omar.  He did express some appreciation for the Brick Lane Jamme 
Masjid, as he had experienced the Islamic education sessions there when he was younger. 
Omar told me he gets along well with some of the older members in the Brick 
Lane Jamme Masjid.  “One of them is my neighbor,” he said, “He’s good, he’s funny.  
He’s got his own jokes – classical jokes.”  Omar likes to talk with men in the older 
generation.  Yet he believes that they have some limitations: “They haven’t studied 
Islam,” he said.  Omar has gone through “Islamic studies, from the teachers in 
Whitechapel,” by which he means teachers at the East London Mosque.  Amin told me 
that “older people go local for mosque,” coming to worship on Brick Lane.  “Young go 
more where there’s a nice atmosphere.”  One reason he gave for the attraction of young 
men to the East London Mosque is simply that “There are lots more PFCs [fried chicken 
shops] down on Whitechapel.”  Another youth I met, who sometimes attends the Brick 
Lane Mosque, more often goes to the East London Mosque because “there’s more 
younger religious brothers around which can help you, which can guide you.  And you 
feel more comfortable there, because there’s a lot of people around the same age, who 
dress in the same way.  With Brick Lane it’s more like the older generations that came 
across here first.” 
The Brick Lane Jamme Masjid shares many similarities with the Brixton Seventh 
Day Adventist Church, because both are first generation dominated religious institutions.  
In both congregations the cultural traditions, practices, and values of the first generation 
are faithfully maintained.  Both institutions are transnationally connected with their 
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countries of origin, bringing dignitaries and guests regularly to join in worship.  Perhaps 
the clearest difference between the two is the gendered maintenance of religious tradition.  
At Brixton, the congregation is majority female.  Women take on much of the leadership 
in teaching Adventist and West Indian values to the next generation.  The Brick Lane 
Jamme Masjid is, in contrast, an entirely male institution.  Although it provides religious 
instruction to girls, is unable to directly influence young women as they mature in 
adolescence. 
The Brick Lane Jamme Masjid is similar to the Brixton Church in its espousal of 
an ethnic style of citizenship.  The leadership of the mosque attempts to cultivate young 
people into dutiful citizens of the local Bangladeshi community, believing that this will 
make them better members of society.  Yet, even from my interviewing of youth who I 
met at the Brick Lane Jamme Masjid, I found clear signals that the mosque has limited 
influence on those in their middle teenage years or beyond, especially when compared to 
the East London Mosque.  I will return to profile this second mosque, after first giving 
view into a Brixton church that in many ways seems to share its high level of attractive 
power. 
 
Ruach Ministries: Champions and Ambassadors 
In his mid-thirties, Pastor Mark Liburd somehow manages to balance warmth and 
youthful energy with an authoritative air.  Mark is a second generation Jamaican himself.  
After beginning with a career in car electronics, he is now a Youth Pastor at Ruach 
Ministries in Brixton.  The church has an estimated 4,000 total attendees over its five 
Sunday services each week.  One of these services is the youth service each Sunday 
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afternoon at 2:00, which draws 150 to 200 young people.  This is an impressive 
achievement in the “rough” streets of Brixton, where it is the largest youth service.  Mark 
is actually one of two staff leaders of the youth ministry, but he acts as its sole 
representative the church’s senior leadership team.   
I met Pastor Mark at his office in Ruach for a 45-minute interview.  We spoke at 
length about the problems faced by young people in Brixton, including gun violence and 
drugs, and the role that the youth ministry has in confronting these.  Pastor Mark and 
some of the youth from his ministry do mission work and evangelism each summer in the 
poor council housing estates of the local area.  Some of his young people regularly help 
to staff a nearby youth club. 
 Early into the interview, Mark mentioned that his youth ministry helps young 
people become better citizens.  I followed up with a question to gauge what he meant by 
this: 
Daniel:  What does involvement in the youth ministry, or their Christian faith, do 
for someone in their British citizenship? 
 
Mark: I think that [question] in itself is problematic….  I don't think anyone 
knows what being British is! [laughs]....  There is a lot of confusion for people, 
what is Britishness, what does that mean?  Is it sitting in the Royal Albert Hall 
singing Old Britannia, waving your British flags?  Or is it just the fact that I'm just 
here I'm just a part of contributing to the country? 
 
For Mark, the concept of British citizenship is itself worth questioning.  He expressed an 
ironic (very British) skepticism about the expressions of patriotism in the summer 
concerts at Royal Albert Hall and about the cultural content of “Britishness” in general.  
He thinks that a sense of national identity is not as important as one’s contribution to 
society.  Mark continued, expressing what he believes to be a superior alternative to a 
citizenship based on British national culture: 
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The citizen side of things [for the youth in my congregation] is really making 
them a better citizen for society, if you sign up to being British or not.  It's more 
of a God culture.  Where your citizenship is really to heaven.  And your 
citizenship is signed up to that.  Whichever country you are in you should be the 
best citizen of that country because you're an ambassador of Christ. [emphasis 
added] 
 
Mark’s comments here reveal much about his approach to youth citizenship.  He begins 
by explaining that the environment he wishes to create at Ruach has a “God culture.”  It 
is a sense of congregational culture, a view of the kind of background conditions in which 
Mark hopes his youth will develop their perspectives on life.  “God culture” provides a 
sense of the kind of polity Mark hopes his youth congregation will be, one in which a 
consciousness of God is forefronted. 
Within the general congregational culture, Mark specifies that his youth should 
develop a citizenship that “is really to Heaven.”  In saying this, he is quoting from St. 
Paul the Apostle, who wrote to fellow Christians in the early years of the Church that 
“our Citizenship is in Heaven” (Philippians 3:20).  St. Paul was himself a Roman citizen, 
entitling him to legal protections and privileges that were highly valuable at that time.  
Yet he considered his spiritual citizenship as a Christian to be more important.   
Citizenship in Heaven, as Pastor Mark uses the term, relativizes both one’s loyalties to 
the nation-state and one’s valuation of a worldly citizenship.  Pastor Mark conveyed this 
approach to identity in a complementary metaphor from the New Testament – that 
Christians are “ambassadors of Christ” (2 Corinthians 5:20).    
Mark’s view is that spiritual citizenship is the ultimate place of safety and 
protection, social membership, and responsibility.  Yet, being a citizen of Heaven does 
not necessitate otherworldliness.  It has clear and tangible implications for the here and 
now.  As Mark said: 
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There's no way your country should look down and say “Oh my gosh, why are 
you tax evading, why are you?”  You should be the best citizen of whichever 
country you are in cuz that's the law of the land.  And you don't want to go against 
that.  So for me, the citizenship side of things is to get young people to sign up to 
being a good citizen regardless of if you believe you're British, if you're not, or if 
you were born in Ghana.  You're here.  You may be here for the next five years.  
Are you British or not, or are you just Ghanaian?  It doesn't really matter.  You 
come here be the best citizen until you leave…. It's really just making people a 
better person regardless of denomination, or if they sign up to being British, or 
Londoners, or Welsh or whatever.  Be who you need to be in alignment to 
Heaven. [emphasis added] 
 
Citizenship in Heaven, as Mark expresses it here, is a radical relativizing of other forms 
of identity and membership.  Mark speaks of “British,” “Ghanaian,” “Londoner,” and 
“Welsh” as identity options, but more important is that underneath these one is becoming 
“a better person.”  In fact, Mark expresses his view that cultural or national identity 
“doesn’t really matter” – much more important are one’s actions while staying in one 
country or another.  His view of youth in terms of being British seems more one of 
‘denizens’ of Britain than citizens, at least in the national identity sense.  
In order to witness the civic environment and “God culture” of Ruach Ministries, 
I attended the youth service several times beginning in May 2008.  The church is located 
on Brixton Hill, about ten minutes walk up from central Brixton.   It is tucked away from 
the street in an unassuming warehouse-conversion next to a carwash (see Figure 3.5).  On 
my first visit, I entered the foyer a few minutes early for the youth service that was 
scheduled to begin at 2:00.  The foyer was crowded with young men and women 
socializing in little groups.  As it turned out, the noon church service was running over 
time.  Television screens throughout the foyer displayed that service on live video as 
Bishop John Francis, Ruach’s lead pastor, spoke powerfully and ministered to a very 
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responsive crowd.  As I waited in the foyer that afternoon, I met several young people 
including Mike (introduced in Chapter 2). 
 
Figure 3.5. Ruach Ministries 
 
 
 
 
As the doors of the main sanctuary opened, hundreds of women and men with 
triumphant smiles streamed out into the foyer.  Some exited the building, others lingered 
in the foyer or the adjoining Christian bookshop.  Those who could not wait joined long 
queues for the restrooms.  Although I cannot confirm if four thousand people were 
attending over the multiple services that Sunday, the building was certainly stretched to 
capacity. 
I had met Mike in the foyer before the youth service.  When we were allowed to 
enter the sanctuary, we went through the main doors and found seats together.  The 
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sanctuary is the main room of the warehouse-conversion, substantially deeper than it is 
wide.  The room is fairly large and nondescript, with blue carpeting, white walls, a main 
stage with projection screens to each side, and no noticeable Christian symbolism.  
Around five hundred seats have been carefully fit into the space.  The Sunday youth 
service fills one to two hundred of the seats near the front.   
At Ruach youth services, ages range from 15 to early 30s.  On the average week 
the youth congregation is entirely black or mixed race.  Within this seeming homogeneity 
there is significant diversity.  Youth hail from many different Caribbean and African 
ethnic backgrounds.  In my several visits to Ruach I met young people with ancestry from 
Jamaica, Barbados, Ghana, and Nigeria, among other nations.  Sometimes this diversity 
is celebrated during the youth service itself.  On one Sunday a Trinidadian music artist 
was visiting to perform a few Christian hip hop songs.  As the MC introduced him, the 
two large projection screens displayed Trinidadian flags.  The MC started his 
introduction by riling up the audience: “Are there any Trinis in the house today?!  [some 
audience response]…  Are there any Trinis IN DA HOUSE?!! [yells and applause].” 
If a religious institution can be a place for cultivating “global citizenship” and 
expanding one’s vision of the world, then the multiculturality of Ruach is important to 
how it socializes young citizens.  Ruach’s internationally-oriented character was 
immediately evident as I entered the sanctuary: The walls are adorned with dozens of 
hanging flags of countries from around the globe.  It was an intriguing selection – flags 
from Ireland, Brazil, Ghana, Belgium, France, Greece, Denmark, Italy, China, Japan, 
India, Barbados, and Australia – but no Britain, no Jamaica, and no further Caribbean or 
African countries.  The flags display the global mindset that the church hopes to cultivate, 
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which is simultaneously wide in its extent and unconcerned with specific national 
boundaries.  They are representative symbols of “every nation, tribe, people, and 
language” (Revelation 7:9) whose histories will all culminate in God’s Kingdom that 
transcends all boundaries.  As Pastor Mark Liburd had told me in our interview, heavenly 
citizenship is more important than the specificity of national identity on earth: “Are you 
British or not, or are you Ghanaian?  It doesn’t really matter.” 
In that first youth service that I attended at Ruach, Pastor Mark served as the 
preacher.  He preached with the title “A Champion on the Road.”  The sermon provided a 
clear message about the kinds of young citizens Pastor Mark hopes to raise in his 
congregation. 
Pastor Mark’s sermon was undeniably funny and given in an inspirational style 
pitched to his Black British youth audience.  The sermon was based on 1 Samuel 16, a 
section of the Old Testament in which the elderly prophet Samuel visits David to anoint 
him as the King of Israel.  The Biblical episode that breaks with conventional 
expectations – The Israelites had in fact chosen a King for themselves, Saul, a tall and 
handsome warrior whom they could picture in that place of leadership.  Yet Saul had 
grown increasingly corrupt and distant from the God of Israel.  In choosing his 
replacement, Samuel visited a very unlikely candidate.  David was a mere shepherd boy.  
He was the youngest of and smallest of his brothers.  Pastor Mark illustrated for his 
congregation just how unlikely and unexpected the Samuel’s anointing was, as he 
couched it in a contemporary illustration:  “Imagine you were being groomed to be king.  
It would be like if Gordon Brown and the Queen came to you in McDonalds, to groom 
you to be king.”   
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“But David was a champion on the road!” Pastor Mark bellowed.  Humble he 
would not remain.  Mark used examples that appealed to both young men and young 
women in his audience.  In a saccharine tone, he spoke of the heartbreak David my have 
felt as he left the lambs he was raising as a shepherd – including, apparently, the 
especially cute “Larry the Lamb.”  Part of the congregation oohed.  But, Mark went on, 
David needed to grow up and face the challenges of life.  The big challenger was Goliath, 
the Philistine giant who was facing down the army of Israel. 
“Goliath was not just a big geezer…” Pastor Mark continued, smiling.  He paused 
for a moment, and then continued in his booming voice, “he was a big geezer with 
demonic powers!”  The congregation responded well, laughing and giving each other 
knowing glances.  Mark clearly knew his audience.  He knew how to move with street 
slang and how to place a good rhetorical punch. 
Pastor Mark quoted significantly from Biblical scripture in the sermon, and tied 
these references to life as a youth in London.  Mark spoke of how David, the champion, 
had been the representative of his entire nation when he faced Goliath.  He paraphrased 
the words of David to Goliath in their showdown: “I’m not an ordinary youth, because 
the Spirit of the Lord is upon me!”  Pastor Mark explained that David was victorious 
because he was favored by the Lord.  If you are a champion on the road, Mark told his 
young people, then likewise “no weapon formed against you can prosper.”   
Mark also drew from pop culture and contemporary examples.  He played a short 
film clip from Rocky, in which Sylvester Stallone, training for the big fight, runs through 
the streets of Philadelphia and up the stairs, ending in his iconic pose with hands in the 
air.  In the same way, Mark told the congregation, youth need a training regimen in 
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reading and learning the Bible if they are to develop into champions.  Mark spoke of 
debates he has had with atheists and people of other faiths when he has represented 
Christianity.  His training has prepared him for these.  There is no need to be fearful 
about facing such challenges in faith if youth remember that “Goliath won his battles 
through intimidation.” 
The message of triumphal living as a champion was a consistent theme in all 
preaching I heard at Ruach.  The church places an emphasis on the “faith gospel”: That 
one’s faith in God should to be tangibly manifested through personal victories (Gifford 
2004, 1998).  The theological core of the faith gospel is that suffering, poverty, and ill 
health are all evils, and that Christ has defeated these evils through his death on the cross 
and his victorious resurrection.  As believers grow in faith, they can expect to gain more 
freedom from evil and a greater capacity to achieve God’s personal plan for their lives. 
On the week after the sermon on being champions, Pastor Mark preached about 
how faith grants freedom from evil in a sermon called “Desperate for Deliverance.”  In 
this sermon he asked youth to consider if the struggles in their own lives could be 
attributed to spiritual forces – particularly demons.  Mark identified demons as causes of 
sinful emotions such as anger and jealousy.  He said that these supernatural entities can 
root into a person’s life in “strongholds” that make them difficult to remove.  Mark 
encouraged youth to be desperate for deliverance from the demons in their lives, praying 
fervently and fasting for a period of time if necessary.  At the end of the service there was 
a long session of ministry.  The whole youth congregation cried out loud in desperation 
about their struggles, some gesticulating to physically play out personal supernatural 
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battles.  People were encouraged to come forward at this time for prayers for deliverance.  
Mark spoke over their voices: “Be confident that this is something you can overcome!” 
Ruach’s motto, displayed on its printed Sunday programs is “Where Everybody Is 
A Somebody.”  There is a focus on applying faith to the achievement of personal goals 
(like a champion) and to the overcoming of personal struggles (such as demons).  Does 
the church, then, promote a brand of the prosperity gospel?  At the time I was attending, 
the Ruach bookstore prominently displayed Joel Osteen’s prosperity bestseller Your Best 
Life Now and a book called Prosperity Gospel: A Defense of the Theology.  Yet, in my 
experience of attending the youth service several times, the themes of health and wealth 
were seldom mentioned.  Much more common were themes of self-actualization through 
school success, the use of talents, and career achievements. 
The congregational culture in the Ruach youth service is decidedly middle class.  
As I met dozens of young people in the foyer before youth services, I learned that 
virtually all who are in the appropriate age bracket are attending university.  Although 
Ruach does not enforce a dress code, youth typically do dress well, and suits and ties are 
not uncommon.  In the first week I attended, a young woman came to the front of the 
church to give a testimony.  She spoke about God’s goodness in helping her achieve 
beyond her expectations on A-Levels, the British subject exams taken by secondary 
school students with university ambitions.  It is usually ambitions of this kind – modest, 
bounded, and professional – that are most celebrated in the Ruach youth service. 
There is some mismatch between the middle class culture of Ruach and the socio-
economic deprivation in some surrounding areas of Brixton, such as the infamous Angell 
Town public housing project.  The mismatch exists because the young people who attend 
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the Ruach youth service are predominantly not local residents.  Most of the youth I spoke 
with travel by tube or bus to the church each Sunday, some having come from a 
significant distance.  Youth were most often attracted to Ruach by the quality of the 
youth services or to the spiritual character of the church, including the “anointing” of 
Bishop John Francis, a figure who has great confidence and power.  Yet the fact that 
youth are not locals themselves has implications for the church’s outreach work in the 
locality.  Similar to the geographically-dispersed congregants that Omar McRoberts 
(2003) met in Four Corners churches, regardless of how effectively Ruach ministers to its 
youth attendees, its influence on the local Brixton area is questionable after they have 
taken their buses home. 
The youth that Ruach attracts are pleased, grateful, and often astonished at their 
encounters with God on a regular basis.  Damien told me that he was drawn to Ruach 
because: “I could just see how God is just moving, and just having this way, and just off 
the rails, and just having liberty in the church….  I just love Ruach.  It’s an outstanding 
ministry.”  The spiritual effects of Ruach on the young people I interviewed were 
something they spoke about with glowing passion, and these did not seem to reduce 
down to answered prayers or social connections.  
Pastor Mark Liburd spoke of his youth ministry as inducting young people into 
their “citizenship in Heaven.”  The meaning of this phrase at Ruach can be better 
understood through two of Mark’s specific goals for his youth – that they become 
“champions” and “ambassadors.”  Ruach youth services encourage youth to strive for a 
victorious life in which faith helps them to meet and overcome challenges as champions.  
The services also teach them to share the message of faith with others, acting as 
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ambassadors of Heaven.  It seems that Ruach’s youth are mastering the ‘champion’ side 
of this role, as many are fulfilling aspirations for personal success and emotional 
adjustment.  More questionable is their success in the ambassadorial side of the role – at 
least if being an ambassador means bringing a faith perspective into politics and local 
community engagement. 
 
The East London Mosque: Islamicized Citizens 
The East London Mosque is the largest mosque in Britain in terms of weekly 
attendance.  It is able to accommodate 4,500 people at a single time for prayer.  Over the 
course of the average week, the mosque estimates that 23,000 people pass through its 
doors.  The number increases to an estimated 47,000 during the holy month of Ramadan 
(East London Mosque 2010).  The East London Mosque is a purpose-built red brick 
structure with tall minarets, constructed in the 1980s on a busy section of Whitechapel 
Road.  The lineage of the mosque can be traced significantly earlier.  A London Mosque 
Fund had been established in 1910 to rent and then buy different sites in the East End.  
The directors of the Mosque Fund successfully raised the finances for the current 
building in part from the much-expanded community of local London Muslims.  They 
were also aided by a generous gift from King Fahd of Saudi Arabia.  The East London 
Mosque is a place of many firsts in Britain, including being the first mosque to broadcast 
its adhan, or call to prayer, over external loud speakers. 
A next expansion of the East London Mosque (ELM) took place in an adjoining 
site to create the London Muslim Centre (LMC), which opened in 2004.  The LMC is a 
six-storey building that has an impressive gate-like main entrance with a curved blue and 
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white Islamic tile motif above.  The completion of the LMC significantly expanded the 
prayer space of the mosque.  The LMC building also made new community facilities 
available to the mosque, adding a boys’ school, a day care, office headquarters for the 
major organizations Muslim Aid and Islamic Forum Europe, large event spaces and 
classrooms, a restaurant and café, accommodation, and a gender-segregated gym.  The 
LMC is the base for broadcasting the full-featured Muslim Community Radio every 
Ramadan, as well as a radio show called Easy Talk throughout the year (see DeHanas 
2010).  The LMC’s many facilities and activities also include various programs for young 
people, work placement assistance, and pro-bono legal advice that was recently 
commended by Britain’s former Chief Justice Lord Phillips (2009).  The joint work of the 
East London Mosque and London Muslim Centre led to victory in the Islam Channel’s 
UK-wide “Super Model Mosque” competition in 2009, in which various British mega-
mosques were pit against each other in competitive brackets for public votes.  Another 
expansion project for the mosque, called East London Mosque Phase II, broke the record 
for single day fundraising on an ‘ethnic’ television channel, when it brought in more than 
£1 million in a day on the Islam Channel.  Phase II will expand the women’s areas, add a 
multi-story parking garage, and provide improved facilities for funerals.  
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Figure 3.6. The East London Mosque [left with minarets] and London Muslim Centre 
[white entrance and six-storey building, right] after Friday Prayers 
 
 
 
 
I first visited the main East London Mosque prayer room with a friend in summer 
2007.  We walked inside through the automatic glass doors of the London Muslim Centre 
(LMC) entrance under the blue and white Islamic tiles.  Inside the grand LMC lobby, my 
friend and I removed our shoes and set them aside.  We walked through the corridor on 
the left towards the main prayer room of the mosque.  The prayer room is a large space 
about three storeys in height with white walls.  The floor is covered in blue carpeting 
with red decorative motifs at regular intervals.  Looking up at the ceiling, one can see the 
white inside of the mosque dome around which there is a circle of Arabic calligraphy 
displaying the ninety-nine names of Allah.  The main prayer room is reserved for men 
alone.  A women’s prayer room, located on a higher floor, overlooks the much larger 
main prayer space through a one-way glass.  When we arrived, the previous 
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congregational prayers had recently been completed.  There were perhaps two dozen men 
scattered across the room, most of them older and of the first generation.  Some men were 
prostrating in additional prayers.  Others lingered on the sides of the room to read or 
recite the Qur’an.  One elderly man sat with rosary-like beads that he used to guide his 
devotions.  A group of seven young men were seated in a circle at a back corner, quietly 
engaged in discussion.  The atmosphere was still and serene.  Men took their own time 
and space to engage in personal acts of devotion or study.   
I began to understand the ideological vision of the mosque by regularly attending 
public events at the London Muslim Centre.  The LMC has a very active calendar, 
including hosting Open Days and dinner events for the public.  These open events are 
always executed to a high standard in the LMC’s well-equipped seminar suites and public 
spaces.  The events are often designed to educate about Islam, build a reputation for 
transparency, and aid the mission of da’wah, or spreading the Islamic message.  By 
frequenting such events I was able to meet men with varying degrees of involvement in 
the mosque.  I was particularly fortunate at one LMC dinner event to sit next to Ehsan 
Abdullah Hannan, an East London Mosque imam.  
Ehsan does not match the stereotypical portrayals of imams commonly seen in 
British media.  In his thirties, he keeps his hair at a fashionable medium length and his 
beard carefully styled and cropped.  He was wearing a fine suit and tie when we met.  
Ehsan had recently started studying for a Ph.D. at the University of London’s prestigious 
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), where he has specialized in the writings 
of Islamic scholar Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyah.  Ehsan was a presenter at the LMC dinner 
 119
event on the evening that I met him.  He is an urbane public speaker, quoting with equal 
ease from Islamic scholars and western cultural icons like the Beatles. 
Some weeks after our first introduction, Ehsan and I met for a recorded interview 
about the mosque’s work with second generation youth.  We climbed the main stairwell 
of the London Muslim Centre to sit on couches in a modern upper foyer.  Ehsan at that 
time had the position of community relations imam, acting as the main mosque 
representative for various local outreach efforts and partnerships.  His work often 
involved young people.  For example, he was meeting later that day with BLYDA, the 
Brick Lane Youth Development Association, which does work to break Bengali young 
men out of drug dealing and gang lifestyles.  Ehsan’s own understanding of young 
Bangladeshis comes in part from being in the “1.5 generation” himself: He arrived in 
England with his parents at age 9, spending his formative years in British schooling. 
Ehsan and I spoke about many of the problems among young Bangladeshis in the 
local area, including drugs, violence, and low overall levels of academic achievement.  
To his mind, “the challenges are generally identity challenges.”  Problems most often 
arise when Bangladeshi youth develop “the sense that they have a very distinct culture” 
from the greater British community around them.  Ehsan explained his own theory on 
how such separationist identities develop:  
Many Bangladeshis when they were growing up would have been told “don't 
forget you're Bangladeshi.  Don't ever forget that you're Bengali.”  Not 
necessarily “don't forget you're a Muslim.”  I think it's parents using a safety 
harness, so they don't lose their children.  But because it didn't define what being 
Bangladeshi is or isn't, all it defined was ascribing yourself to a particular group 
of people….  If a person is told they are Bangladeshi and it’s drummed into them, 
on an unconscious level they’ve divorced themselves from greater society. 
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The problem is in large part a problem of self-segregation as Bangladeshi.  According to 
Ehsan, Bangladeshi identity is not filled with a particular moral content, so youth are left 
both isolated from the mainstream and unmoored from any particular value orientation.   
The issue is one of negative self-image because “the large majority of the 
Bangladeshi community come from the rural backgrounds of Bangladesh and are not 
very well educated.”  Ehsan said that youth who do not have adult role models beyond 
their parents’ immigrant generation can be mired in thinking: “This is our lot.  We’re an 
inferior class.  A race that’s treated in an inferior way.  They are not us, we are not they.  
They are white.  We are Bangladeshis.”  As such, there is little motivation to do well in 
education or to contribute to broader society. 
Ehsan believes that the solution comes from youth developing a strong core 
Muslim identity.  The East London Mosque promotes Islam as this core, which he thinks 
will help youth navigate the challenges of growing up in their generation: 
If they were to be told “you're a Muslim, keep your faith, be sincere, etc., etc.  
Remember your mother tongue. It's up to you what you want to call yourself 
[ethnically].  That's not an issue, as long as you're good to everyone and you 
respect everyone.”  Then they might start seeing people coming off the train, and 
that they've been working all day, working very hard.  That these are also my role 
models.  And life's about working hard.  They will start taking experiences of life 
from a greater pool of people. 
 
Ehsan’s message here closely resembles the words from Mark Liburd at Ruach about 
being a “citizen of Heaven.”  Ehsan, like Mark, thinks of all specific ethnic identities as 
all equally valid choices.  What matters deep down is that “you’re good to everyone and 
you respect everyone.”  Ehsan believes that Muslim identity provides the best way in 
which to achieve this good internal character. 
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 It is worthwhile to also compare Ehsan’s perspective, as a representative of the 
East London Mosque, with the words of Sajjad Miah of the Brick Lane Jamme Masjid.  
Sajjad sees Bangladeshi identity as the source of good values into which children should 
be raised.  In fact, he believes that the erosion of this cultural identity is the cause of 
youth drifting into delinquency.  Ehsan, in contrast, locates the problem in Bangladeshi 
cultural identity, which he argues leads to segregation and low aspirations.  Later into our 
interview, Ehsan posed the rhetorical question: “After how many generations are you 
going to say you’re Bangladeshi?”  In his view, it is an unsustainable identity.  It is much 
better to realize that “You’re one people now, you’re British, you’re part of society.”  
Islam can provide a singular and unifying way to do this, eliminating ethnic differences 
to allow youth to take on role models from “a greater pool of people.”  Sajjad and Ehsan 
– and by extension, the mosques they represent – are on the opposite ends of an East End 
debate about religion and culture. 
 The model of a good citizen that is upheld at the East London Mosque is the 
“Islamicized citizen.”  Ehsan’s comments provide a first view into this style of 
citizenship, which I would see reflected across the many sermons, events, and personal 
conversations through which I encountered the mosque. 
The messages with which a mosque can make its most consistent impact on 
believers are the khutbas (sermons) delivered for the main Friday afternoon 
congregational prayers.  At the East London Mosque, these are most often given by 
Senior Imam Abdul Qayyum, although the mosque also hosts visiting preachers.  
Because Friday prayers are so large at this mosque, drawing more than 4,000 people, I 
spent significant time getting to know the mosque at other times during the week before 
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attending Friday prayers for the first time in May 2008.  I arrived significantly early for 
the prayers, entered one of the large secondary prayer rooms, and sat down on the carpet 
at the back of the room.  Men of all ages began to enter, some in Arab or South Asian 
style dress, others in Western casual or professional clothes.  They followed the practice 
of filling in the next available space at the front in rows, with men shoulder to shoulder.  
Some Bengali boys in their early teens stayed in the back area where I was sitting.  I was 
not quite prepared for the sheer numbers as the large room filled to capacity.  Imam 
Abdul Qayyum, a bearded first generation Bangladeshi man, delivered the khutba that 
preceded the physical act of prayer.  He was broadcast to us via live video projection.     
Abdul Qayyum’s talk was the first khutba40 I heard at the East London Mosque, 
and I was immediately struck by how different it was in style from sermons at Ruach, a 
similar institution in terms of its appeal to youth.  The imam delivered a message of about 
seven minutes each in three languages: Arabic, Sylheti, and English.  He thus did not 
attempt to ‘warm up’ his hearers with an introduction, as Mark Liburd often does in his 
approximately 40 minute Ruach sermons.  Instead, Abdul Qayyum took us straight to the 
heart of the khutba: “Brothers and Sisters, [this message is about] the adab41 of the house 
of Allah,” he began.  Then, raising his voice with an added sternness: “The masjid42 is the 
house of Allah!”   
                                                 
40Khutba, as explained earlier, is the Arabic word for a sermon given in a mosque.  
Because this section of the chapter includes many Arabic Islamic words, I will footnote 
definitions of each in their first occurrence. 
 
41Adab: Manners, comportment. 
 
42Masjid: Mosque. 
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Abdul Qayyum’s sermon concerned the adab, or manners, of the mosque.  As it 
was an Islamic message, the version he delivered in English made frequent use of Arabic 
Islamic terms and interspersed quotes from the Qur’an and ahadith43 (also in Arabic).  
Abdul Qayyum spoke of how small actions to keep the mosque clean are honorable deeds 
that will be rewarded in the hereafter.  He mentioned several matters of Islamic etiquette.  
He gave an injunction to arrive punctually for prayers, which made the comment about 
‘West Indian time’ I had heard at the Brixton Adventist Church seem light and airy.  As 
he put it, quoting from a translated hadith: “The Prophet said: ‘There are some people 
always late, and Allah will make them late everywhere in righteous deeds.  Allah will 
make them so late that they end up in Jahannam!”44 
The imam’s khutba was serious in tone, though not humorless.  Later into the talk 
Abdul Qayyum explained with some exasperation that “The sock is a very big problem.  
Every summer I talk about the sock!  The sock carries a very bad smell.  Sometimes one 
person’s sock can trouble this whole house.”  Nor was his khutba behind the times – He 
spoke about how there is usually at least one worshiper who has left a mobile phone on 
during prayer time, and that if the phone rings it will “nullify their jumwa.”45  
This first khutba I heard from Imam Abdul Qayyum had the same tenor as most 
others he would give in the weeks I attended.  They were messages about the deen of 
                                                 
43Ahadith: The plural form of hadith, which is a compilation of the Prophet Muhammad’s 
words and deeds.  Various ahadith are available and Islamic schools and scholars have 
different judgments of the weight of particular collections. 
 
44Jahannam: Hell.  The opposite eternal condition of Jannah, or Paradise. 
 
45Jumwa: The main congregational prayers that take place on Friday afternoon each 
week.  It is considered obligatory for Muslim men to perform these prayers together with 
others at the mosque if they are able. 
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Islam: The set of religious micro-practices that fit into all areas of life.  The concept of 
deen includes the full scope of Islamic practices such as prayer, modesty of dress, 
manners in the mosque, saying bismillah (in the name of Allah) before embarking on any 
action, and eating and drinking with the correct (right) hand.  Deen, as the comprehensive 
blueprint of pious behavior, is an extremely important concept at the East London 
Mosque.  The idea of deen was often summed up for me by youth who would say that 
“Islam is not just a religion.  It’s a way of life.”  Most of the sermons I heard at the 
mosque were primarily aimed to provide guidance on correct behaviors in the Islamic 
deen, carefully prooftexting this with Qur’an or hadith references.   
The citizenship identity that the East London Mosque attempts to cultivate is that 
of the Islamicized citizen.  It is by a daily regimen of following the deen that one’s 
behaviors and outlook will progressively approach their Islamic ideal. 
Imam Abdul Qayyum delivered a khutba several months later, in January 2009, 
that sheds light on another aspect of the East London Mosque’s vision of the citizen.  The 
khutba was given in the immediate aftermath of the three-week Gaza War of December 
2008 and January 2009.  Abdul Qayyum spoke about the resilience of Muslims in Gaza 
through the Israeli incursion as evidence of divine intervention: “Allah subhanahu wa 
ta’ala46 helped them.  That’s why they survived,” he said, “That’s why they defended 
their land and their people.”  He urged his congregation to be steadfast in prayer, in the 
hope that Allah would intervene further:  
We must pray to Allah.  May Allah complete the victory of our brothers and 
sisters.  May Allah make [it so that] the house of Allah – Bayt Al-Maqdis, Al 
                                                 
46Subhanahu wa ta’ala: “glorious and exalted is He,” a phrase often used after the name 
of Allah that can be abbreviated in writing as swt. 
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Masjid Al-Aqsa47 – is freed from this illegal occupation.  May Allah free [this 
mosque] so Muslim ummah can pray there and glorify Allah subhanahu wa 
ta’ala. 
 
Imam Abdul Qayyum spoke to his congregation as members of the ummah,48 the global 
community of all Muslim believers.  He was urging prayer for the Al-Aqsa Mosque, an 
Islamic holy site of great importance in Jerusalem.  The mosque is currently regulated by 
Israeli authorities, who allow prayers there but reserve the right to restrict entry and 
times.  Abdul Qayyum was making a political statement that fellow believers should 
petition Allah in prayer, asking that Muslims might regain control of the mosque. 
 Yet prayer was not the only form of action the imam encouraged in relation to 
Gaza and Jerusalem.  He said that “Allah subhanahu wa ta’ala [has] given sincerity to 
the Muslim population.”  Muslims were already acting in various ways to come to the 
assistance of Palestinian brothers and sisters in the ummah.  He commended his fellow 
Muslims for “how they were doing dua,49 how they were generous to donate for their 
suffering brothers and sisters,” his voice cracking with emotion.  He spoke of “how they 
were participating in all these demonstrations and they’ll continue.  This the Muslim 
ummah have shown.” 
Ummah-membership enjoins political action, especially when others in the global 
Muslim community are suffering or threatened.  Political activism on behalf of Islamic 
                                                 
47Masjid Al-Aqsa (Bayt Al-Maqdis): The mosque on the temple mount in Jerusalem. 
 
48The ummah, when used in this sense, is the objectified global community of all Muslim 
believers.  The term ummah has different potential connotations.  Charles Tripp (2006) 
explains that the use of ummah in this global sense developed in the late 19th Century 
amid the questions raised by nationalisms.  
 
49Dua: Petitionary prayers.  Within the highly uniform framework of Islamic prayer, there 
is a period of dua in which personal petitions and devotions are appropriate. 
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causes is assumed to be the natural outworking of ummah solidarity.  Abdul Qayyum had 
spoken of praying, giving charitably, and participating in demonstrations as actions that 
Muslims take for the ummah.  Yet these actions must be underwritten by a pious heart.  
Citing an example of the Prophet’s piety when faced by the territorial struggles of his 
day, Abdul Qayyum reminded his listeners that “our relationship with Allah is number 
one.  That makes [sure] our financial contribution is accepted.  That will make [sure] our 
participation in all this picketing is accepted.” 
The East London Mosque attempts to develop worshipers into Islamicized 
citizens.  A first aspect of this process for second generation youth is the adoption of an 
all-encompassing Muslim identity.  Imam Ehsan had told me that such an identity 
displaces narrowly defined ethnic identities (Bangladeshi in this case) connecting youth 
to “a larger pool of people” and to a sustainable moral orientation.  A second aspect of 
the process of Islamicization is the continual practice and development of deen, the 
Islamic micro-practices of everyday life.  One’s entire life should be Islamicized, 
reaching from large life decisions down to the smallest of details in cleanliness or eating.  
Third, an Islamicized citizenship identity is embedded in a global community, the 
ummah.  Membership in the ummah is demonstrated by solidarity, including the 
willingness to take action or make sacrifices for the sake of fellow brothers and sisters.  
An Islamicised citizenship is a comprehensive one – it reaches deeply into one’s identity, 
daily practices, and community of belonging as it becomes the main frame of reference 
for civic engagement. 
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Concluding Discussion 
 Classic works such as Oscar Handlin’s The Uprooted (1951) and more recent 
studies by Kershen (2005), Casanova (2007; 2006), and others highlight the role of 
religion in the historic social incorporation of first generation immigrants.  Nicole Toulis’ 
(1997) study of immigrants in a Jamaican first generation church finds, in line with other 
recent research,50 that religion is a rich source of meaning, belonging, and social 
resources for many contemporary migrants undertaking the journey (Hagan 2008) and 
adapting to a new society (Mooney 2009). 
 Yet the same religious institutions that serve as secure ethnic hubs for immigrants 
may be viewed with indifference or even scorn by their second generation children.  Will 
Herberg (1955) observed the phenomenon that while ethnic identification tends to decline 
in the first three generations, religious identification usually rises.  Second generation 
adolescents and young adults who attempt to “break away” from their parents and adopt 
their own independent identities are likely to favor institutions that emphasize religious 
identities over and above ethnic ones.  
 Indeed, the “ethnic hub” institutions of the Brick Lane Jamme Masjid and Brixton 
Seventh Day Adventist Church struggle to retain youth beyond early teenage years.  In 
part, this is due to the high expectations they place on the young.  The citizenship 
identities upheld in these institutions tend to be too circumscribed and ethnically bounded 
for youth raised in cosmopolitan urban London.  They are based heavily on 
responsibilities of good behavior rather than on the rights and privileges that could come 
                                                 
50There is a very significant literature on this topic, well summarized in Foner and Alba 
(2008). 
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from being a member.  Mabel, a young Jamaican I met on Brixton Road, gave her 
perspective on the constraints of the Brixton Adventist Church she used to attend: 
There’s a church called Brixton Seventh Day Adventist Church just around 
Santley Street, and most people have left there, because of stuff like, they will 
concentrate more on what a person’s wearing than what’s in their heart or what’s 
on their mind, or the content of their character.  And things like, in Pentecostal 
church, you can shout “Hallelujah!” as loud as you want to, you can praise God.  
Whereas in the Adventist church, they’d tell you to be quiet. 
 
 The religious institutions that have won the affections of second generation youth 
are those which have conscientiously sought them.  Ruach Ministries has developed a 
youth service closely attuned to the style and needs of young people.  The East London 
Mosque offers extensive youth activities as well, some of these run by the Young Muslim 
Organisation or the Islamic Forum Europe.  The mosque has further developed its 
reputation among Bangladeshi youth because of its partnership work to combat drug 
addiction (Eade and Garbin 2006), its respected scholars and facilities, and its position as 
dialogue partner for British politicians and host to Muslim dignitaries.  It would be 
difficult for first generation ‘ethnic hub’ institutions to compete with the attractive power 
of such large and well-financed organizations. 
 Yet Ruach Ministries and the East London Mosque differ in ways that have 
implications for the kinds of young British citizens they produce.  First, there is a 
difference in how moral authority is communicated.  The youth service at Ruach 
promotes a “subjectified” Christianity.  When the pastor of Ruach’s youth service posits 
authoritative truth claims, these claims are made relevant to the individual subject in 
order to show that they are true.  The means of this subjectification include idiomatic 
preaching, contemporary music, and the fact that at Ruach, as Vernon had told me, youth 
are allowed “to come as they are.”  The subjectification of Christianity is most radical in 
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the ministry sessions at the end of Ruach youth services, when young people are 
encouraged to verbally and physically express their struggles by yelling, praying, 
speaking in tongues, and moving about the sanctuary.  It is in these sessions that youth 
communicate personally, and at times physically, with the Holy Spirit. 
 The subjectification of Christianity at Ruach Ministries is not surprising, given 
broader developments towards subjectivity that have been noted in Western religion and 
spirituality (e.g., Heelas and Woodhead 2004; Wuthnow 2000) and in Pentecostalism 
specifically (e.g., Coleman 2000).  Christian Smith, in a study of religion among 
American emerging adults, observes that young people “simply cannot, for whatever 
reason, believe in—or sometimes even conceive of—a given, objective truth, fact, reality 
or nature of the world that is independent of their subjective self-experience” (2009: 46).  
Ruach youth services do encourage youth to believe in objective realities by faith.  But it 
can be a faith that is tenuously held, and which is reliant on fresh spiritual experiences for 
its renewal. 
 The contrast is great with the East London Mosque.  The mosque promotes what 
scholars have called an “objectified” Islam (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996; Starrett 1998).  
Objectification is the process of transfiguring the various historic and context dependent 
streams of Muslim belief into a timeless, changeless, and singular entity of Islam.  
Whereas experience often dictates the truthfulness of the Pentecostal Christian message, 
for practicing Muslim youth Islam dictates much of their experience.  The Islamicization 
process is a systematic restructuring of everyday life – one’s daily schedule to meet 
prayer times, the gender composition of friendships, one’s outward appearance and 
personal habits – so that these conform to the Islamic deen.  Imam Abdul Qayyum makes 
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little, if any, attempt in his khutbas to speak in terms that are “relevant” to young people.  
He regards the behavioral obligations of Islam as transcendent and immutable.  
 There is, in fact, a finer line between subjectification and objectification than this 
discussion indicates thus far.  Ruach Ministries does preach a message of objective truth, 
and certain aspects of this message (e.g., the resurrection of Christ) must be accepted 
without firsthand experiential knowledge.  Likewise, Muslim youth who regularly pray at 
the East London Mosque may find that prayer is itself a subjective experience which feels 
so “right” that it confirms the objective truth of Islam.  For these youth, the regular body 
practice of prayer feels right in part because it is a familiar path that has been well worn 
by repeated travel.  Each act of prayer, in the context of thousands of acts before, adds to 
the internally referential veracity of Islamic experience.  
Overall however, the worship experiences at Ruach Ministries and the East 
London Mosque rely on different underlying logics of the connection between subjective 
experience, objective reality, and behavioral action.  I have diagrammed these differences 
in Figure 3.7.  At Ruach, subjective experience grants youth faith in an objective reality 
(Christianity), which will in turn motivate them to action.  At the East London Mosque 
the process begins with an objective reality (Islam) that compels youth to perform 
particular actions that will, over time, restructure their subjective experience. 
The objectification of Islam at the East London Mosque gives the Muslim identity 
propagated there a comprehensiveness and power.  At Ruach, because young people’s 
own experiences are accepted as functional arbiters of truth, there is a greater freedom for 
youth to take on faith in a self-focused or piecemeal manner.  This can mean that young 
Jamaicans include Christianity as one of many identities, while Muslim identity tends to 
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be more singular and all-defining – an identity phenomenon that I will explore in the next 
chapter.  It is also true that the implicit logics of belief in Figure 3.7 differ in the 
grounding they provide for action (and ultimately, for activism).  Islamic social activism 
is grounded in actions that are understood to be instantiations of ultimate reality (prayer, 
zakat, and so on), while Christian social activism is most frequently based in the faith 
experiences of individual participants – a difference in the social mechanisms of activism 
that I will explore in more depth in Chapter 5. 
 
 
Figure 3.7.  Subjective Experience, Objective Reality, and Action 
 
 
Ruach Ministries 
 
Subjective Experience            Objective Reality       Action 
 
 
East London Mosque 
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Moving beyond the discussion of moral authority, a second major difference 
between Ruach Ministries and the East London Mosque is in their notions of community.  
Muslims at the East London Mosque conceive of themselves as members of the imagined 
community of the ummah, which is global in scope.  Pnina Werber (2002) has written of 
Muslims in Britain as having membership an imagined diaspora, because their 
compels 
empowers grants faith in 
restructures 
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relationships with other Muslims are imbued with a sense of common ancestry or kinship.  
Indeed, the “Islamic” styles of clothing worn by many second generation Bangladeshi 
Muslims connect them globally with Arabian Peninsula clothing styles much more than 
with the traditional Islamic dress of Bangladesh.  Through these clothing styles, 
Bangladeshi Muslims develop even an outward family resemblance with Muslim 
communities elsewhere in the world.  Communal acts, such as regular prayer and fasting 
during Ramadan, are central mechanisms by which a sense of a global, diasporic kinship 
is built and reinforced. 
The East London Mosque is quite deliberate in its cultivation of the imagined 
community of the ummah.  A good example of the mosque’s work to develop a unified 
sense of Muslim community in the East End is its Muslim Community Radio station 
(MCR, 87.8 FM).  MCR is broadcast each Ramadan, with programs in both English and 
Bengali, including topical call-in shows, youth programs, limited forms of Islamic music, 
fatwa shows, and spiritual counsel for the challenges of fasting during Ramadan.  The 
radio station is exceedingly popular in the local area.  Bangladeshis of all generations 
listen in their homes or cars, and shopkeepers play it during the day.  The broad reach of 
MCR during Ramadan helps to set the agenda for local activism, to instill a particular 
stream of Islamic interpretation, and to create a common sense of community, as 
Muslims throughout the borough listen to the same topics discussed each day (see 
DeHanas 2010).  Throughout the year, the mosque broadcasts a weekly political 
commentary show called Easy Talk, via Internet radio.  The East London Mosque also 
establishes a sense of community simply through sheer numbers.  Every Friday, 
Whitechapel Road is transformed by the large crowds attending for congregational 
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prayers.  The mosque’s presence is accentuated during Ramadan, when many local 
residents dress more “Islamically” and attend various events at the mosque.   
Because so much of the East London Mosque’s cultivation of community happens 
through the common actions of believers, the result is probably best termed an enacted 
community (rather than simply an imagined one).  With its strong community presence, 
the East London Mosque is more analogous to an Islamic cathedral51 than to a 
megachurch.  It has taken on the local area as its “parish” and now has significant sway 
religiously, socially, politically, and in public displays of piety.  
In Chapter 2 we found that Bangladeshi Muslim youth are highly engaged in civic 
actions that are communally oriented, such as boycotting Danish and Israeli products, or 
signing petitions against the war in Iraq.  Actions of these kinds are sometimes promoted 
by the mosque directly, or more often informally through the various social networks and 
organizations that are based there.  As the East London Mosque’s community presence is 
so strong, its political mobilization efforts are important to explaining the robust levels of 
Bangladeshi youth civic engagement.  
In comparison, Ruach Ministries’ vision of “citizens in heaven” tends towards the 
otherworldly.  It has not taken on a parish-like vision of the Brixton area, working instead 
on the principle common to (Neo-)Pentecostal churches that “the world is [its] parish” 
                                                 
51There is of course, a long tradition of mosques serving as centers of the community, 
education, and society.  The use of “cathedral” here is simply as an analogy familiar in 
Western tradition.  For Islamic mosques in the same period as Europe’s great medieval 
cathedrals – with the same grand social and cultural scope – see Daniella Talmon-
Heller’s studies of mosques in Damascus, Aleppo, and Jerusalem (2008). 
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(Martin 2002).52  Whereas the East London Mosque’s vision of the ummah as the site of 
citizenship identity is grounded in particular territories (e.g., Mecca, Palestine, Kashmir), 
Ruach’s global vision is radically de-territorialized.53  The Ruach sanctuary is lined with 
flags of the nations of the world, but the actual choice of nations seems to be arbitrary.  
Congregants have gathered at Ruach from all around London, drawn by the charismatic 
leadership of its pastor.  Ministry happens within its walls and in the lives of individuals.  
Ruach’s main aim, then, is not to establish a local presence or imagined community – 
rather, it cultivates within each believer a sense of individual imagined communion 
between oneself and God.  Pastor Mark refers to this aim as creating a “God culture.” 
The difference between enacted community (at the East London Mosque) and 
imagined communion (at Ruach) is a significant one.  A personal faith developed at 
Ruach can be a powerful motivator for individual change and achievement.  However, as 
much as attendees at Ruach are sensitized to their individual needs for communion with 
God, they may at the same time be less attuned to possibilities for community change and 
renewal.  
                                                 
52This phrase that David Martin uses to describe Pentecostals is, of course, not a 
Pentecostal one.  It comes from the words of John Wesley (1739) in his journal: “I look 
on all the world as my parish; thus far I mean, that, in whatever part of it I am, I judge it 
meet, right, and my bounden duty, to declare unto all that are willing to hear, the glad 
tidings of salvation.” 
 
53On these points I differ from Olivier Roy (2003) who writes of globalized Islam as the 
pre-eminent example of de-territorialization.  This is understandably true of virtual 
Islamic communities on the Internet, for example, which he has studied.  My experience 
in the East End is that issues of territory are highly salient, both in terms of local mosque 
competition for “areas” and especially in terms of the global vision of Muslim territories, 
especially Palestine.  The most interesting dynamic is the shift in territorial importance: 
Bangladesh is the place most often spoken about by first generation Bangladeshis, while 
territories of the Muslim ‘diaspora’ are much more frequently mentioned in the context of 
the East London Mosque. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
COMPETING ALLEGIANCES?:  
SECOND GENERATION IDENTITY OPTIONS 
 
“Many British Muslims have divided loyalties” narrates Jeremy Vine on an 
episode of Panorama, the BBC investigative journalism show (February 2009).  The 
episode opens with segments of documentary footage: Police in riot gear confront an 
angry mob of Muslim protesters, radical preachers speak out against democracy, and a 
troubled white Muslim convert attempts to bomb a restaurant in Exeter.  Further into the 
episode there are various street scenes from British cities, including Brick Lane in East 
London, where bearded Muslim men, women in hijab, and urban mosques are 
accompanied by ominous music.  The overall message of the program is that radicalism 
lies just beneath the surface of British Islam.  The trustworthiness of British Muslims 
must be questioned.  The title of the episode captures these fears of divided loyalties: 
“Muslim First, British Second.” 
 Although the BBC Panorama episode is sensationalist, it is important not to 
dismiss outright the concerns it raises.  Loyalties to radical Islamic causes are a problem 
in Britain, however small the number of cases may be.  Timothy Garton Ash (2006), in a 
measured article written for The Guardian, argues that the British Muslim youth sense of 
belonging and citizenship presents a widespread problem.  Writing in the aftermath of the 
7/7 2005 London bombings, Ash admits: “For anyone who has hoped and believed, as I 
have, that the British way of integrating Muslim citizens is more promising than the 
French one, the last year has been discouraging.”  He cites a Pew Global Attitudes 
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Survey of Muslims (2006), which found that 81% of young British Muslims identified as 
Muslim “first,” above being British.  In contrast, only 46% of the youth surveyed in 
France chose Muslim above their nation of citizenship.  In the entire global survey, which 
included several Muslim majority countries, Pakistan was the only state in which the 
levels of “Muslim first” identity (87%) exceeded those of Britain.54  For Ash, these 
figures are a worrying sign of large scale Muslim youth alienation from British 
citizenship. 
Muslim first, British second?  In this chapter, I investigate the dynamics of 
identity and loyalty among second generation youth.  I will seek to determine how youth 
compose their identities, which identity components they most (and least) identify with, 
and the implications of these identities for civic engagement.  
Identity and loyalty issues are important to British Caribbeans as well.  Paul 
Gilroy’s classic treatise on race in Britain, There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack 
(1987), takes its name from a British racist slogan.  Gilroy argues in the book that British 
identity has historically been defined on white racial and Christian religious grounds, 
making it inaccessible for blacks and other minorities.  Some sociologists have argued 
that many ethnic minority youth react against hegemonic white or mainstream identities 
and develop what they have termed “oppositional culture” (Ogbu 1991) or an 
“adversarial subculture” (Portes and Zhou 1993), setting them at odds with greater 
society.  Following these arguments, the consistent underperformance of Black Caribbean 
                                                 
54Pakistan’s high percentage of “Muslim first” was probably at least as much due to 
weaknesses in the provisions of Pakistani citizenship as it was to a resurgence of Islam 
(see Naqvi forthcoming).  Bangladesh was unfortunately not included in the Pew Survey.  
The full list of Arab or Muslim majority nations included is: Morocco, Jordan, the 
Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, Kuwait, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Turkey. 
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youth in British education (Sewell 1997) and their lack of participation at the ballot box 
(Purdam et. al. 2002) may be rooted in their low sense of acceptance by or identification 
with broader society.  Some commentators suggest more generally that Caribbean youth, 
South Asian youth, and other minorities are not been developing clear articulations of 
British identity, and that this will have ramifications for British social cohesion and for 
national success. 
Many of the most urgent questions about citizenship and second generation youth, 
therefore, centrally concern identity.  Do second generation youth experience the push 
and pull of identity influences as competing allegiances, or do they instead develop 
multiple cultural competencies?  What meanings do youth have in mind when they 
choose “Muslim first” or “Christian first” above other identities?  Are second generation 
youth developing a sense of ‘Britishness’ and a cultural identification with citizenship, or 
do they instead feel excluded from participation due to race, religion, or ethnicity? 
Before proceeding to address these questions, it will be important to define what 
is meant by identity.  There are many theoretical perspectives on identity in contemporary 
social science, including those found in the influential works of Tajfel and Turner (1979) 
and Barth (1969), among others.  When I speak of identity in this dissertation, I have in 
mind Manuel Castells’ succinct definition.  Castells (1997) considers identity to be:  
The process of construction of meaning on the basis of a cultural attribute, or a 
related set of cultural attributes that is given priority over other sources of 
meaning. [emphasis added] 
 
Castells’ definition can be used to emphasize that identity is a process, as Clare Saunders 
(2008) does in her recent article on identities in social movements.  In this dissertation I 
likewise treat identity as a process.  However, I put more emphasis on another aspect of 
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Castells’ definition – that within identities certain cultural components of meaning are 
“given priority” over others.  To state my perspective a bit differently: Identity is a 
process of cultural prioritization.  
 
Figure 4.1.  The Identity Ranking Exercise 
 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter I investigate the prioritization of cultural components in identity 
through a ranking exercise, which I engaged in with all sixty interviewees.  I placed 
various cards on the table with identities labelled on them (e.g., Muslim, Bangladeshi, 
British, Londoner).  Youth chose cards to describe their identities, ranking them in order 
of strength and explaining to me why they prioritize identity in this way.  The cards I 
used for this exercise are shown in Figure 4.1, and I describe the method in more depth 
when I present Table 4.2 later in this chapter.  
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From the evidence of identity rankings, I will build on the main argument of my 
dissertation about how religion influences citizenship.  In this chapter I will explain the 
contribution of identity – especially religious identity – to civic engagement.  To lay the 
foundation for this analysis, I begin by reviewing the main approaches to identity 
composition and prioritization that previous researchers have observed among second 
generation youth.  
 
Second Generation Youth: Four Styles of Identity Construction 
Continuity 
Much previous research on the second generation in Britain, particularly with 
South Asians, demonstrates a high importance of generational and family influences.  
First generation Bangladeshis tend to maintain strong ties with their home village, 
communicating frequently, sending remittances, and maintaining the illusion of eventual 
return (Gardner 2002; Ansari 2004).  Members of this first generation usually bring a 
traditional Sufi or Barelwi form of Islam.  Some may become more conservative in 
practices (such as adopting a stricter interpretation of hijab) as they become aware of 
their distinctiveness from British society (Ahmed 2005).  Several researchers have shown 
strong links of the second generation to these first generation immigrant parents.  These 
researchers argue that there is a substantial amount of continuity between generations.  
Charlotte Butler (1995), for example, found that families are central to the identity 
development of young Muslim women.  The young women she studied desired 
independence and education, but not to the degree that these would require a sacrifice of 
family links.  Butler discovered that for Muslim young women Islam can be an important 
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medium for maintaining intergenerational family ties, communication, and 
understanding.  Jessica Jacobson (1998) finds that second generation Pakistani youth may 
have any of a diversity of reactions to parents’ religious and cultural backgrounds – from 
positive acceptance to complete rejection – but that parental influence is almost always 
important.55   
Cultural studies scholar Errol Lawrence (1981) has argued, similarly, that 
continuity is the dominant trend between first and second generation Caribbean people in 
Britain.  There appear to be limits to his observation, however, at least in terms of 
religious identity.  Studies by Modood and colleagues (1994) and Crockett and Voas 
(2006) find that second generation Caribbeans are less likely to feel constrained to follow 
their parents’ religious perspective than are second generation South Asians. 
 
Between Cultures 
Social scientists studying second generation youth often recognize adolescence 
and early adulthood as unsettled years in identity formation, when family, religious, and 
ethnic identities are all open to be questioned (e.g., Lewis 2007).  In contrast with 
perspectives that emphasize continuity, some researchers that include Anwar (1998b) and 
the various authors in Watson (1977) have argued the second generation finds itself 
caught between cultures.  Youth may experience an identity crisis as they are riven 
                                                 
55Jacobson’s findings about the strength of parental influence on Pakistani youth appear 
to be corroborated by more general research on parental influence.  Nationally-
representative research on adolescents (Smith and Denton 2005) and on emerging adults 
(Smith and Snell 2009) in the United States finds that parents are typically the most 
pervasive and powerful influence on their children’s religiosity.  
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between strong parental, community, and religious norms and the usually more ‘Western’ 
and liberal perspectives of peers, schooling, and media.   
There are two solutions often mentioned to a between cultures situation.  Some 
youth will supplant the religio-cultural identities of their parents with a more “Western,” 
or perhaps “white,” identity espoused in school and by broader society.  Other youth will 
resist the ‘host’ culture and respond with strengthened identities that are based in race, 
ethnicity, or religion.  This second solution is variously termed the development of an 
“oppositional culture” by Ogbu (1991, 1995) or of an “adversarial subculture” by Portes 
and Zhou (1993).  Gardner and Shukar (1994) argue, in line with this view, that the 
affirmation Bangladeshi youth fail to receive from British society they may find instead 
in a strengthened, and possibly resistant, Muslim identity.   
The segmented assimilation research tradition (Portes and Rumbaut 2001, Portes 
and Zhou 1993), which is highly influential in American academic work on second 
generation youth, can be broadly classified as a between cultures perspective.  It follows 
the same logic that discrete choices and outcomes separate one’s culture of origin from 
the culture of assimilation.  Major research traditions on race, particularly labelling 
theory, have taken a between cultures perspective because they posit that stark perceived 
racial differences are internalized by minorities (e.g., Waters 2003).  One prominent 
example is the work of social psychologist Claude Steele who has argued that the fear of 
“acting white” leads black youth to underperform in school settings (Steele and Aronson 
1995), a case of being caught between two races. 
 
 
 142
Hybridity 
While the “between cultures” approach emphasizes the disjuncture between 
discrete parental and societal identities, other researchers have argued that second 
generation identities have become blurred and multiple.  Christine Sheikh (2007) argues 
that while Muslim American youth may identify “the West” and “Islam” as discrete 
cultural worlds, they are most often inclined to “take the best of both worlds.” Gerd 
Baumann (1996) studied second generation youth of several ethnic backgrounds in the 
multicultural Southall area of London.  He concludes that most youth are skilled in a 
multiplicity of cultural discourses, often creatively combining cultural influences, such as 
in Bhangra, a fusion of black hip hop and South Asian musical styles. Similarly, Sanjeeve 
O’Jahal (1999) finds that British Asians are capable of code-switching at school, donning 
a “white mask” in the classroom when they find this useful.  John Eade’s (1997) work 
with young Bangladeshis in the East End and Claire Alexander’s (1996) work with young 
Black Londoners also conclude that youth identities are hybrid, situational, and should 
not be essentialized as fixed choices.  Les Back (1996) studied South London youth of 
many ethnic origins, including mixed race youth.  He argues that their syncretic and 
situational uses of identity cast doubt on if (in the South London context) a discussion of 
“British identity” is of any use at all.   
The hybridity perspective represented by these researchers usually emphasizes the 
influence of peers in the social construction of identity.  The intellectual underpinnings of 
hybridity can be found in the cultural studies and post-colonial writings of Stuart Hall, 
Paul Gilroy, Homi Bhabha, Gayatri Spivak, and others.  It has rapidly grown to be an 
important, if not the dominant, view of ethnicity and identity within British social 
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science.  It is often thought to be an emancipatory perspective on cultural identity that 
creates new capacities for human freedom (Werbner and Modood 1997). 
 
Deculturation 
Although hybridity perspectives are highly influential within sociology, especially 
in Britain, they have not gone unquestioned.  Jessica Jacobson studied British Pakistani 
Muslims in East London in the 1990s.  In Islam in Transition (1998) she writes that a 
“recurring theme throughout this book has been that theorists should be careful not to 
overestimate the extent to which aspects of identity are malleable and subject to 
interpretation.”  Jacobson continues:  
"It seems to me vitally important to recognize that there are certain limits to the 
extent to which individuals can redefine themselves and the groups to which they 
belong; or that, at the very least, even if theoretically it is possible to challenge in 
countless ways such limits, they are very often accepted and hence, in practice, 
they exist."   
 
Jacobson found certain consistencies in the identities of her young Pakistani 
informants that belie what she considers to be an overemphasis on hybridity.  In 
particular, while British, Pakistani, and other sources of identity can be questioned and 
redefined, for Jacobson’s informants Islam was very commonly perceived to be a source 
of orientation and stability.  Many of Jacobson’s informants appear to be attracted to the 
comprehensive answers of a culturally purified Islam, and have taken this all-
encompassing Islam as their seemingly immutable core identity.   
Olivier Roy makes similar observations in his research on global trends in Islam 
(2004; 2006).  Roy argues that the forms of Islam that have gained most ground among 
second generation youth are “deculturated.”  Charismatic sheikhs, often in a Salafi 
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tradition, claim to preach a universal and pure form of Islam that is unencumbered by the 
traditionalist cultures of the first generation.  Youth who feel distanced or alienated from 
Western society and from the older generation find this narrative of an all-encompassing 
Islam very attractive.  
The deculturation perspective differs from a “between cultures” perspective 
because it locates the greater share of identity conflict as occurring between generations 
rather than between the culture of origin and the “host” society.  Roy (2004) has extended 
the perspective to include evangelical forms of Christianity (such as Neo-Pentecostalism) 
as well.  He writes that forms of Christianity and Islam are marketed as though stripped 
of culture, giving them the flexibility and appeal to second generation youth in a variety 
of national contexts.  
Because deculturation is less often cited in studies of race, ethnicity, and the 
second generation, critiques of it are not as fully developed.  The marked emphasis on 
dis-continuity between generations appears to be at odds with the work of Charlotte 
Butler and others who find strong intergenerational connections.  Deculturation could 
also be criticised for overstating the influence of particularly “neo-fundamentalist”56 
styles of religious institution and ideology, such as Salafi and Deobandi Islam, while 
virtually ignoring any counterbalancing influence of more culturally-continuous forms 
such as Barelwi or Sufi influenced Islam.  Likewise, the application of deculturation to 
Christian religious traditions remains anecdotal in Roy’s work, awaiting empirical 
verification. 
                                                 
56Neo-fundamentalism is Roy’s term. 
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Usually research studies work within a single perspective on identity, whether it is 
continuity, between cultures, hybridity, or deculturation.  However, each of the four 
perspectives on identity brings forward a particular view of what to expect, empirically, 
about the ways in which youth construct and employ their identities.  I summarize the 
expectations of these four models in Table 4.1.  The table’s columns display 1) the 
identity component that will be prioritized by youth as first in importance, 2) the degree 
to which the identity style causes polarizing conflict, and the nature of this conflict, and 
3) the kind of language youth of the identity style would be expected to use in an 
interview situation.   
 
 
Table 4.1.  Theoretical Models of Youth Identity 
 
 Primary ID Polarisation Theorized Language 
Continuity 
 
Parents’ cultural/ 
religious 
 
 
Low.  Insulated from 
conflict 
 
“My mum always says….” 
“We have this tradition every year….” 
Between 
Cultures 
 
Parents’ cultural/ 
religious OR 
British/English 
 
 
High. Polarization of 
cultural/religious 
against British/English 
 
“It’s hard to be a Jamaican here….” 
“I had to get away from Jamaicans to fit 
in…” 
Hybrid or 
Situational 
 
Changes with the 
situation, context 
 
 
Low. Ease in code 
switching. 
 
“There’s a bit of everything in me….” 
“It just depends on the situation…” 
Deculturation 
 
Religious 
 
 
High.  Polarization of 
‘born again’ religious 
and parents’ cultural/ 
religious 
 
 
“That’s cultural. Religion is different…” 
“My parents don’t know real Islam…” 
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The Identity Ranking Method 
The four major perspectives of continuity, between cultures, hybridity, and 
deculturation each shed some light on identity construction among second generation 
youth.  Philip Lewis (2007) helpfully points out that there are pitfalls to privileging one 
theoretical vantage point to the exclusion of others.  In particular reference to young 
Muslims in Britain, he writes:  
“[T]oo many social scientists assume that young Muslims are either victims 
trapped between two cultures, or able to switch effortlessly between cultures.  
Instead, [research] suggests that Muslims feel the need to initiate a meaningful 
dialogue among different cultural practices they have internalized.”57  
 
Lewis explains that identity construction is highly dynamic and no single perspective can 
be expected to illuminate the whole picture.  His image of identity emerging through 
“meaningful dialogue” reminds us that identity formation is an unfinished and 
intersubjective process that draws on various influences.   
 I designed my research interviews to capture, as far as possible, the “meaningful 
dialogue” that occurs as youth piece together their identities.  To do this, about halfway 
through each semi-structured interview I began a section on identity with an identity 
choice-and-ranking exercise.  As I sat down with the interviewee in a public place, like a 
coffee shop or library, I laid out on the table a set of labels that each displayed a different 
potential component of identity.  The labels included racial, ethnic, regional, national, 
and religious identity options (e.g., Black, Jamaican, West Indian, British, Christian).  
The full set of identity labels is shown in Figure 4.1 and Table 4.2. 
 
 
                                                 
57Philip Lewis, (2007).  Lewis is basing this particular observation on the research work 
of Sahin (2005).  
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Table 4.2.  Labels Used in Identity Ranking Exercise 

 
Black 
Brown 
White 
 

 
Asian  
Indian 
Bangladeshi 
Bengali 
Sylheti 

 
African 
West Indian 
Caribbean 
Jamaican
 
British 
English 
Londoner 

 
Muslim 
Christian 
Non-Religious 
 
[blank write-in]
 
 
 
 I had developed the set of labels through the extensive fieldwork and research in 
my first few months in London.  They were intended to capture the most salient group 
labels among my two youth research populations.  In each interview, I would ask the 
interviewee to select all of the labels that he or she could “personally relate to.”  I also 
included some blank labels that youth could use to write in any identities important to 
them that I had missed.  Once the interviewee had made all of her identity choices, she 
was asked to rank them in order of strongest personal identity down to weakest.  With the 
identity labels ranked, I asked the interviewee to explain why she had ordered them in 
this way.  We then entered a conversation about the meanings of specific identities and 
the relationships between them.  The interview guide in the Appendix provides the full 
set of questions I asked about identities. 
 The primary purpose of this exercise was to generate a good conversation about 
self-definition and about the interrelationships between identity options.  In doing so, I 
hoped to make some headway into research questions about identity and culture that I 
listed early into this chapter.  I found the identity ranking exercise to be extremely useful 
for initiating this kind of conversation.  It also provided a common language that could be 
compared between all interviews.  Many youth told me the exercise pushed them to think 
further about their identity.  Some really enjoyed it, and said their friends would too: 
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“Man, I want play this game with my people!” Rahel told me (Bangladeshi male, age 21).  
It was the part of the interview that youth most often commented on afterwards.  
 The identity ranking method captures well what identity construction is.  Identity 
construction is “a process of cultural prioritization” that establishes relationships of 
relative meaning.  Completing the exercise with young people allowed me to witness 
them actively work through this process.  For example, Michelle first chose seven 
components that she considers part of her identity, and laid these cards on the table.  She 
then added “West Indian” – almost as an afterthought.  When I asked her rank the 
identities in order, Michelle said quietly, as if in a note to herself: “Well, West Indian’s at 
the bottom.”  She proceeded to rank up from there.  By watching Michelle engage in the 
process of ranking, I could see the relative lack of value that she attributes to her West 
Indian origins, which enabled me to probe further. 
The identity choice-and-ranking exercise (when complemented by other sections 
of the interview) provides a good window into how second generation youth compose 
their identities, what they prioritize as most important, and what they define themselves 
against.  I will now briefly review broad identity trends I saw among all second 
generation youth, before focusing on the patterns specific to Jamaican youth and then 
Bangladeshi youth. 
 
Basic Youth Values 
 I was interviewing Tariq, an 18 year-old Bangladeshi, and we had just started to 
talk about his Muslim identity.  I asked him to tell me more precisely what kind of 
Muslim he is.  I was prepared for him to define himself in relation to an Islamic schools 
 149
of jurisprudence such as Hanafi and Shafi’i, or, at least, in terms of the broader division 
in Islam between Sunni and Shi’i.  His response took me by surprise: 
I: [What type of Muslim are you?] 
Tariq: I don’t fit any of those groups.  I’m just me.  We’re just Muslims, chilled 
out, go to college, saving up to buy a PS3. 
 
Tariq just wanted to be recognized as an ordinary teenager.  Like any other teen might be, 
he was enrolled in college58 and saving up to buy a Play Station 3.  His words 
communicated the very ordinariness he experienced in being a Muslim in the East End.  
In a sense, I had been asking an improper question – why did I dwell on labels, when he 
was just being himself?   
Tariq’s comments demonstrate his embeddedness in the “ethics of authenticity” 
that pervade Western culture (Taylor 1993).  The value of individual authenticity was 
expressed by every youth I interviewed, in one way or another.  I heard youth in my 
interviews convey in various different ways the same general philosophy: It is important 
to be yourself and communicate that self sincerely to others.  When I asked youth which 
types of people they saw as very different from themselves, many expressed a strong 
distaste for hypocrites, the opposite of authentic individuals.   
Because individuality and authenticity are so prized, youth place a high value on 
identities that they have chosen for themselves.  Many talked about coming understand 
their Christian or Islamic faith for the first time as an adolescent or young adult, through 
a conversion or “born again” experience.  Youth likewise devalued some of the identities 
that they had not chosen.  For example, Jessica, an 18 year old with a Jamaican father 
                                                 
58College, in the British system, refers to an elected period of schooling after age 16 but 
before university.  Tariq was a student in an Islamic college in the Whitechapel area who 
I met on the street when he was walking home from a local gym. 
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told me: “I’m not Jamaican.  Jamaican is in me, but….”  By this she meant that though 
she has Jamaican lineage, it is not an identity she has chosen and given importance.  
Another identity-related value that most London second generation youth share, 
linked to authenticity, is the positive value of diversity or multiculturalism. Some youth 
expressed pride that they have a diverse circle of friends.  Others told me about how they 
love the diversity and exciting multiculture of London as a city.  Shahedul, a 23 year-old 
Bangladeshi youth, did not choose “English” as an identity when we went through the 
identity choice-and-ranking exercise together, yet did choose “British” and “Londoner.”  
I asked him, why not English?  “When I hear English,” he told me, “I think of white 
people.  But when I hear London, I think multicultural.”   
In a similar vein, most youth expressed a high level of tolerance for people of 
other cultures.  For example, many Muslim Bangladeshis were very careful to stress that, 
though they believe Islam is the Truth, the Qur’an instructs them that “there is no 
compulsion in religion.” 
Overall, the fact that virtually all second generation youth share values of 
individual authenticity, diversity, and tolerance simply bears witness to the fact that they 
have grown up in a modern liberal democracy (and, within that, in a vibrant cosmopolitan 
and multicultural city).  It would be highly surprising, of course, if second generation 
youth did not positively affirm values such as authenticity and diversity.  These values 
are the very basis for their own acceptance in plural British society. 
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Jamaican Identities 
Race 
Race matters to all Jamaican second generation youth.  “Black” was the identity 
most commonly chosen by Jamaicans, chosen by all except one (who first considered it 
and then replaced it with “brown”).  Those who chose “black” routinely ranked it higher 
than either “British” or “English,” again with only one exception.  In two thirds of cases 
(16 of 24) “black” was either ranked as the first or second component in identity.  In most 
of these cases it ranked higher than “Jamaican.” 
Yet the commonness and salience of black identity do not necessarily signal its 
strength.  Thaddeus, age 21, ranked black first.  When I asked why he had placed it first, 
he said: “It’s obvious, it’s just me.”  He then explained to me what he meant: “Basically 
it’s probably the first thing that you might notice from seeing me.”  Black identity for 
Thaddeus is something ascribed to him by the perceptions of others.  This conception of 
being black – that it is an identity given by others – was the most common way I heard 
Jamaicans speak about it.  
Michelle spoke about being black in more positive terms.  “I’m very proud of 
being black, for my culture, for what’s happened in [our] past until now.”  For many 
Jamaican youth, a sense of black history was important.  Being black connected them 
with past courageous generations, epitomized by endurance through the years of the 
transatlantic slave trade.  Michelle mentioned other aspects of being black as being 
positive, such as the diversity captured within the term: “Some people may stereotype 
black people for being all one way, but black – the thing is that there’s different shades of 
black.  We cover 500 shades from the very light to the darkest black….  Being black, 
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yeah, it’s beautiful.”  Michelle also mentioned that black people “can just do a lot of 
different things that I think a lot of the time society doesn’t really celebrate for us.  Like 
we can be academics, great in sports, great entertainers.”  Her affirmation of being black, 
while positive, was nonetheless defined by a relationship with white members of society 
who may not recognize blacks for their achievements.59 
For some youth there was ambiguity as to what “black” means.  Naomi told me: 
“Sometimes I think black is just a skin colour.  And sometimes I think it’s a personality.”  
There was a sense that one could “act black,” but that this was not predetermined.  Mike, 
a mixed race youth introduced in Chapter 1, had said: “I don’t really ‘act black’ like 
black people do or ‘act white’ like white people do.”  Some youth believe that race is 
declining in significance.  Chanel told me: “I used to believe yeah, that being black in 
England, you’re underneath.  Or you’ve got less chance.  I used to think that would be a 
problem for me….  I don’t really think like that no more.  I think we’ve got past that 
stage now.”  In her estimation, today “people are more interested in what qualifications 
you’ve got than what color your skin is.” 
The various ways in which Jamaican youth spoke about being ‘black’ captured a 
tension that has been present in the literature on the topic.  In her book Ethnic Options 
(1990), Mary Waters observes that whites have freedom in choosing “symbolic 
ethnicities” based in their ethnic heritage.  Blacks, in contrast, encounter the additional 
issue of racial discrimination, which they are best able to face through “oppositional 
ethnicities” (Waters 2003).  Thus, blacks are much more ethnically constrained than 
whites.  Claire Alexander (1996: 18) questions this view in her book The Art of Being 
                                                 
59As I am a white American researcher, my racial appearance may have sensitized youth 
to the ways they are viewed by others. 
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Black (1996: 18), writing that “black youths are concerned with the construction of new 
cultural alternatives, in which identity is created and re-created as part of an ongoing and 
dynamic process…. I [portray] an alternative vision of black youth; not as a unified and 
homogenous, externally defined and structurally constrained entity, but a collection of 
individual lives, choices and experiences.”  Mary Waters’ view is broadly a ‘between 
cultures’ one while Claire Alexander’s fits within the hybridity research tradition. 
Jamaican youth I interviewed seemed to sometimes confirm Alexander’s 
perspective and at other times Waters’.  Samuel, age 25, is a Jamaican youth who tried to 
articulate a post-racial perspective.  He took a blank card and created the write-in identity 
of “human.”  Samuel ranked human first, then brown, black, Jamaican, Londoner, and 
Christian.  He told me why his identity as part of humanity came first: “Human because 
it’s kind of like, I’m human.  So it don’t matter what race I am, what I do, what color.  It 
all boils down to everybody bleeds the same.”  Samuel’s positive affirmation as a person 
was a creative solution that appeared to transcend any concerns of race.  Yet, when I 
asked Samuel if any of the identities he had chosen ever come into conflict, his answer 
revealed a continuing significance of blackness:   
Daniel: [Do any of these identities ever come into conflict?] 
 
Samuel: I think the human and the black.  The human and the black, you know.  
They come as a conflict. 
 
Daniel: Tell me why. 
 
Samuel: Because I think regardless of “slavery’s over” or “racism’s finished,” 
there’s still an element of it about.  I think it’s subliminal.  It’s almost subliminal 
now….  I’m saying, “I’m human.”  But they’re saying, “No, you’re black.” 
 
As much as he wants to move beyond race, Samuel thinks that race remains important 
because racism persists.  He speaks of racism as remaining in what he calls a 
“subliminal” form, perhaps what Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2001) has called “implicit 
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racism.”  Samuel continued, speaking of how he thinks racism can be internalized by 
blacks as self-image.  This perpetuates the problem.  “Our people do let us down,” he 
said, “’Cuz it’s like, it’s weird – if you call someone something for long enough, they 
actually come to be that thing.”  
 
Table 4.3.  Samuel’s Identity Ranking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Other racial options were available as identities in the ranking exercise: “white” 
and “brown.”  Five Jamaicans out of 24 chose white as fitting somewhere into their 
identity.  All did so because they have some white ancestry, including Mike whose 
mother is white.  Clarise is also mixed race, and chose white as important for this reason 
and also because she was raised by white parents in a foster home.  The low number of 
youth who identify with white is surprising, especially in light of the finding that today 
one out of every two Caribbean children born in Britain is of mixed race parentage (see 
Song 2009).  Brown was a much more common choice, elected by two thirds of Jamaican 
youth.  I will explain a common reason for choosing brown in the profile of Mabel below. 
 Most Jamaican youth showed significant creative freedom in their identity 
composition, as we have already seen in write-in identity of “human.”  Yet this generally 
hybrid and fluid approach to identity sometimes came in tension with a sense of the fixity 
 
Human 
Brown 
Black 
Jamaican 
Londoner 
Christian 
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of certain identities, especially “black.”  I will illustrate this identity tension by first 
focusing on the apparently fixed cultural boundaries seen in the case of Mabel, before 
then giving view into the creative and fluid identity composition of four young men. 
  
Mabel 
Brixton was sometimes a challenging place to recruit new interviewees.  Many of 
the young people I approached in hopes of interviewing were not actually Jamaican, but 
instead from Africa or elsewhere in the Caribbean.  Yet Mabel broadcast her Jamaican 
identity to me all the way across Brixton Road.  She was wearing a shoulder bag with a 
large and bright vinyl Jamaican flag as the opening flap.  From a distance I knew 
immediately that she was Jamaican, and proud. 
Mabel agreed to do an interview, and we sat down together at a nearby chicken 
shop.  Mabel is short in stature, quick-witted, and very outspoken.  She keeps her hair in 
lots of little braids that she calls twists: “When it comes to hair, me with my twists – no 
one does that, it’s just me,” she said.  She was wearing a small “no guns” campaign 
badge pinned on the right side of her dark blue denim jacket.  The badge resembled a 
round “no smoking” sign except with an image of a handgun crossed out in red.  Mabel 
was on a gap year when we met.  Having just finished high school,60 she was taking a 
year off to help at home before pursuing further work or education. 
As we sat down, Mabel, unprompted, began talking about her love for Jamaica.  I 
decided to probe further into the topic and to save some of my usual introductory 
questions for later.  Mabel described Jamaica to me: 
                                                 
60High school is called secondary school in the UK.  It is common to take a gap year after 
completing secondary school, to engage voluntary work or travel, or just to take time off. 
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Usually people think palm trees and beaches.  There really is a lot of that.  [But 
also] there’s no pretences or anything….  That’s why Britain and Jamaica are so 
different.  Like, in Britain you can walk along the street and no one really 
acknowledges you.  And fair enough, because they don’t know you.  But in 
Jamaica, like, they say “good morning” and “good afternoon,” and they don’t 
even know you.  That’s one of the things I love about it, it’s just like the 
neighborly sort of community spirit. 
 
 Mabel contrasted the personal warmth and community spirit of Jamaica with 
Britain several times in the interview.  She elaborated on her statement about Jamaicans 
having no pretences: “I like people that are real, like don’t pretend to be someone else…. 
I really admire people who are true to themselves.”  In saying this, she was expressing the 
ethic of authenticity that was common to youth I interviewed.  Jamaicans often use 
Patois, a variant of English, when they speak informally.  Mabel likes Patois for the 
reason of its authenticity: “The way it’s said – the expressions are so straightforward.” 
Mabel spoke of “family” and “discipline” as important Jamaican values.  Much of 
Jamaican culture, she said, is captured in little sayings.  One saying about discipline she 
mentioned is “if you want all the bread go get it yourself, and if you want half a bread 
make somebody buy it” – which means do for yourself anything that you want done 
properly.  When Mabel’s mother thinks that she has sage motherly advice that is falling 
on deaf ears, she will often say “who don’t hear, must feel.”  The saying means that 
someone who does not hear wisdom will soon feel the consequences.  Jamaican parents 
pass on culture and wisdom through sayings like these.  They also use fables of Anansi 
the spider, which originate in West African oral traditions.  Mabel told me: “He likes his 
money, that spider.  He likes his money.  But he always gets his comeuppance in the 
end.” 
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If any of the Jamaicans I interviewed consider identities as fixed and discrete 
entities, Mabel is one.  She views Jamaicans as having particular cultural traits such as 
straightforwardness that she highly values, especially being a Jamaican herself.  She also 
has a clear sense of who she is not.  Mabel told me “I have a problem with Africa.”  
Although she identifies with the continent in terms of heritage, she told me that Africans 
rub her the wrong way in daily Brixton life: “African people – to put it bluntly, Nigerian 
people – get on my nerves, because I’ve had problems with them in the past.  i.e. no one 
is going to tell me any different when I say Nigerian men tend to be perverts.”  She is 
often approached by Nigerian men on the street: “Even down to like when I was fifteen 
years old, I’d say, ‘I’m fifteen years old!’, and they’d still bother me….  And African 
women like to watch you as well and give you these nasty looks.  I’m not the only one 
that thinks that.  A lot of Nigerians are not the most popular people, because of how they 
are.  They’re loud and just leery.”  It was true that Mabel was not the only Jamaican I 
interviewed who perceived strong differences with Africans – Thaddeus and Naomi also 
expressed negative sentiments.  Naomi told me, regarding Nigerians in particular: “They 
are really, really loud and really, really over the top.”  These interviews and others61 
helped me to discern that there is some degree of inter-ethnic rivalry between Jamaicans 
and Nigerians in Brixton. 
Mabel defines herself ethnically as Jamaican, in particular distinction from 
Nigerians and other Africans.  Her maintenance of symbolic boundaries between ethnic 
                                                 
61A focus group of three youth from Ruach ministries spoke about the rivalry they 
sometimes felt with Africans.  The sense of rivalry is not perceived by all youth.  Some 
interviewees have good friendships with Nigerians.  One of my interviewees was dating a 
Nigerian.  However, the issue came up in enough independent conversations to confirm 
that it is more than Mabel’s isolated point of view. 
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groups helps keep her world in moral order (see Lamont 2002).  She spoke about how 
sometimes Africans try to breach these symbolic boundaries: “A lot of Africans do try to 
pass off as Jamaican.”  She mentioned a recent issue with her Jamaican flag shoulder bag, 
which had tested these symbolic boundaries:  
Even the other day a man said “Oh, I like your bag.  I’d like to wear that.”  I’m 
just like, if you wear that then that’s just going to cause people to misconstrue 
who you are.  Because you are an African, be proud….  I said “thank you” and 
everything, tried to be polite.  But I’m thinking, there shouldn’t be impostors.  Be 
proud of who you are. 
 
Mabel’s perspective of “be proud of who you are” assumes a certain essence to identity.  
Each person is an African, a Jamaican, or someone of another ethnicity.  It is important to 
know and accept one’s identity, because to pretend otherwise means being an impostor. 
Mabel thinks of the racial component of her identity in fairly essentialist terms.  
She spoke frequently during the interview from a “black perspective.”  For example, 
when we talked about gang violence, she lamented: “Gang culture is just sad.  And I 
speak from a black perspective – it’s all I can do because I’m that.  Speaking from a 
black perspective, it really does sadden me that I will see a group of black boys 
congregate…. We’re killing each other, as black people.”   
In line with Mary Waters’ research, Mabel has developed her black identity partly 
in reaction to not having a full sense of acceptance from white Britons.  She spoke with 
some frustration about the experience of being black in Britain: “They’ve got this thing 
‘There’s no black in the Union Jack.’  And it’s true, we don’t come from here.  It is true.  
But at the end of the day I am here.  What are you going to do about it?” 
In most of our interview, Mabel spoke of her identity in discrete terms.  She finds 
acceptance in British society to be a problem because she perceives that society as 
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defined in terms of whiteness, from which she is excluded.  She thus appears to be a 
youth who is caught between cultures – or, more accurately, someone who is stranded on 
one side of a racial divide. 
 
Table 4.4. Mabel’s Identity Ranking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yet, Mabel’s identity is not as clear-cut as I expected from our initial questions.  
When she completed the identity ranking exercise, she did choose a racial identity as 
strongest.  When she saw the cards with identity labels on the table, her first thought was 
to choose “black.”  But she instead chose “brown,” explaining this choice to me:  
“I suppose the black, I do use that term a lot.  I think it’s just a habit.  I am brown 
[-points to the skin on her arm-].  That’s black [-points to a black notebook-].  So 
I do need to come out of the habit.  I am brown.” 
 
Mabel was reconsidering her usual practice of self-referencing as black.  In a literal 
sense, her skin color is brown.  Mabel had spoken adeptly about her blackness throughout 
the interview, but at this she point questioned the very existence of “black.” 
 I had other Jamaican interviewees who, at least at some point in the interview, 
spoke of aspects of their identities, such as being “black” or “Jamaican,” as fixed 
containers of some cultural essence.  Mabel did this perhaps more than anyone.  Yet all 
Jamaican youth, even Mabel, at some point showed a flexibility in their self-definition.  
 
Brown [or Black] 
Londoner 
British 
Jamaican 
African 
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Mabel recognizes “black” as an identity that she has been branded with by white Britons.  
However, when given “brown” as an identity option, she uses it as a tool to critique 
“black” and take on greater agency in how she defines herself.  Thus even within the 
apparent fixities of Mabel’s sense of identity there appears to be room for movement. 
 
Moving with Music 
If Mabel is on the fixed and essentialized end of the identity spectrum among 
Jamaican second generation youth, then a set of four musically talented youth I 
interviewed are examples of greater fluidity.  In this section I will describe these four 
young men and ways in which they use music to creatively articulate their senses of 
identity. 
Music is like life-blood to Damien.  When we interviewed, he was age 20 and 
attending a London area university to study Music Management.  Damien is aiming for a 
career promoting Gospel music artists.  He has been actively networking on MySpace, 
Facebook, and industry-specific sites like GOSPELflava.  Damien thinks he has reason to 
be optimistic – one of his brothers is a producer with his own small record label.  Another 
brother lives in the U.S. and has promoted well-known artists like P. Diddy and 
India.Arie.  His large family, it seems, has always been musically talented. 
Damien is of medium stature with a soft, gentle voice.  He usually speaks slowly 
and clearly, but sometimes launches into flights of enthusiasm on the topics of music or 
his faith.  When I laid the cards on the table for the identity ranking exercise, Damien 
labored at it for a long time.  When he had made most of his selections, he asked to 
borrow my pen for a write in identity.  On a blank slip of paper he wrote “music.”  He 
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placed this prominently – just below his faith and racial identity, and just above 
“Jamaican.” 
 Damien had placed Christian first: “First of all I’m a Christian.  My belief is very 
important to me.  It keeps me going throughout the day.  And my relationship with God, 
it’s important, it’s vital for me.  It’s what makes me who I am.”  He expressed this 
“Christian first” identity as the cornerstone in his life.  It was not unlike how Asma and 
Rubina hold faith as the basis from which they live.  Damien grounds this faith identity in 
his personal communion with God. 
Racial identity for Damien did not seem to require much explanation.  He placed 
“black” and “brown” as a tie for second place in his identifications.  For him, race was a 
label given by others: “Black, well, they say I’m black.”  And as such, the label had 
questionable validity as an actual description of his skin color: “But really, I’m brown.”  
He thus approaches race in very much the same fixed-though-fluid terms that Mabel 
does. 
 And then there was “music”: “Music is my heart, it’s my passion, it’s my love.  
From ever since I was a child, ever since I could remember I’ve just always been in love 
with music.  Topics I’ve always loved and I talk about.  My family is, especially my 
brothers are, associated with the music industry.”  For Damien, his write-in identity of 
“music” is something he holds as dear as his roots.  His choice to add his personal interest 
and possible vocation amid a list of ethnic, racial, and religious identities shows just how 
strong individuality and authenticity have become as youth values.   
 Damien’s approach to identity is an unmistakably hybrid one.  He combined a 
total of twelve identity components together, more than any of my other interviewees.  
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He sees himself as an amalgamation of many different places and influences.  These 
include British, African, Caribbean, Indian, and white, all of which he is able to trace in 
his heritage.  Damien’s stance on identity seems to be rather carefree and creative, with a 
sense that the more identity options there are, the better. 
 
Table 4.5. Damien’s Identity Ranking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Damien was far from unique in his passion for music.  Making and performing 
music (rather than just listening to it) was the most common personal interest mentioned 
by the young Jamaican males I interviewed.  Several of them claimed to have real talent.  
Some go to recording studios, visit open mic events, make CDs to pass around to friends, 
or set up MySpace pages to promote their own work.  I often asked youth if they could 
perform a sample for me on our interview audio recording.  Only later did I realize how 
much their performed music reveals about their approach to identity.  Rap, as the lyrical 
 
Christian 
Black – Brown 
Music 
Jamaican 
West Indian 
Caribbean 
African 
White 
Indian 
British 
English 
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component of hip hop music, is particularly revealing of identity because rapping so often 
involves taking a stand and expressing an allegiance. 
 Adam is a tall, gaunt young man who wears diamond stud earrings.  He was 19 
when I first met him at a Jamaican restaurant across the street from Ruach Ministries, 
after we had both attended the youth service.  Adam and I arranged to do an interview a 
week later, at a local café.  In the first few minutes of our conversation at the café, Adam 
told me that he makes his own Gospel rap recordings.  He says he does this to help youth 
get “in a positive mindset…. So they can see what I’ve gone through, and see where I got 
it wrong.”  While we sat there recording the interview, I asked him to demo his music for 
me.  “What, rap now?” he asked.  I said “Sure.”  Adam started a Gospel rap from 
memory, at a brisk pace: 
Don't be wise in your own eyes 
 The Devil is a liar 
 was my downfall 
 That's the reason why we backslide,  
 so be careful 
 Because he comes your way on a sly 
 roaming through the world 
 He'll try to hook you so stay wise 
 Proverbs in the morning 
 Psalms in the night 
 It's warfare 
 Making sure I'm putting on my war gear 
 Don't go there, you know there's a hole there 
 It's a trap 
 The devil's trying to take you off track 
 Life 
 I need to try to get away from this hype 
 The devil wants me 
 I see it in my enemy’s eyes 
 Knows I've been fresh born since I got baptized 
But he can't touch me cuz I'm covered by the blood of Christ…. 
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Adam’s full rap that I recorded continued on to about three times this length.  It followed 
the daily trials of struggling with the devil and temptations.  Adam explained to me his 
regimen of reading the Biblical book of Proverbs in the morning and of Psalms at night.  
“Proverbs because it’s a wisdom book,” he said, “when you wake up in the morning it’s 
good to read something that gives you wisdom for the day.”  In comparison, “Psalms is 
more like a warfare book.  So what you do there, it’s when you’re sleeping that the devil 
tries to attack you.” 
With visible regret, Adam admitted: “To be honest to this tape, yeah, I have not 
been doing that recently [reading Psalms and Proverbs]….  Recently I have backslided.”  
The term ‘backsliding’ means regressing from the ways of God.  He told me that in the 
past year he’s been smoking a lot of cannabis with his friends.  “It’s made me paranoid,” 
he said.  During the interview Adam’s mood shifted like a man with multiple 
personalities, sometimes quoting scriptures fluently with confidence, and at other 
moments expressing guilt and anxiety.  He asked me to stop the recorder at one point to 
get himself back together.  Adam finds that he is living in a tension between the Christian 
morality preached by his church and the actions of his friends in “the world.”  Although 
Adam is now clearly troubled in his conscience, he told me “I believe that, by the grace 
of God, that God will pull me back up.”  
Johnny, age 18, is a Jamaican youth I met at a church who had a much more 
relaxed way about him.  While Adam seemed to be in the fringe of his church 
community, Johnny is the son of a church leader.  Every time I visited Johnny’s church 
he was there.  He seemed to know everyone.  Johnny is musically talented and he invests 
much of his time and energy in writing and performing.  When we interviewed, also at a 
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café, I asked him to demo his music on my recorder too.  Here is what I heard from 
Johnny, in a smooth and slower R&B sound that is more like the band Boyz II Men: 
 I'll be everything you need 
 And I'll be more 
 If this love wasn't for you, 
 Then what would I be doing this for?  
 That I love you God*, that's what I want your heart to see 
Think of nothing else, but makes me think of you and me 
 
 Johnny has a melodious and powerful voice.  I told him that liked what I heard.  
Then I asked: “So that’s a worship song of some kind, like a spiritual song?”  He 
answered, “That’s a song I made.  Most of the songs are based around the people I know, 
so it’s a lot of girls I know.”  I realized then that I had misheard the song: “Oh, that’s a 
song about a girl!”  Johnny had sung the words “I love you girl” but somehow I heard “I 
love you God” (marked in the song with an asterix, *).62 
 Although my misinterpretation of Johnny’s song was a small one, it revealed to 
me the kind of lens I had taken into our interview situation.  Because Johnny was very 
involved in his church and is known there for his musical ability, I had assumed that he 
would demo a Gospel song for me.  Johnny told me that he does write a lot of religious 
songs too.  But his choice to share a song about a girl with me showed the great ease he 
has in moving between the social worlds of church life and ‘secular’ life.  The fact that 
Johnny has written many songs – both sacred and secular – demonstrates his skill at what 
Elijah Anderson (1999) calls code-switching.  
 Samuel, age 25, is a final young Jamaican who gave me a demo of his musical 
talent during an interview.  He is the one who wrote in “human” as his foremost identity.  
                                                 
62I misheard the word “girl” in the song as “God.”  I also misheard the last line of the 
song, which should say “Think of nothing else, but baby think of you and me.” 
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I first met Samuel at the public library in Brixton.  He comes from tougher circumstances 
than Damien, Johnny, or Adam.  Samuel grew up an orphan, moving between boys’ 
homes and shelters as a child.  In his teenage years, he spent his days stealing mobile 
phones and wallets on the streets of Brixton to survive.  He told me that he remembers 
what it was like to always be “looking for victims.”  But one day when he stole a man’s 
phone and ran, that man chased after him.  The man and a friend, both large and well 
built, caught Samuel when he was hiding behind a car.  He was sure they were going to 
beat him up.  Instead, the man talked with Samuel to understand his situation.  He 
decided to take Samuel in, to live with him and his wife at their home, and he became 
Samuel’s mentor.  Samuel says he has been living as a Christian since around that time.  
He credits all of the events to the intervention of God.  When I met Samuel at the library, 
he had been coming there regularly to search the Internet for jobs.  Although still dealing 
with issues of anger and impatience from his younger years, he thinks he can now hold 
down a steady job. 
 Samuel’s transition from a street life to greater stability has not been easy, but 
music has played a part.  For a while after his Christian conversion, Samuel volunteered 
at the Raw Materials Music Academy in Brixton.  He was trained to mentor young 
people.  He would help them develop their talent while also counselling them into a 
positive lifestyle.  Sadly, the Academy closed in 2007 after it was robbed several times of 
its equipment.  Samuel wishes he could take up this kind of mentoring again, but does not 
know of a place where he could do so. 
 When I asked Samuel to sing a sample of the music he writes, he sang two 
“rhymes” for me.  One of the rhymes had an evident Christian content: 
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 Life's short, even shorter when you dis-tort 
 reality, take it for jokes or for rash thoughts 
 Instead of clowning around like you're a fool 
 Just check yourself before you wreck yourself for good 
 I know my date of birth but not by time of death 
 That's why I'm in God's hands, I'm a part of God's plan 
 Don't know the word "can't" cause I know that I can 
For I'm giving you extra like the Halifax man 
 
In this rap, Samuel brings across the life and death reality of the streets.  With crime and 
gang violence, you never know your “time of death” – it could be any moment.  It was a 
message I often heard in Brixton churches, the need to turn to God in the face of death.  
As Samuel put it “That’s why I’m in God’s hands.”  Yet his rap is not only about 
otherworldly concerns, but also the immanent and everyday.  God enables success in 
worldly things: “Don’t know the word ‘can’t’ cause I know that I can.”   Samuel had told 
me that in his own life, God is with him “like a friend.”  “He’s taken me out of 
situations,” he said.  The rap ended with a humorous reference to Howard Brown, the 
black spokesperson for Halifax Bank in Britain, who sings in television commercials 
about “giving you extra.”   
 Samuel’s take on Christian faith, as seen in this first rap, seems very close to 
Adam’s.  The Christian faith is a struggle, an adventure that requires the right moves to 
persevere.  The adrenaline pumping style of his first rap came across also in the second 
one he sang for me.  The second rap had no religious overtones: 
 Everyday I live this 
 I move with this 
 I have to take my chances, flow… 
 Flows never boring 
 To the skies soaring like a bird that flies 
 Looking down at the earth my view's bird's eye 
 And I ain't talking captain, about macky, just mackin' 
 Engineering the sounds, we make crazy hits man 
 Studio's so hot, turn on the rotating fan 
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Play back our vocals, hear that baseline bangin’ 
Even like my man said, get that freed up.  Yeah, yeah. 
 
This second rap is about “flow.”  It is about moving with the current and the rhythm.  
Samuel told me that it is a rap he created while free-styling at an open mic event.  The 
very act of free-styling – creating fresh spontaneous lyrics in front of an audience – is 
about flow.  Young black men judge each other at open mic events based on speed, style, 
and wordplay.  
 From listening to Adam, Johnny, and Samuel demo songs that they have written, I 
could discern two styles by which Jamaican youth bring cultural references together to 
compose rap and R&B music.  The first is flow, the quick-witted, natural movement from 
one thought or situation to another; a fluid ability to adapt.  The other style could be 
called steadfastness.  It is the style of Adam’s rap or Johnny’s R&B, with the single-
minded devotion to God or to a girl.  Both styles are important to how second-generation 
Jamaican young men express themselves and earn respect from their peers (flow) or 
communicate their loyalty (steadfastness).  Yet the master style is flow.  All of my 
Jamaican interviewees who sang their own original songs for me had written diverse 
repertoires of music, both Christian and secular, which gave them the adaptability to 
choose the right song for the right moment. 
 Natasha Warikoo (forthcoming 2011) writes about second generation youth who 
demonstrate “multiple cultural competencies.”  She argues that young people in urban 
New York and London schools who are simultaneously skilled in the cultural symbols of 
school and of hip hop are poised to succeed in both contexts.  Youth who are not able to 
achieve the “balancing act” between these situational contexts tend to suffer either in the 
esteem of their teachers or the esteem of their peers. 
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 Rapping is a verbal demonstration of a youth’s multiple cultural competencies.  
Johnny and Samuel both show the ability to feel at home in the cultural worlds of church 
and of hip hop infused street life.  Adam has honed these skills as well, but in his time 
spent with peers he has developed habits that make it harder to sincerely perform the 
cultural scripts of church.  Adam feels guilt in contexts where he must demonstrate his 
faith, and for this reason does not attend church consistently. 
 These examples from young men and their hip hop music provide important clues 
about the nature of Jamaican second generation youth identities.  These are not young 
men caught between cultures, but instead they show dexterity in moving smoothly 
between cultural worlds.  Yet hybridity may not be the ideal description of their identities 
either – at least if hybridity implies a mixing, or syncretism.  The youth tend to keep 
songs about Christian faith distinct and unpolluted by street life.  There may be some 
overlap, as in Samuel’s first song, but in general the street and Christian symbols are part 
of different genres of music.  Skill lies in developing one’s repertoire and choosing the 
right song for the right time.  Perhaps a better term than hybridity for these youth is 
situational identities.  Jamaican youth build repertoires of identity scripts that are each 
appropriate to particular situations or contexts. 
 Anne Swidler (2003) describes the process of moving between cultural scripts or 
frames, relating this to changing vessels on the sea:  
“[A] person operating within one set of assumptions comes to a problem he 
cannot handle within his dominant scheme.  Then, after floundering for a while 
trying to adapt his frame to unexpected difficulties, he may quite abruptly jump 
from one frame to another.  This does not signal a loss of confidence in the first 
vessel, but simply a temporary abandonment of one craft while one navigates 
choppy waters in another.” 
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In Swidler’s view, the ability to use different cultural frames to match situations is not a 
sign that one has lost confidence in a particular frame.  In the same way, the fact that 
Jamaican youth can code-switch in different contexts is not necessarily an indication that 
they are insincere or not steadfast in any of their identities.  
 The situational nature of many Jamaican youth’s identities – especially young 
men – became clear to me when I had completed the identity ranking exercise with all 
youth.  I had recruited six young men in church contexts, and seven in secular contexts.  
Five out of six that I first met in a church situation told me that they rank Christian first in 
their identity.  All seven that I recruited in secular situations instead chose an identity 
other than Christian to rank first.  Of course a strong variance is to be expected – I was 
much more likely to select highly religious people in a church.  Yet it seems also that the 
church context heightened in youth the awareness of the Christian part of their identity, 
leading them to forefront it in the interview situation.  Adam would not have been as 
likely to place Christian first as an identity if we had met in a different situation, such as 
in a local gym.  The church context of our first meeting gave him a sense of obligation to 
act and speak as a Christian. 
 Jamaicans overall showed a high level of flexibility in composing their identities.  
Even Mabel, who had quite “fixed” views about identity, was able to step outside the 
bounds of her black identity and question it.  In most cases identities appeared to be 
situational.  In some cases, such as mixed race youth, identity was also hybrid.  
Interesting also was the relative lightness and creativity when composing identity.  
Damien had chosen “music” as central in defining himself.  Johnny, also mentioned 
earlier, chose various ethnic and racial identities in the ranking exercise that included 
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Asian.  He told me that Asian fit into his identity because “I actually like a lot of Asian 
stuff…. I’m a big fan of manga, from Japan, and like Chinese stuff.”  Identity Johnny’s 
case does not have an organic, assumed nature to it.  It is very much the product of 
individual choice and composition, in which personal hobbies are seen as legitimate 
options alongside race and ethnicity. 
 Claire Alexander (1996) found that the “art of being black” in Britain is an 
“ongoing and dynamic process.”  My findings closely resonate with hers.  The process is 
so dynamic, in fact, that I found it almost impossible to predict which identities a 
Jamaican youth would forefront when we reached the identity ranking exercise.63  Table 
4.9 provides a summary of which identities were chosen as “first” by second generation 
youth.  Whereas Bangladeshis predominantly chose Muslim first, Jamaican youth made 
many different choices for their prime identity, such as black, Jamaican, Christian, or 
brown.   
 Mary Waters (1990) found that white Americans have a broad freedom in 
defining themselves because they can choose ethnic identities that are symbolic of their 
own personal affinities.  Blacks, she argued, do not have the same freedom but are 
instead constrained by racialized society to respond with a race-based identity.  In more 
recent work, Waters (1999) has found that second generation West Indians in New York 
have greater freedom from American racialization because they are able to ground 
themselves firmly as West Indians, distinct from African Americans.  The Jamaicans I 
interviewed in Brixton also seem to be less constrained by racial definitions.  Brixton’s 
                                                 
63I make this statement in particular about Jamaican youth I recruited in secular contexts, 
who chose a wide variety of identities as first in importance.  The youth that I first met in 
churches (particularly males) more often chose Christian first when asked. 
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second generation Jamaicans represent well what Stuart Hall has called “new ethnicities,” 
as they have more situational and hybrid ways of defining themselves and great identity 
freedom.  Perhaps less clear is who Jamaican youth have been freed to be.  
 
Table 4.6: Identities Chosen as “First,” Youth Subsample from Secular Contexts 
Jamaicans (N = 16) Bangladeshis (N = 23) 
 
Black (4):       25% 
Christian (4):  25% 
Brown (2):     12.5% 
Jamaican (2):  12.5% 
African (1):     6.25% 
British (1):      6.25% 
Human (1):     6.25% 
Londoner (1): 6.25% 
 
Muslim (19):      82.6% 
Asian (1):           4.2% 
Bangladeshi (1): 4.2% 
Bengali (1):        4.2% 
Sylheti (1):         4.2% 
 
 
Bangladeshi Identities 
Muslim First 
Bangladeshi identities formed a distinctly different pattern.  Most resounding 
from the interviews was the strength of Muslim identity among my Bangladeshi 
informants.  A full 31 of my 35 Bangladeshi interviewees, or 89%, ranked Muslim first in 
the identity exercise (82.6% of youth recruited from secular contexts chose Muslim first, 
as seen in Table 4.6).  The result matches quite closely with the Pew survey percentage 
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, that 81% of British Muslims choose Muslim 
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first.64  Here is how Asma, an 18 year-old Bangladeshi female, explained the pre-
eminence of her Muslim identity:  
“For me, religion is really important.  So I would say I’m a Muslim first.  It 
doesn’t matter what culture I’m from, what country I’m from.  Because the person 
I am is I’m a Muslim person.  And that’s how I live my life.” 
 
Several of the points Asma makes in this brief quote are worth elaboration because they 
express attitudes common to Bangladeshis I interviewed.  Asma found religion “really 
important.”  She shared this feeling with about half of her Muslim peers, who had high 
religiosity (i.e., they were praying five times a day and expressing positive regard for this 
level of practice).  When Asma looked at the identity labels on the table and noticed 
Muslim, it did not take her any time to think about putting it on top.  In this quote she 
speaks of how Muslim identity relativizes all other identity commitments: “It does not 
matter what culture I’m from, what country I’m from.”  Other identities may fall second 
or third, but their actual distance to Muslim is great because Muslim is qualitatively 
different.  Muslim defines a type of person, with a particular moral orientation: “the 
person I am is I’m a Muslim person.”  And this seeps into all areas of daily experience 
and action: “that’s how I live my life.”  
Virtually all Bangladeshis, like Asma, chose Muslim immediately from the 
identity options and placed it first.  A frequent theme in describing Muslim identity was 
its permanence.  Shah told me “Muslim is first due to the fact that it’s my religion and 
nothing can ever change that.” 
However ‘Muslim first’ meant somewhat different things to different people.  
Quoting Shah again, he thinks of Muslim identity primarily as an inheritance from his 
                                                 
64As explained in Chapter 2, my sample of interviewees was not random and therefore 
the 89% figure should be taken with caution.   
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parents: “You know my family were Muslims, and followed the religion. So it’s literally 
that’s why it comes first.”  Another young Bangladeshi, Mahmoud, spoke of his Muslim 
identity in more spiritual terms: “I’ve put Muslim first because my main goal in life is my 
relationship with God.”  Mahmoud referred to his Muslim identity as having ultimate 
importance: “As a Muslim, I believe in the afterlife, so my plans go beyond just the 
future in this life.  They go to the future in the hereafter as well.”  Youth most commonly 
identified with Islam for one of these two reasons – its connection to parents and family, 
or its Truth as a spiritual doctrine.  
 For some youth, Muslim identity was more problematic.  Shahedul is a thin young 
man who was wearing a tan English flat cap when we spoke.  In our conversation he 
would often tap the table with his finger when he was making a point.  Shahedul placed 
“Muslim” first in his identity ranking, almost as a default.  Yet as we spoke more about 
religion a few minutes later, Shahedul asked if we could change his ranking.  He said 
“I’m not really practising anymore or going to mosque” and asked if we could shift 
Muslim down to fourth place, putting it below British, Londoner, and Asian.  He was one 
of only four youth who did not place Muslim first – although he only did so after 
reflecting on it more. 
 Another youth who did not place Muslim first is an 18 year old named Karim.  I 
met Karim in a park off of Whitechapel Road where he was loitering with four of his 
friends.  He is about 6’3” and very skinny, with dark skin.  He was wearing a white Nike 
hoodie and a light blue baseball cap covered with hundreds of small New York Yankees 
logos.  Karim’s identity ranking was unusual: It began with Sylheti first, and then 
progressed to Non-Religious, Muslim, Asian, British, English, and finally Londoner.  
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Karim’s first identity, Sylheti, comes because his parents are from that region.  At his 
young age they largely define his sense of roots.  He included Non-Religious because he 
is currently not practicing Islam by attending prayers.  Karim placed Muslim third, and 
spoke to me about the identity with visible guilt.  He said: “I can’t put it first because I’m 
smoking weed all the time.” 
Muslim identity was “first” for almost all second generation Bangladeshi youth I 
interviewed.  Even in the few cases where Muslim identity did not rank first, most youth 
acknowledged that they thought it should.  Muslim is the main orienting identity for the 
Bangladeshi young people of the East End.  In significant part, this is due to what 
Coleman (1987) has called social closure: Muslim identity (of one kind or another) is 
socially propagated from all sides, by Bangladeshi parents, by mosques, and by peers.  
The saturation of the identity in these various social contexts means that coming to terms 
with being Muslim is inescapable for East End Bangladeshis.   
The pervasiveness of Muslim identity in various social relationships helps to 
explain why it is so often chosen as a component of identity.  However it does not explain 
why youth choose Muslim first so often, rather than relegating it to the background.  An 
explanation for this phenomenon began to crystallize for me during two particular 
interviews.  Yasmin and Rubina are highly articulate Bangladeshi young women.  Both 
are University of London educated, both are creatively inclined, and both consider Islam 
important to them.  However, the styles by which they understand relate to Bangladeshi 
culture set them apart as quite different from each other, and reveal underlying identity 
processes.  I interviewed the two young women within months of each other, in two 
coffee shops that lie along the same road. 
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Yasmin 
I met Yasmin for an interview at the Starbucks on Whitechapel Road, a chain 
coffee shop situated somewhat awkwardly near the heart of Banglatown.  Yasmin has 
deep olive skin and wore dangling gold hoop earrings.  She had her hair up in a black 
headwrap, which at the time I thought of as an African style. 
Yasmin was 22 years old when we talked.  In the first few minutes of our 
interview I learned that she is a professional dance performance artist.  She was doing a 
solo performance that evening at an open mic night in the Whitechapel Art Gallery, just a 
few buildings along the road.  She told me that dance allows her to connect with and 
explore her Bengali, British, and other cultural identities.  In her own words: “It’s about 
looking at myself as a young Bengali living in Britain and being in a city life…. It’s 
about how you express [that] in narrative.  The narrative of living in London, the 
narrative of being a woman, being a Muslim.  It’s all these things.”  Yasmin attempts to 
articulate these various layers of cultural narrative through movement.  For example, a 
dance performance might involve Western contemporary dance fused with South Asian 
styles, such as the North Indian storytelling dance form called kathak. 
Very few second generation youth make the exploration of cultural identity into a 
career vocation, as Yasmin has done.  I tried to discern where she had developed her 
profound interest.  A major influence has been her mother.  Yasmin’s father died when 
she was young, and she has had a very close relationship with her mother throughout life.  
Her mother is a very artistic person who writes Sylehti poetry and sings traditional songs 
to maintain a living memory of Bangladesh.  Because she does not speak English, she has 
relied on Yasmin and the other daughters in the family to be her points of connection into 
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British life.  In a reciprocal way, Yasmin links to her own Bangladeshi heritage through 
her mother. As she puts it: “Being a second generation, my connection to my ancestors 
has my parents between the two.” 
A turning point in Yasmin’s life was her first and only visit to Bangladesh with 
her mother and sisters.   It was through this visit that she really realized her emotional 
connection with the country as “home”: 
I was eleven when I went. We initially said we were going to stay there for six 
weeks, for the whole summer break, but it extended to six months.  And that was 
purely because we didn’t want to come back. Myself, my two sisters and my 
mum, we were in a house, and going there and seeing my father’s grave, which is 
over there, and being in the village that my parents grew up in as husband and 
wife.  That for me was a place that I needed to be at that particular time of my 
life.  My sister felt exactly the same.  I was eleven, one of my sisters was twelve 
and my other sister was eighteen.  The gap is quite large between myself, my 
other sister, and the eighteen year old.  But we had a common ground, which was 
“We’re home!”….  It was really just seeing another life that was ours. 
 
Although Yasmin was born and raised entirely in London, upon visiting Bangladesh she 
experienced “another life that was ours.”  Her close connection with her mother and her 
longing for her father may help to explain why Bangladesh resonated so deeply with her 
then.  A sense of not fully fitting in among her peers in Tower Hamlets, as she would 
explain later into the interview, may also have played a part.  As Yasmin spoke of the 
Bangladeshi countryside and the senses it evoked, her whole countenance brightened: “It 
was about walking the distance along the road,” she told me, “It’s where the wheat, it’s 
where the mustard seeds are growing, it’s where the cows are, the sheep, and the goats. 
For me that was the experience!  It was so hot when we went. The smell is very 
particular.” 
Yasmin identifies herself as a Muslim as well, but speaks of this in an interesting 
way.  She told me: “Muslim is a part of my identity that I can’t deny.”  Her response of 
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“can’t deny” was much more passive than most of my Bangladeshi interviewees, who 
spoke with an active enthusiasm about being Muslim.  As we spoke more, I learned that 
being Muslim is indeed significant to Yasmin, although not in the ways I was accustomed 
to hearing from other East End Bangladeshis.  
 
Table 4.7.  Yasmin’s Identity Ranking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yasmin is a Sufi Muslim.  She says that Sufi spirituality has deep roots in her 
father’s side, and it is now quite actively maintained by her mother.  She told me that in 
her view “the essence of Sufism is a spiritual sense, a perspective on how you see life….  
And that for me is something I’ve got and will always carry.”  Her general life 
philosophy and her aesthetics as a performer are infused with this spiritual sense.  
Although Muslim religious practice is important to her too, she made clear to me that she 
does not follow this dogmatically.  She prays three to five times each day “depending on 
how I’m feeling or depending on what I’m doing….  Prayer is like the center.  [But] if I 
have to do something else, I don’t create excuses.” 
Despite Yasmin’s significant identification with Sufi Islam, she does not feel fully 
included among the Bangladeshi Muslims of the East End.  I asked all interviewees to list 
their five closest friends.  Yasmin’s were two Jamaicans, a Nigerian, a Pakistani, and an 
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Irish/Indian – making her stand out from other Bangladeshi interviewees, all of which at 
least had a majority of friends who were Bangladeshi.  Yasmin had met her diverse set of 
friends she in university or through her performances. 
Yasmin feels like something of an outsider in the East End Bangladeshi 
community.  It is for this reason that she says she “can’t deny” being Muslim.  Her 
differences with the local community are rooted in differing views of religion and 
culture: 
Their perspective on the Bengali culture and their perspectives on religion are 
completely different [than mine] because there’s a separation. There’s a 
separation between what religion is and what culture is.  In my mother’s 
household we embrace the two, but in their household they divide the two.  As I 
was growing up and connecting with other families they’ve always said that 
there’s a contradiction in culture and religion.  Coming from my own background 
I knew that there wasn’t. 
 
Yasmin believes that her family heritage and time spent in Bangladesh give her insight 
into the richness of Bengali cultural expressions of Islam.  She contrasts this with the 
view of Islam that she thinks pervades the East End, which separates Bengali culture 
from Muslim religion and sets them against each other.  She says of Islam in the East 
End: “In terms of culture, the food is there, the [Bengali] clothing is there underneath,” 
she told me, “but things are getting diluted.” 
Yasmin’s own cultural style seems to be a combination of continuity and 
hybridity.  She works diligently to maintain continuity with Bangladeshi culture through 
her relationship with her mother and through performance art.  Yet this continuity is not 
simple nor is it direct.  Yasmin has consciously interpreted Bengali influences and 
blended them with other cultural influences in performance art.  The dance style she uses 
to convey her Bengali heritage, kathak, is actually a North Indian form rather than being 
 180
directly Bengali.  Yasmin’s way of dressing is likewise hybrid.  She wears a black 
headwrap, jewellery, and flowy clothing, a sort of compromise to keep her hair covered 
in hijab yet also maintain a creative, artistic persona.  Yasmin appears to be quite at home 
with her own “hybrid-continuity.”  Yet it seems to have come at a price: she has found 
her uniqueness isolates her from peers in the East End. 
 
Rubina 
Rubina is a fitting comparison with Yasmin because they are similar in many 
respects, but have markedly different identity styles.  I interviewed Rubina in August 
2008 at the Fair Factory coffee shop, just a few stores away from the Starbucks.  The Fair 
Factory was opened just a week before our interview as a fair trade coffee shop to support 
the work of Muslim Aid, a humanitarian NGO.  The coffee place was located across the 
street from the main headquarters of Muslim Aid, nestled in the shadows of the East 
London Mosque’s red brick minarets. 
When we conducted the interview, Rubina was 19 and about to start her second 
year studying at the University of London.  Thin and youthful in appearance, she was 
wearing a black headscarf.  The black cloth of the headscarf came down to cover the 
front of her neck where it was embroidered with an attractive bright floral pattern.  
Rubina is an inquisitive young woman who, like Yasmin, has found a creative medium 
for exploring her culture and identity.   She is an English literature major and a prolific 
writer.  She happened to be writing a short story the night before we met, simply because 
she is motivated to improve her writing.  Rubina also contributes regularly to an online 
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blog.  She told me: “I write on a lot of things.  I write on a lot of finding yourself, finding 
identity…. A lot of soul searching and balancing the life and stuff like that.” 
Rubina, like Yasmin, had visited Bangladesh once when she was a child.  She told 
me about her experience: 
I was 13 and I went for three months….  It’s nice.  It’s very different to think that 
my home is on a farm – like my original home where I come from.  I’m actually a 
countryside girl and not a city girl the way I imagine myself to be! 
 
Rubina’s visit to Bangladesh had helped her to identify with her rural heritage.  Her 
experience was in some respects similar to Yasmin’s discovery of “another life that was 
ours.”  Yet the trip to Bangladesh had also confirmed to Rubina that some aspects of the 
culture remain alien to her:  
You know it’s very different.  I couldn’t live there now….  None of them are 
educated.  We’re from, you know, quite a poor area.  So you can’t afford to go to 
school and they’ve got a very narrow-minded way of thinking. 
 
Rubina had experienced narrow-mindedness in Bangladesh.  She told me that it this was 
most evident in terms of religious faith.  “Islam is very different to them, because Islam is 
for them just a bunch of cultures, like tradition,” she said.  This contrasted with her own 
practice of Islam: “Whereas me… my Islam that I learnt here is a faith.”  
Rubina’s efforts to distance herself from the traditional culture of her parents 
demonstrate that her approach to culture is one of deculturation.  Whereas Yasmin had 
told me she “can’t deny” being Muslim, Rubina described herself as a “very strong 
Muslim.”  In our interview Rubina frequently contrasted her view of Islam as a pure faith 
with what she saw as the corrupted, Bangladeshi form of Islam that is “just a bunch of 
cultures, like tradition.” 
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It is interesting to compare Rubina’s description of her visit to Bangladesh with 
how she describes her visit to Mecca in Saudi Arabia a few years later.  Rubina travelled 
on the “mini-pilgrimage,” or umrah, a shorter visit than the hajj that is nonetheless 
significant.  In our conversation she had maintained a critical distance in tone when 
talking about Bangladesh, but when described the umrah she glowed with excitement:  
I think [visiting Mecca is] why I’m a very strong Muslim.  Because I saw it with 
my own eyes and I know what I felt in my heart.  And I knew that it was complete 
peace.  I reached that when I was there and, you know, it was enough for me. 
 
Rubina and Yasmin are both second generation youth who know that they have 
some distinctiveness and connection that reaches outside of Britain.  Yasmin has made a 
transnational connection to Bangladeshi culture through her parents.  Rubina, in contrast, 
derives meaning from her connection to the transnational community of the ummah. 
 
Table 4.8. Rubina’s Identity Ranking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Olivier Roy’s terms, Rubina is a “born-again Muslim” because she has re-
adopted her faith for herself after a journey of personal discovery.  Roy (2006b) observes 
that “The bulk of born-again Muslims want to establish something which could be close 
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to a faith community… people who share the same beliefs and can live together in the 
purity of their religion.” 
The glories of the global Muslim unity that Rubina tasted while in Mecca have 
made Bengali cultural Islam seem small and provincial.  She spoke of the difference 
between “pure,” global Islam and Bengali Islam as not only evident when she has 
travelled abroad, but also when she is home in Britain.  Rubina had recently visited the 
nearby city of Luton to campaign for Muslim Aid.  She told me that in Luton “it’s still 
quite traditional, still quite backwards in the sense that Muslims still haven’t moved with 
the British culture…. It was like being transported back to Bangladesh, because people 
were, they were dressed in their [traditional] clothing [and] they couldn’t speak the 
language properly.”  It is important, as a Muslim, to have “moved with British culture.”  
Bengali culture will often impede this. 
In fact, Rubina felt that her childhood as a Bangladeshi in East London was “like 
a cocoon.”  It had been very sheltered: “I know how my mum brought me up.  The 
neighbours were all Bengali.  They had Islamic circles in the house, we had Bengali 
lessons and stuff like that.  Our parents tried very hard to keep us away from things of 
western culture.  Like even things that are allowed in Islam.”  As a deculturated Muslim, 
Rubina believes that Islam is a system that transcends all cultures.  A Muslim can keep 
pace with British culture as long as she or he carefully follows what is allowed in Islam.  
Although her parents had good intentions in trying to raise her in a Bengali and Muslim 
environment, Rubina found the experience as overly restrictive.  In a sense, Rubina’s 
parents had not been Islamic enough because they did not understand Islam as an 
abstract, transcendent system that can be applied anywhere.   
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These differences are revealed most starkly in issues of gender and marriage: 
They don’t understand the concept of [Islam] being a faith rather it’s a, you know, 
a bunch of obligations that you must do….  Like you have to do this, you have to 
do that.  Oh no, you can’t marry someone lower class than you!  But Islamically 
of course you can. 
 
By purifying her Islam of Bengali culture, Rubina is able to do away with key cultural 
restrictions on her choices.  When her parents attempt to control choices in marriage and 
family, Rubina can find in Islam empowering arguments.  The issue of marriage is close 
to home for Rubina.  She has already debated with her mother about Islamic and 
Bangladeshi conceptions of marriage, in relation to marriage choice for her brother: 
My mum’s looking for a bride for my oldest brother, because he doesn’t have a 
girlfriend.  So she wants to do an arranged marriage for him.  And I think that 
there’s plenty of [suitable] people, but they’re not Bengali.  I go “What’s wrong 
with it then?  Islam is saying that they need to be a good Muslim!” But [my mum 
is] like “Yes, but you know people are going to point fingers and say your son 
married out of the race.”  Like [I say] “Mum there’s only one race which is the 
human race.  You know that’s what unites us all.  You know there is no 
differentiation, you know we’re meant to follow the Prophet Mohammed, you 
know he didn’t differentiate between people.  Why do we do it?”  She goes “Oh 
you don’t understand, you wouldn’t understand.  We lived here too long.” 
 
The mutual exasperation of Rubina and her mother show just how wide the gulf between 
generations can be, for young Bangladeshi women in particular.  Rubina appeals to Islam 
as a source of transcendent values, hoping to resolve their dispute.  Islam has become for 
her a source of empowerment.  It provides the most comprehensive, reasoned, and 
community-sanctioned solution for gaining control from her parents.  Rubina’s use of 
Islam as a faith system is a resource for living confidently within the modern sensibilities 
she has developed while growing up in London.  
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Deculturation in Action 
 The identity style of deculturation is very widespread among Bangladeshi youth 
in the East End.  My estimate based on fieldwork and interviews is that half of East End 
Bangladeshis are consciously deculturated, like Rubina.  Although not all are as articulate 
as she is, Bangladeshi youth often raised the same concerns about freedom from parents 
and the impurities of Bengali culture, while expressing their faith in a comprehensive, 
transcendent vision of Islam.  
Young Bangladeshis tend to perceive deculturated Muslim identity as a source of 
empowerment, much as Rubina does.  A Muslim young woman named Shany explained 
her “Muslim first” identity as one that is free from any culture, thus breaking down 
barriers between people: 
[I chose] Muslim first because it is my most strong identity and I think it breaks 
down all barriers of every other identity.  As a Muslim I don’t have a color, I 
don’t have a language, I don’t have a nationality.  It kind of bonds me to billions 
of other people without those barriers…. It pretty much is quite an all-
encompassing entity. 
 
Islam provides an all-encompassing identity for Bangladeshi youth, connecting them to 
others around the globe.  Bangladeshi identity can seem small and provincial in 
comparison. 
The ways in which deculturation is adopted and used tend to differ among young 
women and men.  Many young women, like Rubina, find Islam to be an empowering 
resource when they face their parents, especially in the issue of arranged marriage.  Even 
Zahera, a young woman who does not habitually wear the headscarf or consider herself to 
be a practicing Muslim, sees Islam as providing freedom from oppressive cultural norms.  
Zahera says: “Within the Bengali community I’m told ‘why are you not married?’ and 
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‘let me find you a husband.’  Whereas from an Islamic perspective, I don’t have to get 
married.  I can actually choose to abstain from marriage.”  Another dynamic that often 
attracted young Bangladeshi women to strong Muslim identities was the acceptance in 
relationships of sisterhood. 
Bangladeshi young men tended to contrast religion with Bangladeshi culture not 
on issues of marriage and family, but instead in terms of Islam being more educated, 
more Western, or even more fun than a traditional Bangladeshi lifestyle.  As Bangladeshi 
parents usually come from poor and rural backgrounds, many youth see them as not 
having the requisite knowledge to fully comprehend Islam.   
 
Table 4.9. Farouq’s Identity Ranking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When I met Farouq, he was standing in front of a Chicken Shop on Cannon Street 
Road, smoking a cigarette.  He has spiked black hair and wore an oversized white puff 
jacket to look more intimidating.  Farouq does not consider himself a devout Muslim, as 
he usually only attends mosque to pray on Fridays.  He does rank Muslim first, however, 
and thinks of his Muslim identity in a deculturated way.  Farouq told me that people in 
his parents’ generation “are confused and mix tradition and religion together.”  In 
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comparison, “the young kids nowadays are more focused on everything, more wise.”  
Farouq said that Islam frees him from the constraints he would have felt to “make my 
parents happy, be a good boy, wear certain clothes, have certain haircuts.  Like, don’t 
have fun.”    
Another youth, Amin, does not think of himself as particularly religious either, 
though he does also identify as Muslim first.  Amin expressed a similar view to Farouq’s 
that the Islam of his parents is outmoded: 
 Our generation’s more westernised.  Whereas our parents generation, they’re 
more into the culture thing and everything.  They’re more into image and bad 
publicity and everything.  They want to keep that under control… We want to 
have fun basically, we’re westernised. 
 
Amin told me, further, that the Islam practiced by young people is a more knowledgeable 
one.  “There’s big scholars just studying religion and everything,” he said, “We’ve learnt 
from them basically, and we know what’s wrong and what’s right.”  When I asked him 
who these “big scholars” are, he mentioned Sheikh Abdur Rhaman Madani of the local 
Darrul Ummah Mosque and Imam Abdul Qayyum of the East London Mosque. 
It is a tribute to the savvy youth programs and informal peer networks of Darrul 
Ummah and the East London Mosque that even “non-practicing” young men, like Farouq 
and Amin, take a deculturated view of Islam and associate it with knowledge and having 
a good time.  Almost all Bangladeshi youth I interviewed had similarly superlative 
associations with Islam, regardless of how much they themselves fulfilled religious 
obligations. 
 Yet deculturation, if taken to its logical extreme, can challenge more than just 
Bangladeshi cultural identity.  I met 19 year old Khan on Brick Lane.  We walked to the 
popular Sweet & Spicy Bangladeshi restaurant for some warm nan bread and an 
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interview.  Khan had shortly cropped hair and a modest beard, and was dressed 
professionally.  His accent exudes an air of educated confidence.  Early into our 
interview, Khan took a more confrontational tone than I usually experienced in 
interviews.  He spoke frequently and with disdain about “Orientalists,” who he defines as 
“people who are anti-Islam… who would like to distort the message of Islam.” 
 In the identity ranking section, Khan asked “Can I choose just one?”  He selected 
“Muslim” and placed that identity alone on the table.  To explain his choice, Khan 
contrasted it with identity combinations like Bangladeshi Muslim and Black Muslim:  
You [could] have Black Muslim.  So why do you need to put something ahead of 
Muslim?  Before or after, there’s nothing.  You shouldn’t put anything before or 
after Muslim.  That’s it.  It’s simple – you just worship your Lord, you do 
everything he has commanded you to do, stay away from everything that is 
forbidden for you to do, and that’s it.  That’s why you’re Muslim. 
 
Khan supports the views of Anjem Choudary and the Islam4UK organization, which 
have advocated the enforcement of Shariah Law in Britain.  Khan explained to me in the 
interview why he finds a future British Islamic state appealing, including the harsher 
punishments for criminals and the idea that women will be safer from men if they are 
required to wear hijab.  Islam4UK, since the time of our interview, has been proscribed in 
the UK as a radical organization (in January 2010).   
 
Table 4.10. Khan’s Identity Ranking 
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Deculturation is a process that can take many forms.  Khan was one of three cases 
of Bangladeshi young men who expressed their support for radical organizations.  One of 
these youth, Zain, had taken part in a Hizb ut-Tahrir protest march to advocate Shariah 
law in the UK.  In cases such as these, a deculturated Muslim identity has undermined all 
others, making a common purpose or basis of communication with non-Muslims a 
challenge. 
  
Not So British? 
Having grown up in London, the youth I interviewed typically spoke with the 
same London accents and mannerisms as their British peers.  Some were quintessentially 
British in their interests – playing cricket or watching television shows such as East 
Enders.  None of this should be surprising.  All of the youth I interviewed are full-fledged 
British citizens, educated in London schools, and exposed to British media and public 
culture.  
I provided youth with “British” and “English” as options in the identity ranking 
exercise.  Virtually all youth chose at least one or the other.  Only two Jamaicans and two 
Bangladeshis who could not relate to either English or British.  This very high level of 
general identification with the nation of citizenship suggests that (besides a few 
exceptions like Khan) these are not youth who hold completely oppositional identities, or 
who live ghettoized lifestyles that fully separate them from the state. 
Identification with “British” was especially widespread (20 of 24 Jamaicans, 33 of 
35 Bangladeshis).  The actual ranking youth gave to this identity varied considerably.  
Only one, a Jamaican 20 year old named Martin, chose “British” first.  On the other end 
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of the spectrum was Damien, mentioned earlier, who placed “British” 11th and “English” 
12th in his list of twelve identities.  Identification with “English” tended to be less likely 
than “British.”  15 of 24 Jamaicans chose “English,” while only 11 of 36 Bangladeshis 
did so. 
Although almost all youth chose “British,” “English,” or both, their actual levels 
of attachment to these identities could be quite low.  Mike had told me “I’m not a very 
patriotic person…. Coming from a mixed race background, I like everywhere.”  Leonard 
likewise did not take much pride in his British identity, saying that: “Being patriotic don't 
seem to really hit home with me about British, or being British.  It more seems to hit 
home with me about Jamaican.”  Almost all youth were like Mike or Leonard: They 
either identified a bit with “everywhere” or, more commonly, had other identities that 
meant more to them than being either English or British. 
When I asked youth who chose “British” why they had done so, easily the most 
common response was “because I was born here.”  For many, “British” was primarily an 
indicator of geography – the context in which they were born and have grown up.   
Near the end of the interviews, I also asked a related question about Britishness: 
“What does your British citizenship mean to you?”  Youth tended to be surprised by this 
question.  Most paused or fumbled around for a while.  Chanel told me “It’s just the color 
of my passport really.  I got a British passport, that’s what it means.”  Amin’s view was 
very similar “I’ve got the red passport, that’s it…. And you get to go to European places 
without a visa.”  When asked about British citizenship, in most cases youth either had 
nothing to say or associated citizenship with their passport, their freedom of travel, or 
their protected status when visiting another country. 
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If Britishness tended to be greeted with indifference, Englishness was more often 
problematic.  Some thought of “English” simply in terms of the language, and in these 
cases could identify with it strongly.  Yet those who consider “English” to be cultural 
identity tended to feel excluded in some way.  Shany, a young Bangladeshi woman, told 
me that she is “definitely not English.”  She said “I think it’s just because I’m not 
white….  It’s more of an ethnic thing that I don’t relate to, because I don’t look the part.” 
Frequently youth spoke of how racism or labelling from others shapes their access 
to English and British identity.  Shah told me that “I’m Asian rather than being British…. 
I was born and brought up here, but people would label me as [Asian] before I’m 
British.”  Mabel had expressed her frustration that in Britain “they’ve got this thing 
‘There’s no black in the Union Jack.’” 
 When youth tried to give cultural content to Britishness or Englishness, the most 
frequent image that came to mind was the English pub.  Bangladeshi Muslim youth often 
singled out the pub as an English institution that would remain alien to them, due to 
Qur’anic prohibitions on the consumption of alcohol.  Some Jamaican youth, particularly 
churchgoers, felt equally unable to relate to pub culture or binge drinking.  Mabel said 
that she could appreciate British culture, but that British history tends to be one-sided: “I 
resent that they do not teach about people like Marcus Garvey and Immanuel VII65 in 
history classes, but they’d rather talk about Henry VIII.” 
 While most second generation youth did not evince much interest in English 
culture or history, there were a few who were enamored with all things English.  Shany 
was studying English Literature at university.  She told me that her favorite books tend to 
                                                 
65Marcus Garvey and Immanuel VII are both founding figures in the Pan-African 
movement. 
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be from Victorian authors: “I think I’m a bit of an old fogy.  I like reading traditional 
things.  I like reading my Charles Dickens, and my Jane Austen, and my Mark Twain and 
stuff like that.”  Belal is a devout Muslim young man who grew up in the Bangladeshi 
community in Whitechapel.  As a child he devoured English literature, his favorite book 
being Roald Dahl’s Danny, Champion of the World.  Belal had managed to develop a 
highly intellectual English accent from watching BBC television.  Although he did not 
identify himself as English, he spoke with a distant admiration of the English culture of a 
bygone era: 
I am not an Englishman.  [But] it is a culture I really like…  The way their culture 
used to be.  I’m talking about a post-war Britain, where cricket used to be played 
in the long summer hazy days.  Boarding schools – I’m a really big fan of that.  
Manners, family, strict discipline.  I really love it.  I’ve never done the hunting 
before, but all that tweed jacket thing with the hunting – I’m a big fan of that. 
 
In a similar vein, Clarise told me she thinks Jamaican values are British values.  
Underneath Jamaican culture she said there is an “infrastructure” of British values that 
has carried over since the days of the slave trade.  “Watch old movies and you’ll actually 
see what old Britain was like.  Very rigid, and very ‘this is what’s right’ and ‘this is 
what’s wrong.’  And if you look at Jamaicans now and their culture – like back home 
Jamaicans, not the ones here [in Britain]…. They’re very ‘this is what’s right’ and ‘this is 
what’s wrong.’”  It is notable that for these youth it was the Englishness of days past – 
whether portrayed in old movies, Victorian literature, or men in tweed hunting jackets – 
that resonated most.  This nostalgic Englishness seemed carry a greater weight of 
discipline and moral responsibility that they could readily identify as connected with their 
own. 
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 The questions from the beginning of this chapter are important to raise again.  
Second generation youth tend to rank other identities above British and English – 
whether these are religious, racial, or ethnic.  Are these youth “Not so British?”  Are 
issues of civic loyalty, like those raised by Timothy Garton Ash and the episode of 
Panorama, actually well founded? 
 It is important to recognize, first, that Caribbeans and South Asians actually have 
higher rates of identification with Britishness than the native white population.  When 
given choices of only national (and not religious) identities in the Government’s General 
Household Survey (ONS 2002), most white people selected English, Scottish, Welsh, or 
Irish identities instead of British.  Most Caribbeans and South Asians identified most 
strongly with British.  Ian Bradley (2007: 177) has shown that a full spectrum of surveys 
reveal strong British identification among Britain’s black and Asian ethnic minorities.  It 
is when the choices are broadened beyond national identity, particularly to include 
religion, that identification becomes more complex. 
 Britain is, of course, a political union of four nations: England, Scotland, Wales, 
and Northern Ireland.  It is difficult to conceive of a cultural content to British identity 
because Britain has historically been a political-legal entity more than a self-consciously 
cultural one.  It is for this reason that Gordon Brown’s suggestion to define a cultural 
substance to British values eventually fell flat.  As Lord Anthony Giddens (2008) argued 
in the House of Lords debates about Britishness and British values (emphasis added):  
I suggest that we drop the dead donkey; that is, drop the idea of Britishness.  The 
very term “Britishness” is odd….  [W]e should speak of Britain as a citizenship 
nation.  That is what holds the nation together and gives us a coherent identity.  If 
you speak of Britishness, you are looking for an elusive, essential identity which 
does not really exist. 
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Giddens recognizes that Britain is a citizenship nation, where citizen status is the “glue” 
that holds together a wide range of diverse people.  Just as English and Scots bring their 
own cultural content to the table as British citizens, the same can be expected of other 
ethnic and religious groups in Britain.  Britain as a citizenship nation is fundamentally a 
polity of dialogue between multiple perspectives (Modood 2007). 
The fact that Britain is a citizenship nation helps to explain why my interviewees 
often had difficulty articulating the value of their “Britishness,” beyond a set of rights and 
opportunities (see also Hussain and Bagguley 2007).  Britishness – if it is anything – is a 
set of citizen rights, opportunities, and responsibilities.  Yasmin, the young Bangladeshi 
dance artist, told me that she thinks of being British as a “space to develop.”  It is within 
the norms and rules of the British state that one is freed to develop an identity, and 
eventually to make a civic contribution. 
If “British” is a civic definition that joins together people with other identities 
they hold as core, then it is not problematic if British youth choose “Muslim first, and 
British second.”  In doing so, they are following the accepted norm by which most 
Scottish would choose “Scottish first, British second.”  Accepting that this is a valid way 
to prioritize identity, it becomes important to understand the various meanings youth may 
have if they choose Muslim first, Christian first, or black first (for example), as I have 
attempted to do here.  
 Second generation youth approaches to identity range from Damien’s all-
inclusive list of twelve identities down to Khan’s singular and all-encompassing 
Muslimness.  Jamaicans tend to have more open, flexible, and situational identities, while 
Bangladeshis were somewhat more sparing in their choices, almost always placing 
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Muslim first.  These broad trends have implications for what youth will bring to the table 
as British citizens and for their potential levels of political participation.  
 Islam is an orienting identity for East End Bangladeshis.  The process of 
deculturation, spearheaded by the East London Mosque, the Darrul Ummah Mosque, and 
other local organizations, is a reflection of broader currents with global revivalist Islam.  
Deculturation has spread to different degrees among different youth, but I was struck in 
my interviews that virtually every young Bangladeshi recognizes the argument that pure 
Islam should not be mixed with Bengali culture.  Deculturation, and other overlapping 
processes like da’wa (missionary activity) and political mobilization, have largely 
eliminated the competition for primary allegiance in the East End.  While Bangladeshi 
youth may interpret or practice Islam differently, very few would question its ultimate 
truth or its enjoining of particular actions.  Muslim identity is therefore broad, and 
sometimes deep, as a foundation for collective political action in the East End. 
 Youth like Rubina from this chapter and Hamid, from Chapter 1, have grown to 
be highly articulate in their Muslim identity.  Young people such as these are often highly 
active in the “alternative politics” that centers on the mosques and NGOs of the East End.  
Other youth, such as Farouq and Amin, may be further from the center of political 
activism, but the common ground of Muslim identity can often be enough to gain their 
signatures on a petition or their donation in a charity box.  When I asked Farouq if he had 
voted, he told me that he had previously, for George Galloway of the RESPECT Party in 
2005.  However, at that time he was mainly responding to pressure: “I thought I had to 
[vote],” he told me, “I didn’t want to.”  Direct pressure is unlikely to be applied often, but 
the culture of local political activism is strong and at times may be hard to r
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religiously extreme youth such as Khan can actually exert the opposite form of pressure.  
Khan takes the view that voting is forbidden, unless a nation is under Shariah Law.  
However, it is clear that in the East End today Khan is part of a small minority.  Overall, 
Muslim identity has been effectively mobilized for political participation.   
 The dynamics in Brixton are significantly different.  Brixton Jamaican youth can 
choose from a wide array of possible identities.  Jamaican youth identities take the form 
of ‘new ethnicities’ which are more situational and hybrid than those of most 
Bangladeshis.  Young men such as Johnny and Damien are skilled in multiple cultural 
contexts, and as such they may be well poised to succeed in different social worlds 
(Warikoo forthcoming 2011). 
 Yet the freedom and flexibility of “new ethnicities” makes for a shifting terrain of 
identities, in which common political agendas are elusive.  Brixton is a place that is 
fragmented into various ethnic communities, some – such as Jamaicans and Nigerians – 
which exist in a certain rivalry or tension.  The 1970s and 1980s were years of 
commonality in a black political agenda.  In more ethnically complex times, no common 
identity, whether political, religious, or otherwise, has been able to carry the same 
unifying power.
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
RELIGIOUS ACTIVISM: 
BUILDING BLOCKS OF SOCIAL CHANGE 
  
At noon on Saturday August 22, 2009, about three hundred people gathered at 
Westminster in London to march against gun and knife crime.  The event was planned by the 
South London regional Seventh Day Adventist administration to take place on the Sabbath 
Day.66  It also included some participants from other denominations and religiously unaffiliated 
supporters who felt passionate about the issue.  The protesters marched silently past Parliament 
carrying signs emblazoned with the acronym LIVE: “Living Intentionally Versus Existing.”  
Some larger banners had pictures of knives and guns.  Hundreds of camera-toting tourists, 
finding their route to Big Ben and Westminster Abbey temporarily obstructed, waited by the 
road with quizzical stares. 
 The march continued from Westminster across the River Thames, on a three hour course 
into South London that followed blocked roads and police escorts.  Although they remained 
silent through the Westminster portion, the marchers sang Christian worship songs together for 
the rest of their journey.  The destination was Kennington Park in South London.  There they 
were greeted upon arrival by free vegetarian food, a variety of booths and outdoor activities, and 
a program on the main stage of worship music, speeches against gun and knife violence, and the 
memorializing of victims.  
 
                                                 
66Seventh Day Adventists practice a Sabbath of rest and worship from sunset each Friday 
evening until sunset on Saturday.  This includes holding their regular worship services on 
Saturdays, unlike most churches in the Christian tradition.  
 198
Figure 5.1. Seventh Day Adventist LIVE March 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 In this chapter I continue the discussion of how religious beliefs and practices contribute 
to the development of young citizens in London.  In particular, I consider the ways in which 
religion influences youth to take different approaches to bringing change to their personal lives, 
to their communities, and (in some cases) to politics.  In Chapter 2, I found that the political 
participation of most Bangladeshi youth in the East End is significantly higher than that of most 
Jamaican youth, according to well-accepted measures from Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley (2004).  
By profiling the LIVE event and a comparable grassroots event in the East End, I will argue here 
that religious conceptions of change are a key component of the political participation disparity.   
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The LIVE Event: Opposing Gun and Knife Crime, One Person at a Time 
The Seventh Day Adventist LIVE march on Parliament, and the community event that 
followed it in Kennington Park, were geared primarily towards teenage youth.  These events 
provided an ideal setting in which to observe young people engaging in faith-based civic 
activism.  I had originally heard about the event from some of my Jamaican interviewees at the 
Brixton Seventh Day Adventist Church.  Johnny, an 18 year-old I interviewed months before, 
told me about the previous year when he had marched: “It was amazing!  We had so many 
people ask us what we were doing it for.  We were making them think about how they live their 
lives.”  
The event in Kennington Park included various performances and activity booths that 
were run by the youth ministries of South London Adventist churches.  The vast majority of 
congregants in these churches are African or Caribbean in origin, and this composition was 
mirrored that afternoon.  In good Adventist tradition, the youth emphasis of the event was paired 
with an emphasis on family.  Family members of crime victims were asked on the main stage to 
speak about how they keep going in light of tragic loss.  An Adventist youth group performed a 
mime to dramatize the toll that gun crime takes on friendships and on families.  A memorial 
service was held for the last half-hour of the afternoon, giving families time to process and 
remember together.    
 The main aim of the LIVE event, captured in the acronym “Living Intentionally Versus 
Existing,” was to encourage youth to think through how they live their lives, rather than blindly 
sliding into peer pressure and violence.  A plywood wall at the back of the park had been painted 
sky blue.  Youth were invited to put their handprints on the wall in white paint, pledging that 
these hands would never touch a knife or gun.  
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Alan James, a Caribbean man affected by gun crime, gave a spoken word performance.  
His assertive, powerful lyrics were wrought with emotion.  They captured some of the tenor of 
the event: 
 …Put down the gun.  Don’t want another brother die. 
 Put down the gun.  Don’t want another mother cry. 
 Put down the gun.  Don’t want to kill another wife. 
 Put down the gun.  Don’t want to spill another life. 
 Put down the gun.  Don’t want another sister dead. 
 Put down the gun.  Don’t want another Mr. Lead. 
 Put down the gun and stop acting like a clown. 
 Put down the gun… before the gun puts you down. 
 
The crowd roared with applause. 
I wandered through Kennington Park, visiting the LIVE event booths and speaking with 
young people in the crowd.  I spoke with a group of three young black men, all age 19, who told 
me that they attend Adventist churches in Peckham and Kennington.  I asked if they could relate 
to the message of the event.  How much of a problem was gun and knife crime in these areas of 
South London?  The flurry of responses from the young men came so quickly that their replies 
interrupted each other: 
A: It’s ser-i-ous— 
 
B: —It’s got worse— 
 
A: —You wouldn’t believe it. 
 
B: It’s like, its normal.  Before when we hear of it we were shocked, but now it’s 
normal…. You just get used to it— 
 
A: —It’s nothing new—  
 
C: —I’m not surprised at all— 
 
A: —It’s everybody.  Very dangerous. 
 
B: That’s why I’m glad this sort of activity is happening. 
 
The three young men went on to tell me that they each have friends or acquaintances who had 
stabbed or shot someone else.  They see youth violence as an urgent problem that is only getting 
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worse.  Even so, they expressed optimism about the LIVE event.  I asked: What kind of lasting 
effect is it likely to have?  
A: I hope this event really changes people’s minds. 
 
B: Pray, not hope, pray.  
 
For these three young people and others I met, the significance of the LIVE event was both the 
stand it took against youth violence and the power it had to change the lives of those gathered 
there.  It is worth noting that they did not see it as part of an ongoing program of lobbying or 
activism, but rather as a day in which minds would be changed. 
A talk delivered by Sam Davis was the centerpiece of the day’s events, and essential to 
understanding their intended purpose.  Davis, a second-generation Jamaican man in his fifties, 
leads the South England Conference of Seventh Day Adventists (SEC).  He was dressed in suit 
and tie and was introduced on the main stage as an honoured guest.  When approaching the 
microphone, he held out his silver mobile phone PDA.  He would look down at the PDA as his 
speech prompter.   
Davis’ speech was, in fact, a sermon.  It was delivered in a confident preacher’s cadence.   
He began by reading Matthew 13:24-28, from the New King James Version: 
Another parable he put forth to them, saying: “The Kingdom of Heaven is like a man 
who sowed good seeds in his fields.  But while the man slept, his enemy came and sowed 
tares among the wheat and went his way.  But when the grain had sprouted and produced 
a crop, then the tares also appeared.  So the servants of the owner came and said to him: 
‘Sir, did you not sow good seed in your field?  How then, does it have tares?’  And he 
said to them ‘an enemy has done this.’” 
 
In these New Testament verses, Christ tells a parable of a man who sowed good seeds.  Only 
later does the man discover that tares – or weeds – have sprouted up alongside his intended good 
wheat.  Sam Davis began explaining the parable to his Kennington Park audience by describing 
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the good world God created in the Garden of Eden.  He said that God’s intention was only for 
good to be sown in human lives: 
Everything that God had provided was just right.  It was never God’s plan that sin and 
death would enter that environment.  It was never God’s plan that mothers and fathers 
should weep for their children.  Never in the script that young men should mow down 
each other over turf warfare.  Never in the script that drugs and violence should mar this 
planet.  God sowed only good seed in the earthly garden. 
 
By preaching in this way, Davis was connecting with street life experiences and stories 
that would have been familiar to his audience.  He was retelling these stories into a spiritual 
grand-narrative of epic struggle between God and a deceptive enemy.  Just who was the 
interloper who had sown weeds in the field?  Davis explained that this was the Devil: “We need 
to de-mythologize the Devil,” he said, “We need to say he is real.  We need to say the Devil is 
not someone with horns and a tail, but he is real, and he wants our kids.”   
Davis recognized the Devil as an agent actively at work in society, an agent with a 
cunning personality and evil motives.  The Devil had sown bitter weeds of sin and death on 
God’s territory.  These weeds were the underlying cause of youth violence and the other social 
problems in South London.  To solve the social problems, therefore, one had to get personal.  
One had to take on an alternative life free from the Devil’s influence.  Davis explained the 
solution in this way: 
Until we begin to teach our children that they have been made in the image of God, that 
God loves them and that they need to love their fellow brothers and sisters, society will 
have lost it. 
 
Standing there in the crowd, it was at this moment that I realized what the anti-crime rally was 
deep down.  It was a revival meeting.  The central purpose was to change hearts and minds, one 
by one, so that they would come into a right relationship with God.  If this sort of conversion was 
achieved, then social change could be expected as a natural outflow.  I will return to how Davis 
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expressed this view on change a bit later.  For the moment, however, it is worth considering 
more generally if religious revival movements can be harbingers of real social change. 
Some of the most powerful social movements in history have had a religious revivalist 
character.  David Chappell (2003), in A Stone of Hope, argues the American Civil Rights 
movement was primarily a religious revival in the eyes of many of its participants and central 
figures.  God was freeing His people from yokes of segregation and oppression.  He was setting 
them in right relationships with their fellow men.  It is well known that many of the other leaders 
of the Civil Rights movement were preachers, including the Reverend Martin Luther King Jr., 
and that the movement gained momentum through networks of churches, such as those in the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (Morris 1986).  In the words of one of its towering 
figures, the Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth, the Civil Rights Movement was “a religious crusade, a 
fight between light and darkness, right and wrong, good and evil, fair play and tyranny.  We are 
assured of victory because we are using weapons of spiritual warfare” (Shuttleworth 1963, 
quoted in Chappell 2003). 
Just how does religion contribute to social action, both in Black Majority Ethnic Church 
settings and elsewhere?  Over the past few decades, American sociologists have been particularly 
engaged in this question.  Some of the earlier studies from Morris (1986) and from McAdam 
(1982) demonstrated the importance of church networks and resources for providing the structure 
that channels social movement growth.  Mary Patillo-McCoy (1998) extended the research scope 
beyond structure to include church culture.  She found that cultural practices in Black Churches – 
including prayer, call-and-response, and the Christian imagery of songs and sermons – provides 
the motivation and meaning for community actions.  She perceived that behind these cultural 
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practices was a belief in an all-powerful, immanently active God who could galvanize change to 
surpass human limitations.   
Richard Wood (2002) builds upon these previous research studies of structure and culture 
in his comparative book Faith in Action.  Wood compares faith-based activist organization PICO 
with race-based activist organization CTWO, both in Oakland, California and both advocating 
for the disadvantaged.  CTWO attempts to unify the interests of members of various races, as 
expressed in its organization leaflet: “We are Black, Latino, Native American, Asian, and White 
people of all ages and economic backgrounds who demand… power over issues that affect our 
lives.”  The language here demonstrates CTWO’s recurrent challenge to create common purpose 
and unity from diversity.  For faith-based PICO, in contrast, the cultural work of purpose and 
unity has already been accomplished within its partner network of religious congregations.  
Wood concludes from the comparison that religious congregations provide advantages to social 
movement organizing.  Congregations are advantageous both because they are pre-existing 
reservoirs of social capital and because they gather around beliefs and symbols that are rich 
sources of human motivation.  Confirmation of Wood’s research can be seen in the significant 
history of social movements that were at least partly congregation-powered.  Twentieth Century 
examples in addition to the American Civil Rights Movement include the Solidarity Movement 
in Poland, the 1979 Revolution in Iran, and Anti-Apartheid in South Africa.  Michael Walzer has 
argued for an even greater influence of religion, tracing the origins of political activism to the 
Calvinist revolutions and reforms of early modern Europe (Walzer 1982).  
There may be, therefore, reason for optimism as we project the potential impact of the 
LIVE Event.  Sam Davis’ speech certainly seemed to capture the imaginations of the audience 
that day.  Returning to the speech, we have already seen that it took the form of a sermon in a 
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revival church service.  Casting everyday problems into a spiritual cosmology, it gave the 
audience evocative cultural resources and motivation that they might potentially use to resist gun 
and knife violence.  
Yet the speech and event were, at the same time, inherently self-limiting.  The limits were 
most evident as Sam Davis brought his sermon to its rhetorical crescendo [emphasis original]: 
The politicians are looking for a solution, and they are saying that what we need is better 
social housing, we need more mentors, we need better education, we need more youth 
schemes and so on.  But I want to say that we have tried it all and it has failed repeatedly.  
We have tried these things and found that none of them have been successful.  And so my 
friends, I want to say to you today, having tried everything – having tried more social 
work, having tried to put more policemen on the streets, having tried better education, 
having tried better youth schemes – why don’t you try Jesus Christ! [crowd cheers] 
 
Davis was presenting Jesus Christ as the ultimate resolution to youth violence.  Within the terms 
of the spiritual narrative he had presented thus far, this solution fit perfectly.  But Davis’ words 
also set boundaries on the process of social change, suggesting that Jesus Christ cannot work for 
the good of society in mentoring relationships, improved education, and youth schemes. 
 Underlying Davis’ words is a particular perspective on how change can be produced.  He 
was arguing for personal faith as the causal mechanism that generates real and lasting change.  I 
have already observed the importance of personal faith when discussing Ruach Ministries in 
Chapter 3.  In the Brixton Seventh Day Adventist Church as well, faith was preached alongside 
discipline as an approach to change.  I have diagrammed the logic of the personal faith approach 
in Figure 5.2.   
Figure 5.2 follows what has been called the DBO model of human action – desires (D), 
beliefs (B), opportunities (O), and action (A) (see Hedström 2008).  The figure shows the 
internal states and external actions of two people, who are labelled with subscripts i and j.  
Personal faith begins with a desire (D) for some outcome or some state of relationship.  This 
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desire then shapes what the individual believes (B) is attainable in the outcome or relationship.  
The beliefs and desires are then able to work in concert and, if all goes well, they enable the 
action that the person desires.  The mechanism is structurally equivalent (though not necessarily 
ultimately equivalent) to what sociologists have called “wishful thinking” (see Hedström 2008).  
A person with the lived experience of “personal faith” will perceive that there is a transcendent 
element – that God is at work in social change.  
 
Figure 5.2. Personal Faith as a Causal Mechanism of Individual and Social Change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the example of gun and knife crime, youth at the individual-level are expected to take 
their desires (D) for a safe and non-violent society and to combine these with a faith that this is 
attainable (B).  In doing so, they become capable of achieving social change through their 
actions (A).  Religious conversion is a related variant of the personal faith mechanism and may 
influence violent crime more indirectly: An individual’s desire (D) for God becomes a faith-held 
belief (B) that may influence later actions to be less violent (A).  In both of these cases, the 
individual must place significant faith (B) in something not yet entirely substantiated to move the 
process forward.  I have diagrammed the personal faith mechanism of two individuals separately 
in Figure 5.2, to emphasise that it is an atomistic process. 
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With personal faith as the individual-level building block, change occurs as more and 
more individuals act in faith (see Smith et. al. 1998).  The many small actions of individuals 
aggregate at the social level into what can be called revival-activism.  The narrative of revival-
activism – that as more people take hold of faith they will make society better – is one that I 
often heard among Jamaican youth and in their churches.  I also heard a Muslim variation of the 
narrative in some of my interviews with Bangladeshi youth.67 
The revival-activism strategy for social change is certainly well intentioned.  Personal 
faith and social revival were important in the powerful social movements for freedom and civil 
rights mentioned earlier in this chapter.  Yet, those who believe exclusively in social change 
through revival-activism are blinded to structural factors.  They are less likely to seek 
partnerships with other organisations, to initiate a long-term strategy of influence and activism, 
or to advocate for the structural changes (e.g., in education, the police force, or employment 
opportunities) that are almost always necessary to produce lasting change (Tilly 1999).  Even if 
personal discipline is added to personal faith (as it will often be in an Adventist approach to 
activism) the neglect of structural factors in the revival-activism strategy will still be a weakness. 
As the LIVE event neared its end, I spoke with an official representative at the 
information booth.  I learned from her that the Seventh Day Adventist Church was partnering 
with a charitable organisation called FAME (Families Against Murders Escalating) and sending 
donations from the event to further their work.  This partnership has potential to make a positive 
                                                 
67For example, the revival-based model of change is a recurrent message of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), 
a radical political activism organization which seeks the re-establishment of a Muslim caliphate.  
HT’s propaganda and events frequently invoke a utopian vision of life under a caliphate, as a 
much more Muslim populace governed by Sharia law finds itself free from crime, hunger, 
poverty, and other evils caused by not living under God’s given system.  A few of my 
Bangladeshi youth interviewees held similar views on the caliphate.  Many others expressed a 
general faith that personal conversion or renewal in Islam made one into a better member of 
society. 
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impact.  When I asked the representative about how the gun and knife crime initiative would be 
continued, however, the limits of the revival-activism strategy again became evident:  
Daniel: What are you guys going to be doing to carry this forward from here? 
 
Representative: As you see, all of these booths [at the sides of the park] are from different 
churches.   
Daniel: Oh – these are all from different churches? 
 
Representative: Yeah…. Depending on the area, we could connect you with the church in 
your area.  And you could see whatever extra-curricular activities they have.  For 
example, tomorrow in the Hatfield area, at Hatfield University, we are organizing a 
basketball tournament.  We’ve done one earlier this year, and a lot of people who are not 
necessarily Christian have come and played.  So at least we are making connections with 
them.  And, you know, they can see that “I don’t have to be drinking, or carrying guns to 
make friends, or doing drugs to have a group of friends.”  You can have fun without 
being into one of those.  You can be sober and still enjoy life.  So we’re at least 
connecting through events like that. 
 
A strategy of personal faith and revival as the basis for change can build personal 
connections with youth susceptible to criminal involvement.  Yet, with its exclusive reliance on 
this “one person at a time” approach to change, the Adventist Church dramatically under-realizes 
its potential influence on the violent crime issue.  Reflecting on the LIVE march and event 
overall, one can see a strange ambivalence.  The march resembled a typical protest on Parliament 
to demand political change.  Yet any message of such change was somewhat neutralized by the 
event at Kennington Park, where the main speaker and the organizers expressed little faith in 
political action. 
 
The Big IFtar: Breaking a Ramadan Fast for the Hungry and Homeless 
 The Saturday of the LIVE march against gun and knife crime also happened to be the 
first full day of Ramadan 2009.  As Seventh Day Adventists protested at Parliament, Muslims 
throughout London were fasting from food and drink.  The East End areas surrounding 
Whitechapel Road and Brick Lane, where I was doing research fieldwork with Bangladeshis, 
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dramatically changed in atmosphere during the month of Ramadan.  Friday prayers overflowed 
with people.  Some of the normally non-practicing Muslim young men I knew begin to wear 
prayer caps and to dutifully attend evening Qur’an recitations and prayers.  After sunset, there 
was a tangible sense of relief in breaking the fast with iftar meals together as crowds of the 
grateful descended on local curry houses and chicken shops. 
During Ramadan 2009 I attended the Big IFtar, a Muslim civic activism event concerning 
the issue of homelessness.  The community iftar meal was held outdoors on a cool Friday 
evening in early September.  IF Charity68 organized the event to raise donations towards meals 
for “homeless people in London as well as displaced communities around the world.”  The event 
took place in Altab Ali Park, a modest park near the Western edge of Whitechapel Road that has 
monuments commemorating Bangladeshi history.69  A crowd of about 200 people of all ages, 
largely Bangladeshi and Muslim, stood in the park for the introductory program.  Most remained 
afterwards to share in the iftar curry.  
IF Charity had invited celebrities to serve as honorary chefs at the large white cooking 
tents.  Baroness Pola Uddin, reality television star Syed Ahmed, and other notable Bengalis 
momentarily stirred pots of iftar dinner and posed for photographs.  Across from the cooking 
tents stood the main stage, the focal point for the introductory program of speeches and 
                                                 
68IF Charity is a young charitable organization whose first sponsored event was the Gaza 100 of 
summer 2009, a 100-meter relay run that raised money to assist children in Gaza.  The IF 
website provides little information about the organization’s aims or ethos, but it is a Muslim 
organization at least partly intended for joining together the work of other Muslim charities in 
London. 
 
69Altab Ali Park has an emotional resonance for many Bangladeshis.  It is named after a 25 year 
old Bangladeshi man who in 1978 was murdered in a racist attack on his way home from textile 
work on Hanbury Street.  Altab Ali is commemorated by a sculpted iron gateway at one entrance 
to the park.  In a corner of the park is the Shaheed Minar, a replica of the monument in Dhaka to 
martyrs of the Bengali Language Movement.  These martyrs set in motion the violent struggle in 
East Pakistan that culminated in independence for Bangladesh. 
 210
performances.  These included a stand up comedian, a personal testimony from a black Muslim 
convert, various speeches from politicians and charity workers, and musical acts.   
 
Figure 5.3. The Big IFtar Charity Event, 2009 
 
 
 
  
The white English Muslim music artist named Naseeha performed on stage in white hip 
hop style baggy clothes and a cap.  He sang two nasheed70 songs with a vocals-only R&B sound.  
The first song resounded with a message of person-based faith change.  It closely resembled the 
main message I had heard at the LIVE march: 
 
 
                                                 
70Nasheeds are a contemporary form of Muslim music that is sung without instrumental 
accompaniment (except percussion, in some cases).  The music takes this form to match 
particular Muslim views on the forms of music are Islamically permitted.  Nasheeds have grown 
in popularity among Muslim youth in the West, especially those from popular artists such as 
Zain Bhikha and Yusuf Islam (formerly Cat Stevens). 
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Al-lah, help us change, 
to make the world a better place. 
Al-lah, help us see, 
the error of our ways. 
 
Naseeha mentioned that his second song, “Peace, Justice, and Harmony” has been played on the 
Islam Channel.  In the course of the song he told a biography of the Prophet Muhammad.  The 
song’s chorus flows from the example of Muhammad’s life to put Islam forward as the only way 
to achieve the changes the world needs: 
Peace, justice, and harmony, 
that’s what we need today. 
Peace, justice, and harmony, 
it’s the only way. 
 
Performances at the Big IFtar were largely, though not exclusively, aimed towards young 
people.  Along each side of the park stood additional booths of information and activities.  Most 
of these booths also had a youth theme.  One booth advertised an Islamic comic series called The 
Adventures of Hakim: Streetwise Champion with the tagline “The hero for the Ummah is back!”  
Another provided print resources from the Young Muslims Organisation (YMO), such as 
manuals for students seeking to improve their school’s or university’s Islamic society. 
I spoke with the Bangladeshi young man running the YMO booth.  As with the LIVE 
event, I was hoping to discern the lasting effects this community event might have.  The youth 
told me about his organisation’s partnership with IF Charity: 
The main thing is that all of this [event today] is for IF.  They’re a Muslim organisation 
that’s trying to feed the homeless people.  We set up a meeting with this organisation, to 
come and join with them and work together.  So that’s what we’re doing. 
 
Organizational partnerships were an important contrast between the Big IFtar and the 
LIVE event.  At the LIVE event, the only partnership outside the Seventh Day Adventist 
denomination itself was with FAME.  In comparison, the Big IFtar was facilitated by an enviable 
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list of organizational partnerships.  IF Charity had brought together various organizations for an 
overall initiative called IFtar 10,000 that would distribute 10,000 meals for displaced or 
homeless people around the world.  Flyers explained that a gift of £10 would provide 10 meals 
over the next 10 days in 10 world “countries”: The United Kingdom, Somalia, Bosnia, Sudan, 
Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Palestine, and Kashmir.  In order to accomplish this 
sensitive global task, seven partner Muslim NGOs71 had been enlisted as iftar meal distributors.  
For example, Muslim Aid provided meals in Somalia and Bangladesh, while Human Appeal did 
so in Afghanistan.  The beginning of the UK meal distribution took place at the Big IFtar itself 
for homeless people from the local area.  Additional UK meals were supported at four Christian 
and secular London charities for the homeless: The Salvation Army, the Whitechapel Mission, 
Providence Row, and Thames Reach.   
How was social change on the issue of homelessness understood, and practiced, in the 
context of the Big IFtar event?  In part, social change was seen as an outcome of a personal faith 
put into action, as expressed in Naseeha’s song “Allah Help us Change.”  In this way, change 
could be achieved through a kind of revival-activism.  A second component of social change was 
through partnership with existing non-governmental organizations, demonstrated by IF Charity’s 
distribution of meals through a globally-linked network of NGO affiliates.  The third component, 
mostly left implicit during the event, was social change through what I call “pillared activism.” 
By pillared activism, I am referring to actions for social change built on the rituals of 
Islamic practice, particularly the Five Pillars of Islam.  The Five Pillars are shahada (confession 
of faith), salah (prayer), sawm (fasting during Ramadan), zakat (alms giving), and hajj 
(pilgrimage to Mecca).  Most of these pillars are repeated each day (prayer and confession during 
                                                 
71The seven Muslim NGOs who distributed iftar meals were Muslim Hands, Muslim Aid, 
Islamic Help, Muslim Charity, Islamic Relief, Human Appeal International, and InterPalestine. 
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prayer) or each year (fasting and alms giving).  Therefore if Pillars are a basis for activism, the 
activism can have the consistency of being undergirded by regular practice.  I will highlight two 
mechanisms of pillared activism: 1) solidarity through ritual and 2) social change through ritual. 
 
Figure 5.4. Solidarity through Ritual as a Causal Mechanism of Individual and Social 
Change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The causal mechanism of solidarity through ritual was difficult to perceive at the Big 
IFtar simply because it remained in the background.  I have diagrammed the mechanism in 
Figure 5.4.  It begins with a collective ritual action (A) that is repeated regularly, as shown by the 
repetition arrow.  The action (A) in the diagram has two subscripts together, for person i and 
person j, to demonstrate that it is collective.  Muslim prayer is the archetypal example of a 
repeated collective ritual action.  Many East End Bangladeshi Muslims perform prayer five times 
each day, with men being more likely than women to have the opportunity to do so collectively.  
A collective ritual action produces common desires (D), beliefs (B), and opportunities (O)72 in 
the persons who engage in it, and the similarity of these DBO’s is reinforced by the repetition of 
                                                 
72The capacity of collective ritual action to form common desires and beliefs is easy to 
understand, but perhaps the formation of common “opportunities” is not.  Some common 
opportunities can come out of collective action simply because participants are in the same place 
at the same time.  For example, men who attend the same mosque for prayer may have a 
common opportunity to sign a petition as they leave the mosque, or their conversations after 
mosque may lead to other joint opportunities.  
Dij 
Bij Aij 
Oij 
Aij, Ai, Aj 
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the action.  In other words, participants in the collective ritual develop solidarity with each other.  
The developed desires, beliefs, and opportunities are likely to cause further actions (Aij) that are 
taken in solidarity, as well as to produce some independent actions for each person (Ai, Aj). 
Although prayer is the most obvious example of the development of Muslim solidarity 
through ritual, other Pillars of Islam can contribute to this solidarity as well.  The common 
experience of fasting during Ramadan can draw Muslims together and provide an added social 
significance to breaking the fast in a communal iftar (Winchester 2008).  Hajj, though many 
Muslims will only experience it once in a lifetime, has a high potential to contribute to solidarity 
through the ritual actions that are performed in Mecca.  Interestingly, the feeling of internal 
solidarity does not necessarily lead to intolerance of outsiders.  A recent study of Pakistanis 
returning from hajj determined that they had developed both a greater solidarity with fellow 
Muslims and a greater tolerance for diverse others, because in their practice of common rituals 
they had been exposed to a great diversity of people (Clingingsmith et. al. 2008).  
A sense of “kinship” (see Ebaugh 2000) develops as Muslims participate in collective 
rituals together over the course of years.  Each additional collective action may further reinforce 
the feeling of brotherhood or sisterhood, which can be felt even more strongly than kinship 
within the consanguineal family.  Because of the feeling of common kinship, many actions taken 
in solidarity do not need a rational motivation beyond the sense of common connection with 
others. 
Solidarity through ritual, experienced by many Muslims as kinship, was an underlying 
mechanism of the civic action at the Big IFtar.  Immediately prior to the event, many of the 
Muslims attending had engaged in Friday congregational prayers together at the nearby East 
London Mosque.  As the iftar feast ended, it would be time to join in prayer again.  The presence 
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of prayer before and after the Big IFtar event seemed to draw individuals into a similar frame of 
mind.  Solidarity could also be seen in the practice of the common iftar meal at the event, down 
to the small detail that everyone broke the fast together with the customary eating of a date. 
The second mechanism of pillared activism is social change through ritual.  While 
solidarity through ritual can motivate actions for social change, in some cases Islamic rituals are 
themselves vehicles of social change.  Zakat is a good example of social change through ritual.  
Finances given through zakat contribute to social change because they are part of an Islamic 
system of redistributive justice.  Zakat can thus be thought of as a form of obligatory activism (if 
this is not too paradoxical). 
Because Bangladeshis in the East End are so far from their country of origin, many give 
their zakat to British-based Islamic NGOs who redistribute it to the poor around the world (De 
Cordier 2009).  This contrasts with Bangladeshis who live in Bangladesh, or even Maghrebi 
immigrants in France, who can more easily send funds to the poor at home through traditional 
means.  Partly for this reason, the UK has the most well-developed Islamic NGO sector of any 
Western country (Adamson and DeHanas 2010). 
The main collective civic outcome of the Big IFtar was voluntary charitable giving, a 
practice known in Islamic terms as sadaqa.  Young IF Charity volunteers with donation boxes 
roved around the event soliciting £10 charitable gifts.  Event speakers invoked kinship solidarity 
frequently to mobilize charitable giving.  Local Councillor Abjol Miah’s speech at Big IFtar 
showed his particular skill at mobilizing action through kinship solidarity. 
Miah is a medium build second-generation Bangladeshi man in his late thirties.  He rose 
to prominence in Tower Hamlets politics when as a RESPECT Party candidate he defeated 
talented Labour politician and professor Michael Keith in 2006.  Miah is a regular personality on 
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the local Muslim radio program Easy Talk.  He identifies himself and his political stances 
primarily with Muslim issues.  As Miah took the Big IFtar stage, he began his remarks by 
acknowledging the diversity of the crowd and stating that the occasion was significant: 
[Today’s iftar is] a great opportunity for us to break our fast in an open way, 
remembering and sharing our meal with the homeless people in London….  Today this 
iftar is a unique iftar, where we will be able to share with each other, people of all 
backgrounds, people of all faiths and no faith, where the concept of Ramadan will be 
shared. 
 
With these opening words, Miah described iftar as a community meal that had brought 
together local ethnic, religious, and socio-economic diversity.  Miah’s words cited unity in a 
common humanity, using the term “people” to represent everyone in the crowd at Altab Ali Park.  
In his next section of the speech, the word “people” would undergo a subtle but significant shift 
in meaning, as Miah’s frame of reference moved from local to global: 
But most importantly, let us not forget the thousands of lives who don’t have shelter in 
the UK and around the world.  And many who suffer under tyranny, under oppression, 
many who will have to break their fast in open cold, where there’s no home for them to 
shelter.  When we break our fast we know that there is room for many of us.  But there 
are many around the world with no guarantee they will get their meal.  So in solidarity 
with people around the world, for the people who suffer, for those who are homeless, this 
is a unique opportunity to break the fast.  
 
Miah was now speaking the language of kinship solidarity.  Although he said broadly that 
he sought “solidarity with people around the world,” it was safe for him to assume that most of 
the audience understood these people to be fellow Muslims.  At an iftar event that sponsored 
meals in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, and Kashmir, the images Miah evoked were of the effects 
of tyranny and oppression on the Muslim poor.  These words may have ignited in his listeners 
deep emotions of family connection and collective urgency.  Kinship solidarity, which had been 
built through the communal practices of prayer, fasting, and fast-breaking, could now be 
channelled into charitable giving. 
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Miah’s rhetoric of kinship solidarity mirrored what I had frequently heard in other 
Muslim fundraising and political events.  The event provides an example of pillared activism 
(the conjoining of Islamic practice with political practice), which has influenced the high rate of 
Bangladeshi youth political participation in the East End.  As Abjol Miah concluded his speech 
about global poverty, he brought forward its implications for local area politics:  
I have with me Councillor Mamun Rashid from Shadwell Ward.  We are RESPECT 
Councillors working hard, to bring respect back into politics, to bring respect back into 
the community, to make our charities successful.  And IF Charity is our number one 
charity at the moment.  It has had the opportunity to unite all the other charities together. 
 
Sam Davies at the LIVE event had eschewed calls to political action.  Abjol Miah, in contrast, 
directly connects Muslim activism and charity with the agenda of the RESPECT Party.  Unlike 
the revival-activism of LIVE, Miah and other Muslim RESPECT Councillors have a sustained 
presence in local Tower Hamlets politics, ensuring that representation of their activist agenda 
remains ongoing. 
The collective action of the Big IFtar had been built on the solid support of pillared 
activism through fasting, prayer, and charitable giving.  The giving that resulted was channelled 
through effective organizational networks.  As such, the results of the Big IFtar event were 
tangible: It contributed to the delivery of 10,000 meals worldwide.  Islamic practice and the 
solidarity that results had been central to enabling this effectiveness.   
The Queen Mary University (QMU) prayer room controversy, described in Chapter 2, 
has also developed into an example of pillared activism.  When I interviewed Hamid in 
December 2008 he was helping to spearhead the Islamic Society’s (ISoc) efforts for prayer room 
policy change.  The QMU administration had designated the former Muslim prayer room as a 
multi-faith room, an action that Hamid said has “really affected the work of the Islam Society.”  
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The ISoc had tried many methods of advocacy, including writing letters and signing petitions, 
but at that time did not believe it was ready for more confrontational measures such as protests. 
Hamid has since finished his studies at QMU.  In Autumn 2009, under new leadership, 
the Queen Mary ISoc took the prayer room controversy to a new level.  The ISoc began to 
protest the administration’s decision – through protests of a uniquely Islamic style. They 
organized outdoor prayers to take place in front of the main university administrative building.  
Dozens of young Muslim men stood together to prostrate in rows, praying in the public space to 
communicate their need for consistent prayer space.  The prayer room campaign adopted the 
slogan: “The right to pray, throughout the day.”  The argument was that space for Islamic prayer 
is intrinsic to the human right of freedom of worship. 
The prayer protests were part of a coordinated campaign, organized through Facebook, 
YouTube, a campaign blog, and grassroots personal contact.  By the end of the semester, a 
compromise was reached with the university.  The administration granted more Muslim-specific 
prayer time in rooms around campus, but it retained the multi-faith room.  The Queen Mary ISoc 
published an open letter on January 4, 2010, to explain the compromise.  I include part of the 
letter here: 
After a semester of activities directed towards increasing access to prayer rooms for 
brothers and sisters, we would like everyone to be aware of what progress has been 
made… [listing of specific agreements with the university about prayer times] 
 
We are working with the College, Student Union and other faith societies to ensure there 
is as little conflict as possible. This is not the final step; our goal [is] to expand opening 
hours, have a Qur’an rack and display posters. These are all goals which we will continue 
to work towards, via the multifaith centre user forum et cetera. 
 
Most importantly we would like to express our gratitude to Allah (‘azza wa jal)- without 
Whom no good is possible. And after that, every single brother and sister who spent their 
time, money and effort- be it with their du’a, selling cakes, making banners, organising 
jumu’ah, printing flyers, publicizing the campaign blog or even just by being there and 
voting with your feet. May Allah reward you all…. 
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The Queen Mary prayer room controversy is an intriguing microcosm of Britain’s 
broader challenges with religious pluralism and the participation of Muslims in civil society.  It 
provides an example of a creative, multi-faceted, and pillared campaign for policy change.  As 
the ISoc letter states: “This is not the final step.”  The issues at stake involve the regular religious 
practice of prayer, which in the British context has been imbued with the significance of a 
fundamental human right.  These are issues that are unlikely to fade in the foreseeable future. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6  
CONCLUSION: BELIEVING CITIZENS 
 
 What kinds of citizens are London’s second generation youth becoming?  The 
answer, in part, is “believing citizens.”  Most of the Bangladeshi youth I interviewed 
devote at least as much time and energy to religious faith as their parents do.  In many 
cases they devote far more.  Likewise for a substantial number of Jamaican youth religion 
is an important and prioritized part of life.  In fact, religion had some relevance to every 
one of the young people I interviewed73 – whether it was taken for granted, questioned, 
reacted against, or wholeheartedly accepted. 
 The emphasis on religion in this dissertation should not obscure the ordinariness 
of second generation youth lives.  As 18 year-old Tariq told me, he thinks his life is quite 
average: “We’re just Muslims, chilled out, go to college, saving up to buy a PS3.”  To an 
outsider, five daily prayers might seem like an overwhelming load, or the supernatural 
dimension of Pentecostalism may be hard to comprehend.  But to many children of 
immigrants in London’s East End or in Brixton, these religious elements are a regular 
part of life experience.  Regardless of religiosity, the youth I interviewed had strikingly 
similar worries and concerns.  When I asked young Bangladeshis and Jamaicans about 
the biggest problem in their respective local areas, the three most commonly cited 
responses from both groups were an urban triad of drugs, gangs/violence, and 
                                                 
73I know this because all youth either ranked a religion related item as part of their 
identity during the identity ranking exercise in Chapter 4, or explained to me why they do 
not relate to religion.  All youth mentioned religion in one way or another before any 
direct prompting from me about it. 
 221
unemployment.  Religious problems did not feature as prominently (e.g., Islamophobia, 
radicalism, religious discrimination), at least not as local area issues.  Many of the 
personal life concerns voiced by youth were simply those common to people who are 
coming of age in the West: Getting a job or building a career, making good friends, 
finding a life partner, or starting a family. 
 Yet “believing” does make a difference to the kinds of citizens young people 
become.  The three main visions of the good citizen that have been put forward by the 
British state in recent years are the participating citizen, the politically literate citizen, and 
the patriotic citizen (à la Gordon Brown).  In Chapter 2, I demonstrated that second 
generation Bangladeshi Muslims (as a group) are model citizens in terms of both their 
political literacy and participation.  Bangladeshi Muslims with high religiosity have 
highest rates of political participation of any subgroup in this study. 
 Why are young Bangladeshis, particularly the most religious ones, becoming 
politically literate and participating citizens?  There are at least two main reasons.  The 
first is that British foreign policy (in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere) and British 
domestic counterterrorism policy have both provided strong impetus for seeking political 
change.  The second reason, which explains the particular strength of political 
participation in the East End, is that Bangladeshi youth are mobilized by local mosques 
and organizations, which are simultaneously transnationally connected and locally savvy.   
I explained the process of Muslim youth mobilization in Chapters 3 to 5.  In a 
nutshell: Many second generation youth feel ashamed of, emotionally distant from, or 
constrained in choices by their parents from Bangladesh, who usually have humble 
origins and a limited grasp of English language and culture.  Well-resourced mosques in 
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the East End, particularly the East End Mosque yet also Darrul Ummah, promote a 
community-oriented, global-revivalist, and deculturated form of Islam that these youth 
find attractive, especially as they attempt to define themselves in distinction from the 
traditional cultural Islam of their parents.  Muslim identity becomes the primary 
citizenship identity of nearly all Bangladeshi youth in the East End, providing moral 
orientation and a community of reference for civic activism.  Coincident with these 
developments in identity is Islamic practice, which buttresses political participation.  
Youth activism is ‘pillared’ by Islamic ritual, because repeated practice – especially of 
the Islamic Pillars of prayer, fasting, and alms giving – creates in youth a sense of kinship 
solidarity.  Islamic practices are also often political acts in and of themselves (e.g., zakat 
is an action of redistributive justice).  Thus, it is the combination of unrivalled Muslim 
identity, the pillaring support of practice, and widely available political opportunities that 
cultivate young Bangladeshis into politically participating citizens.   
 Bryan Turner (2008) insightfully summarizes the global forces that contribute to 
Islamic revival and deculturation, and is worth quoting at length.  The macro processes he 
outlines have shaped the character of East End civic engagement: 
The globalization of the migrant labour market has been one cause of the 
globalization of world religions, especially Islam, and the creation of new 
diasporic religious identities.  Many diasporic Muslim youth, once outside their 
original homelands, have abandoned the traditional religion of their parents and 
have embraced various forms of renewal and revivalism.  These religious changes 
often involve a greater emphasis on personal piety and stricter religious adherence 
to the reformed standards of modern Islam.  Social and geographical mobility 
have produced a redefinition of Islam as a modern, transnational identity in a 
context where citizenship identity is often denied or delayed (Roy 2003).  These 
changes have been reinforced by the growth of literacy, the expansion of higher 
education, and the introduction of women into the formal labour market.  In 
general, this amounts to a 'pietisation' of religious practices, indeed to a new urban 
imaginary of anti-secular spirituality. 
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A sizable proportion of young Bangladeshis are highly articulate like Hamid 
(Chapter 2) and Rubina (Chapter 4), and they have been at the forefront of Islamic youth 
activism in the East End.  For these youth, Islam has become a meaningful source of 
belonging and morality from which they proactively contribute to British life.  About half 
of East End Bangladeshis are more like Farouq from Chapter 4, who also considers 
“Muslim” to be his most salient identity.  Yet Farouq holds his faith tacitly, being more 
concerned for the moment with meeting girls and having a good time.  Young people like 
Farouq are not activists, but many of them can be called upon to sign a petition or 
perhaps to vote.  Finally, there are youth like Khan (Chapter 4) whose hyper-Islamist 
identity has eliminated any allegiance to Britain or to the Bengali community.  Extremist 
youth such as Khan are a very small minority in the East End (2 or 3 out of my 36 
Bangladeshi interviewees).74  However they can be a vocal minority through groups such 
as Hizb ut-Tahrir or Al-Muhajiroon and its offshoots, and sometimes they may influence 
or intimidate youth like Farouq.   
Today in the East End, the more constructive forms of Islamic engagement that 
Hamid exemplifies are having greater traction among the second generation than 
extremism does.  Yet all of the youth I have mentioned here – Hamid, Rubina, Farouq, 
and Khan – have developed their views of Islam in the context of the East London 
Mosque, demonstrating both the broad reach of this mosque and the divergent ways in 
which its deculturated message can be adopted. 
                                                 
74I sampled more than a third of my Bangladeshi interviewees from mosques.  It can be 
expected that a sample taken entirely from street recruitment would find a lower 
proportion of “extremist” Muslims. 
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 Jamaican second generation youth in Brixton also show rather high levels of 
political literacy.  Yet their participation in political activities is much lower than the 
average for Bangladeshis.  Religiosity does not have a demonstrable impact, positive or 
negative, on Jamaican political participation. 
 Second generation Jamaicans have in large part left the traditional first generation 
religious institutions of their parents, much as Bangladeshis have.  For the Jamaican 
young adults who do attend church, the most popular choice in Brixton is the megachurch 
Ruach Ministries or one of many smaller Pentecostal or Neo-Pentecostal churches.  My 
observations at Ruach demonstrate that its youth ministry is a welcoming place for young 
people to come “as they are,” bringing both their personal struggles and life ambitions.  
Ruach’s youth ministry can galvanize young people to significant achievements.  In some 
cases, such as Samuel in Chapter 4, involvement in a church like Ruach provides youth 
with the identity, mentoring, and motivation to escape delinquency and move into an 
entirely new lifestyle. 
 The individual-based ministry at Ruach, however, does not provide a strong 
motivation for political action.  Although Youth Pastor Mark Liburd is commendable for 
mentioning political candidates during election seasons and for encouraging voting, his 
message has not been taking root.   In part the issue is that the individual-based ethos of 
the church – “where everybody is a somebody” – does not provide for much youth 
engagement with the community outside church doors.  Local engagement is limited also 
because the majority of attendees do not live in the local area.  Likewise Mike (Chapter 
2) is representative of the many Jamaican youth who do not think that British politicians 
or political structures serve them well, especially on moral and faith issues. 
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 In large part, the difference between Bangladeshi and Jamaican political 
participation comes down to identity.  The 1970s and 1980s were the height of black 
identity politics in Britain, including significant activism in Brixton.  The black identity 
consensus has since faded, in part due to the rise of hybrid and mixed race identification 
in Britain.  Indeed, among the young Jamaicans I interviewed there were various identity 
options which individuals might value, and these did not cohere into a clear pattern.  The 
Brixton area is highly diverse, perhaps even ethnically fragmented.  The background 
conditions for a strong identity-based politics do not exist in Brixton like they do in the 
East End, whether that identity were to be based on faith, race, or ethnicity. 
 Of course an absence of identity politics is certainly not a problem in itself.  There 
may be other ways of motivating young Jamaicans into political participation.  One 
possibility would be to develop a greater sense of locality politics in Brixton.  There are 
currently efforts towards this, including the Brixton Pound introduced in September 2009 
by TransitionTown Brixton.  The Brixton Pound is a local currency accepted by many 
stores that features pictures of famous former residents on the bank notes,75 and 
encourages the localization of commerce.  However, the political boundaries of the wards 
that compose Brixton mitigate the development of a local political identity.  The four 
wards in Brixton slice right through its center, dividing it into three different electoral 
zones for Parliament.  It is thus difficult for MPs or local Councillors to claim to 
“represent” Brixton. 
 
                                                 
75The four former residents on the Brixton Pound notes are Olive Morris (Brixton Black 
Women’s Group activist), James Lovelock (environmentalist who developed Gaia 
Theory), C. L. R. James (Trinidadian socialist thinker), and artist Vincent Van Gogh, 
who lived in Brixton at age 20 and was marked by his experience of poverty there. 
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Present Realities, Future Hopes 
This dissertation began by referencing Christopher Caldwell’s (2009) Reflections 
on a Revolution in Europe.  Caldwell’s book raises the question: “Can [Britain] be the 
same with different people in it?” 
Britain, of course, will never return to its bygone days of Empire.  As a 
postcolonial nation, it has transformed into a multi-ethnic one.  While British investment 
in former colonies dissolved, migrants travelled to the “Mother Country” in search of 
economic opportunities.  A well-known anti-discrimination slogan pithily expresses the 
present realities: “We are here because you were there.”  In somewhat different words 
during an interview in Brixton, 18 year-old Mabel turned Caldwell’s kind of question 
around: “It’s true, we don’t come from here.  It is true.  But at the end of the day I am 
here.  What are you going to do about it?”  
 Caldwell’s concern, of course, is not with immigration or religion broadly 
speaking, but with Islam in particular.  He believes that Muslim youth are becoming 
adversarial separatists in European societies.  However, Caldwell’s analysis is built upon 
reactionary news coverage of radicalism and terrorism, resulting in arguments that are 
overly-alarmist.  As Caldwell’s writing relies so heavily on particular radical strains of 
Islam,76 it amplifies the words of a small and vocal minority at the expense of presenting 
a balanced perspective. 
                                                 
76For example, Caldwell includes sections in the book called “Hyper-Identities” and 
“Dual Loyalty” (pages 129-135) that cover the same thematic ground as Chapter 4 on 
identity and loyalty in this dissertation.  Most of the quotes Caldwell uses on these pages 
to substantiate his views are from British Muslims.  Yet he has selected quite a skewed 
sample of spokespersons: Imran Waheed of the radical organization Hizb ut-Tahrir, Omar 
Abdullah of the radical organization al-Muhajiroon, and “a Syrian trained exile from 
Birmingham.”  Inayat Bunglawala of the Muslim Council of Britain is the sole voice 
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 My attempt in this dissertation has been to give voice to a broad segment of 
second generation youth in London, while investigating how religious faith influences 
their approaches to citizenship.  The research methodology I used to recruit my 
interviewees – composing a broadly representative “street” sample and complementing 
this with a more in-depth religious institutions sample – have been designed to help re-
balance our perspective.   Likewise, the comparative dimension of this dissertation helps 
to expand questions of faith and civic engagement beyond the usual ‘suspect community’ 
of British Muslims. 
 This dissertation’s title, Believing Citizens, has a dual meaning.  It refers not only 
to the types of citizens I encountered, but also to the need for listening to and “believing 
in” these citizens (see Back 2007).  While British policymaking on South Asian Muslims 
has been uneasy and circuitous (Bail Forthcoming), Afro-Caribbean faith institutions 
have simply had little political consequence (Muir 2010).  It is hoped that this dissertation 
will facilitate taking young citizens more seriously and that it could encourage investment 
in increasing their participation. 
 There are already encouraging signs of the potential for increasing the political 
involvement of London’s ethnic minority youth.  The role of London’s black churches in 
politics has increased in only a few years, and these could provide new avenues for youth 
participation.  The Seventh Day Adventist LIVE March in August 2009 was an 
impressive sign of church civic engagement.  Even if the message of the march was 
politically minimalist, it nonetheless brought many young people out for their first ever 
public demonstration.   
                                                                                                                                                 
included in these sections who might be expected to express concerns common to a large 
segment of British Muslims. 
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Black British church involvement in politics was symbolically validated in March 
2006, when Prime Minister Tony Blair invited a select group of black church and 
community leaders to a meeting at 10 Downing Street.  The meeting was followed by the 
Power of One Conference held at Ruach Ministries, Brixton, where Blair was the keynote 
speaker.  From the podium of Ruach, the Prime Minister praised black churches and 
encouraged them to action:  
“Churches such as yours have long been the bedrock of our local communities….  
Your organizations have a crucial campaigning role.  They are not political in the 
sense that the parties are.  But they do engage in the important issues of their day 
– they cannot but do so.  They are political but with a small p.” 
 
Tony Blair’s recognition of black churches was a milestone in British politics.  
Yet it is clear that these churches remain in early stages in terms of effective political 
engagement.  Councillor Lorna Campbell, a local politician in South London, is one of a 
small number of Black British politicians who openly integrates her faith into politics.  
Campbell notes that: “In terms of political influence in respect to policy formation, there 
has been little if any indication that churches with Black leadership are playing a 
significant role, both at national and local level” (quoted in Muir 2010).  In part, this is 
due to a low level of black representation in significant political positions.  In a 
Parliament of 643 members there are currently 15 ethnic minority MPs.  Five of these are 
British African or Caribbean and ten are British Asian.  A total of 51 ethnic minority MPs 
would be needed for representation to reach parity with the Britain’s 8% minority 
population (Meer and Modood 2009).  
According to Ashok Viswanathan of Operation Black Vote, “There is a direct link 
between people seeing Black faces in high places and feeling that the democratic process 
is something that belongs to them and something that they want to take part in” (quoted 
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in Meer and Modood 2009).  It seems that the issue of representation may be accentuated 
for black youth, who are doubly distanced from typical British politicians by their 
ethnicity and age.  With such issues in mind, Operation Black Vote has launched a 
national campaign with twenty (mostly youthful) black male role models, such as 
politicians, business executives, and a Royal Navy engineer, who have been 
commissioned to speak to young people across Britain (Woolley 2008).  
At the time of writing (late April 2010), there are intriguing developments in the 
upcoming British Parliamentary elections on May 6th.  Besides the much publicized rise 
of third party politics led by Liberal Democrat Nick Clegg, this could be a watershed year 
for ethnic minority representation.  By one estimate, the total number of ethnic minority 
Members of Parliament could double from 15 to about 30 (Umunna quoted in Ogongo 
2010).  Some of the most prominent MP election battles in the country are currently 
being waged in the South and East London areas I studied in this dissertation.  I will now 
profile three prominent Parliamentary candidates in these areas, all of whom can be 
considered young members of the second generation.   
Chuka Umunna is the 31 year-old Labour Party Candidate running for the 
Streatham seat in Parliament.  The Streatham constituency includes the wards of Brixton 
Hill and Tulse Hill, covering much of my fieldwork site in central Brixton.  Umunna is 
presently an employment lawyer with strong Labour Party connections.  He is considered 
an up-and-coming figure in British politics.    
Umunna is mixed race, with a Nigerian father and an Irish/English mother.  He 
says of his racial background: “Being mixed race, I can operate in any environment, but I 
don’t walk into a room and think, ‘I am the only black person here.’  It’s not something I 
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generally think about.  When you open your mouth people tend to be interested in your 
ideas rather than what you look like” (quoted in Shah 2009).  Having grown up in the 
constituency he is highly articulate about local issues and seems at ease when speaking 
with the press.  Umunna was chosen by The Independent (2010) as one of the British 
politicians who most successfully uses Twitter to communicate with his supporters. 
Unsurprisingly, Chuka Umunna’s post-racial politics and shrewd use of social 
networking media have led to speculation that he could have the eventual makings of a 
“British Obama” (e.g., Bright 2009).  These dreams are quite premature, as Umunna has 
yet to win his first political election and himself downplays the Obama comparison 
(Umunna 2008).  Perhaps more important is Umunna’s ability to relate to young people, 
his own youthfulness, and his mastery of local issues.  He says “I am part of a new 
generation which, contrary to popular myth, is not apathetic about politics but disdainful 
of party politics and the traditional ways of doing things” (quoted in Ogongo 2010).   
Umunna spoke at Ruach Ministries in June 2008 as part of the church’s 
celebration event for Bishop John Francis’ 25th year in ministry.  Ruach, on Brixton Hill, 
sits within the Streatham constituency.  Because Umunna has developed a bridge-
building persona, he praised the church but did not elaborate on his specific faith 
convictions.   
Chuka Umunna’s broadminded approach to politics could indeed be well suited to 
the diverse area that he hopes to represent.  Candidates like Umunna, who can connect 
with black and mixed race youth and with people of many other backgrounds, may over 
time play a critical role in diminishing the Black British youth deficit in political 
participation. 
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Looking to the East, the Bethnal Green & Bow constituency in London’s East 
End has become a fiercely contested election battleground in 2010.  The constituency 
fully encompasses the East End areas of Whitechapel and Spitalfields where I conducted 
fieldwork.  The four main candidates for the seat are all Bangladeshi.77  The winner will 
become the first Bangladeshi Member of Parliament.  Rushanara Ali of the Labour Party 
and Abjol Miah of the relatively new RESPECT Party (founded 2004) are the two 
electoral favorites. 
Labour Candidate Rushanara Ali grew up in the East End and attended its well-
known Mulberry School for Girls.  A strong student, Ali continued on to study at Oxford 
and has since then held various positions in policy institutes and in local initiatives, such 
as helping to form the Tower Hamlets Summer University.  Ali would be the first Muslim 
female Member of Parliament.  Her policy credentials, fluency in communicating with 
locals of various backgrounds, and very solid support from the Labour establishment 
would seem to give Ali the edge in the election.   
Yet Abjol Miah’s election campaign has become a force to be reckoned with.  
Miah is the Local Councillor who was introduced in Chapter 5 as a speaker at the Big 
IFtar rally.  He grew up in the East End, where he has been a youth worker and martial 
arts teacher.  Miah’s political ambitions developed out of his reputation for activism 
against the U.S.-Britain led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  In the 2005 General Election, 
Miah helped to orchestrate maverick politician George Galloway’s appeal to Muslims in 
the Bethnal Green & Bow constituency on a strong anti-war platform.  Galloway won the 
                                                 
77The two candidates not profiled here are Liberal Democrat Ajmal Masroor, a 
charismatic young imam and Islam Channel Presenter, and Conservative Zakir Khan, a 
community affairs coordinator.  Neither candidate has a realistic chance of winning, but 
both could affect the outcome. 
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Parliament seat, primarily due to the Muslim protest-vote, ousting veteran incumbent 
Oona King.  Abjol Miah is a fighter.  He won his own battle for a local Council seat 
against Labour Party sociologist cum politician Michael Keith to take a leadership role in 
the Tower Hamlets Council.  Now that George Galloway is stepping aside from Bethnal 
Green & Bow to run for a neighboring seat, the street smart Abjol Miah has a plausible 
chance of becoming a Parliamentarian himself. 
 Abjol Miah’s political ascendancy is interesting because it has been built upon the 
social forces explained in this dissertation.  Miah’s family moved from Sylhet to the East 
End when he was six months old.  He has grown up in British schooling like any member 
of the second generation and speaks with an East End cockney accent.  Miah is a key 
figure in the East London Mosque, presenting on the weekly radio show Easy Talk that is 
broadcast from the mosque’s London Muslim Centre.  He is also a frequent speaker at 
activism and charity events associated with the mosque.  In his speeches, Miah connects 
with young Bangladeshis on the basis of all-encompassing “Muslim first” identities and 
by casting Islamic practices, like fasting and alms giving, as political actions. 
Miah’s communitarian approach to Muslim identity politics has limited cross-
over appeal.  To explain his bid for Parliament to a non-Muslim journalist, Miah said: 
We pride ourselves that we have Muslim councillors, and why not?  For the last 15 
years you've said we're isolationist, ghettoised, unwilling to engage and now that 
we engage we're fundamentalists and extremists. You can't have it both ways. 
(quoted in Brooks 2010) 
 
If Abjol Miah wins the MP election, his victory will be demonstration of a remarkable 
mobilization of Muslim voters, especially second generation youth.  Bangladeshi 
Muslims account for about 40% of registered voters in the constituency.  Thus those who 
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support Miah will need to punch well above their demographic weight, turning out at the 
polls in disproportionately high numbers.   
 Rushanara Ali is a viable choice for many Muslim voters as well.  She is seen as 
an inspiring role model for Muslim women in the East End.  Yet, as a Muslim female, Ali 
has faced a dilemma of self-presentation that her male opponents do not.  She does not 
wear a headscarf.  The simple symbolic act of hijab has strong, polarizing connotations in 
the East End (positive for some local residents, negative for others).  On the more 
pietistic end of the spectrum, Ali lacks legitimacy.  Ali’s association with former Bethnal 
Green & Bow MP Oona King, who supported the war in Iraq, is also a frequently 
mentioned issue. 
 Yet Rushanara Ali has never sought the ‘Muslim vote.’  Her campaign has instead 
been run on the basis of drawing together the diverse voices and strands of history in the 
East End.  Ali’s campaign embodies ideals that contrast with Abjol Miah’s: 
This is a really diverse community and, broadly speaking, people try and get 
along and respect each others' backgrounds. It's a community with a rich cultural 
heritage, as well as a proud religious heritage. That's how people see it – they're 
proud to be British, proud to be Bangladeshi, proud to be Muslim, proud to be 
east enders – and that's how I see myself. (quoted in Brooks 2010) 
 
The two candidates have different conceptions of the role of religious identity in politics 
– one particularistic and the other more universal.  The Bethnal Green & Bow campaign 
has been hard fought.  The election promises to be a memorable one. 
As much as they may differ, the three Parliamentary candidates profiled here are 
all exemplars of an important kind of democratic progress.  Chuka Umunna, Rushanara 
Ali, and Abjol Miah have lived the second generation youth story of growing up in inner 
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city London.78  In recent decades, ethnic minorities have participated most visibly in 
British politics through their actions of protest or dissent – the Brixton Riots, the Salman 
Rushdie Affair, West Indian activism, and protesting the war in Iraq.  Anger and critique, 
whether democratically channelled or not, will continue into the foreseeable future.  Yet 
these young political candidates are forerunners of a new phenomenon within the second 
generation.  There has been a fundamental shift from protesting against British 
government decisions, to becoming elected participants in the political decision making 
process itself.  
 
                                                 
78Chuka Umunna is a mixed race member of the second generation.  Abjol Miah and 
Rushanara Ali both arrived in Britain as children (six months old and seven years old 
respectively).  Although technically part of the “1.5 generation,” Miah and Ali were both 
socialized in British schools among largely second generation peers, giving their life 
histories a second generation character.  
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
Note: The first level of bullet points are essential questions asked of all interviewees, 
while the second level are follow-up questions and probes that may not have been asked 
in all cases.  The interviews were semi-structured, and therefore the wording of questions 
and their order sometimes differed to fit the interview situation. 
 
 
Life  
 Describe for me a typical day in your life now, starting from morning and going till 
evening. 
o Follow up on current school or work situation 
 
 What would you say are the most important things in life? 
 
 
Friends 
 Could you write down the names of your five closest friends for me? You don’t need to 
show them to me – they are just for your memory. 
o Tell me about them.  What do you have in common?  How are you 
different? 
o How did you first meet these friends?  From the same place? 
o What kinds of things do you do together? 
 
 What would you say is the biggest problem facing the local area at the moment?  In 
your opinion, what should be done about it? 
 
 
Transnationalism 
 Could you give me a basic timeline of your life?  Have you always lived in this area?  
Or did you live in some other places when you were growing up? 
 
 Have you ever been to [Bangladesh/Jamaica]?  IF NOT: Would you like to go there? 
 
 IF LIVED IN OR VISITED COUNTRY OF PARENTS: 
o How often do you go there?  What do you do?  Do you like it?  
o Do you keep in touch with friends or relatives there? 
o Do you or your family ever send money to support relatives there? 
o Would you like to live there some day?  Or do you want to keep living here? 
 
 How would you describe Bengali/Jamaican culture? 
 
 Do you speak a language other than English, or are you learning one?  Which one(s)?  
Who do you speak or study with? 
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Household 
 Let’s talk about your household and family here.  Who lives in your household with 
you? [clarify relationship of each person.]   
o Do you have any immediate family [brothers, sisters, or parents] who 
don’t live with you?  Where are they now? 
 
 
Family 
 Tell me a bit about your parents.  How would you describe them to me? 
o Are they working here?  What job(s)? 
o How long have they been here?  Do they fit in well?  Are they happy here? 
o Describe your relationship with your mum.   
o Describe your relationship with your dad. 
 
 I’ve heard some people say that there is a “generation gap” between people your age 
and your parents’ generation.  Would you agree or disagree with that?  Why? 
 
 
Identity 
 I have some different terms on cards here.  Please take all of those that you personally 
identify with: 
 
Black 
White 
Brown 
Asian
Indian 
Bangladeshi 
Bengali 
Sylheti
African 
West Indian 
Caribbean 
Jamaican
British 
English 
Londoner 

Muslim 
Christian 
Non-Religious
 
 Are there terms missing?  If so, we can make some new cards. 
 Please put the cards in the order that you would most identify with them. 
 Why did you rank the cards in this way? 
 [For each card, starting with most important] What does it mean to be _____? 
 [If not asked] What does it mean to be British?  What does it mean to be English? 
 [Choose pairs from the cards chosen to ask all relevant questions of this type]: 
Think about the identities you chose for a moment.  Do any ever come into 
conflict with each other?  How? 
 Have you ever experienced prejudice or been excluded because of any of the 
identities here?  Which one(s)?  From whom?  Can you provide examples? 
 Which of these types do you think you are most different from?  Why? 
 
 You wrote down your five closest friends earlier.  [Confirm religion, ethnicity, gender 
of each] 
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Religion 
 Let’s talk about religion.  [Follow up on the identity cards that relate to religion] 
 
 Could you summarize your religious beliefs for me? [PROVIDE TIME, PROBE AS 
NEEDED] 
o [IF NEEDED] What are your beliefs about God?  About 
Muhammad/Jesus? 
o What are your specific beliefs about the Qur’an/Bible?  How often do you 
read the [Holy Book]?  Do you believe that there could be errors in the 
text of the [Holy Book]?  Should it be interpreted literally, word-for-word?   
o Do you believe in Heaven or Paradise?  How does someone get there? 
 
 What is your type of Islam/Christianity (Sunni/Shia/Wahabi/Salafi/Sufi or 
Pentecostal/Seventh Day Adventist, etc.).  
o Are there some [Muslims/Christians] you would disagree with, or would 
say are not living out their faith properly?  Which ones? 
 
 In the course of your life, have you changed your religious views or how religious you 
are?  Describe when and how you changed.  What were the reasons for this change? 
 
[IF NOT RELIGIOUS] 
 Do you believe in God or some higher power?  What are your beliefs? 
o Do you generally feel positive or negative towards religion?  What has led 
you to feel this way?   
o Do you think you may become more religious someday?  Why or why 
not? 
 
[IF RELIGIOUS] 
 Describe the role of religion or faith in your everyday life.  How important is it? 
 Are there certain actions or practices you do because you are a Christian/Muslim?   
 How often do you pray? 
 Does religion ever limit what you can do?  In what ways? 
 
 Do you attend [mosque/church] in London?  Which one(s) do you go to? 
 How often do you go in a typical week? 
o Tell me about your [mosque/church].  What’s it like? 
o Compare your [mosque/church] to others in this area. 
o Tell me about the leaders of your [mosque/church].  How well do you 
know them? 
o How well do you know other people who attend?  How much do you 
spend time with them outside of [mosque/church]? 
 
Additional Religion Section [IF RELIGIOUS] 
o Do you ever [take part in dawah/share your faith with others]?  What are 
some specific ways you are involved in [dawah/sharing your faith]?  Have 
you seen it be effective? 
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o If you want to learn more about something related to your religion, what 
do you do?   
o Is there someone you would talk to or a place you would go for 
information? 
o Do you read books or listen to talks on [Islam/Christianity] to develop 
your knowledge?  Which authors/speakers do you like?  Why? 
 
o How do you view yourself in relation to other [Muslims/Christians] 
around the world?  Do you think about this often? 
 
 
Culture, Fashion, Street Life 
 Let’s talk about people your age.  What sorts of things are they into at the moment?   
 
 How do you choose the clothes you wear?  Do you have a particular taste in clothes or 
reason for dressing the way that you do? 
 
 Do you like listening to music?  What kinds of music do you listen to?  What are your 
favorite artists/bands?  Why? 
o Do you watch or read the news?  What source do you use for news? 
 
 Are gangs common in this area?  What is the scene like?  If someone your age just 
moved here, what advice would you give them about gangs? 
 
 Are drugs common in this area?  Who is involved with them? 
o Do you ever use drugs?  What types?  How often?  Why or why not? 
 How about alcohol?  Who is involved with that? 
o Do you ever drink alcohol?  How much and how often?  Why or why not? 
 
 Are there issues on the streets here that I haven’t mentioned?  Tell me about them. 
 
 
Involvement 
 What does British Citizenship mean to you? 
 
 Are you involved in any organizations other than school, work, and [mosque/church]?  
Describe your involvement.   
 
 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION SURVEY79 
 
 Finally, What are some of your plans for your future?  How do you think your life will 
turn out?
                                                 
79The political participation survey (from Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley 2004) is included on 
page 45 of this dissertation. 
 239
REFERENCES 
 
Adamson, Fiona B. and Daniel Nilsson DeHanas. 2010. “For the Ummah or Humanity?  
Islamic Humanitarianism between Community and Cosmopolitanism.” Paper  
presented at the International Studies Association Convention. February 20. 
 
Ahmed, Nilufar. 2005. "Tower Hamlets - Insulation in Isolation." In Tariq Abbas (ed.).  
Muslim Britain: Communities Under Pressure. London: Zed Books. 194-207. 
 
Alexander, Claire. 1996. The Art of Being Black: The Creation of Black British Youth  
Identities. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
— — —. 2000. The Asian Gang: Ethnicity, Identity, Masculinity. Oxford: Berg. 
 
Ali, Monica. 2003. Brick Lane. London: Doubleday. 
 
Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and  
Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Ammerman, Nancy Tatom. 1997. Congregation and Community. New Brunswick, NJ:  
Rutgers University Press. 
 
— — —. 2005. Pillars of Faith: American Congregations and their  
Partners. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and  
Spread of Nationalism. New York: Verso. 
 
Anderson, Elijah. 1999. Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the  
Inner City. New York: W. W. Norton.  
 
Ansari, Humayun. 2004. ‘The Infidel Within’: Muslims in Britain since 1800. London:  
Hurst. 
 
Anwar, Muhammad. 1998a. Ethnic Minorities and the British Electoral System.  
Warwick, UK: Centre for Research on Ethnic Relations and Operation Black  
Vote. 
 
— — —. 1998b. Between Cultures: Continuity and Change in the Lives of Young Asians.  
London: Routledge. 
 
— — —. 2001. “The Participation of Ethnic Minorities in British Politics.” Journal of  
Ethnic and Migration Studies 27 (3): 533-539. 
 
Arnett, Jeffrey Jenson. 2000. “Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the  
Late Teens through the Twenties.” American Psychologist 55 (5):469-480. 
 240
Ash, Timothy Garton. 2006. “What Young British Muslims Say Can Be Shocking –  
Some of It Is Also True.” The Guardian. August 10. 
 
Back, Les. 1996. New Ethnicities and Urban Culture Racisms and Multiculture in Young  
Lives. London: Routledge.  
 
— — —. 2007. The Art of Listening. Oxford: Berg. 
 
Bail, Christopher. Forthcoming. “Making Terrorists Racist: Drift, Layering, and  
Synchronization of Multicultural and Domestic Counter-Terrorism Policies in  
Britain, 2000-2008.” Chapter of untitled forthcoming Ph.D. dissertation.  
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. 
 
Barth, Fredrik. 1969. “Introduction.” Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. Boston: Little,  
Brown and Company. 
 
Baumann, Gerd. 1996. Contesting Culture: Discourses of Identity in Multi-Ethnic  
London. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bawer, Bruce. 2006. While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying the West from  
Within. New York: Doubleday. 
 
Birt, Yahya. 2007. “The Islamist: A Review.” Musings on the Britannic Crescent.  
Internet blog. http://www.yahyabirt.com/?p=71 (accessed April 30, 2010). 
 
Blair, Tony. 2006. “The Power of One Conference Ruach Ministries.” Transcript of  
keynote speech. 3 April. http://www.number10.gov.uk/archive/2006/04/the- 
power-of-one-conference-ruach-ministries-3-apr-06-9278 (accessed April 30, 
2010). 
 
Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo. 2001. White Supremacy and Racism in the Post-Civil Rights Era.  
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 
Bradley, Ian. 2007. Believing in Britain: The Spiritual Identity of Britishness. London: I.  
B. Tauris. 
 
Bright, Martin. 2009. “A Barack Obama for Britain.” The New Statesman. January 8. 
 
Brooks, Libby. 2010. “Bethnal Green and Bow: Battle Rages in Constituency with All- 
Bangladeshi Field.” The Guardian. April 19. 
 
Brown, Gordon. 2006. “The Future of Britishness.” Speech to the Fabian Society New  
Year Conference 2006 Who Do We Want to Be? The Future of Britishness.  
January 14. 
 
 241
Bujis, Frank J. and Jan Rath. 2003. “Muslims in Europe: The State of Research.” 
IMSCOE Working Paper. 
 
Burke, Edmund. 2006 [1790]. Reflections on the Revolution in France. London: Pearson  
Longman.  
 
Butler, Charlotte. 1995. “Religion and Gender: Young Muslim Women in Britain.”  
Sociology Review 2 (3). 
 
Caldwell, Christopher. 2009. Reflections on a Revolution in Europe: Can Europe Be The  
Same with Different People in It? London: Allen Lane. 
 
Cantle, Ted. 2001. Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team.  
UK Home Office.  
 
Carey, Sean. 2004. Curry Capital: The Restaurant Sector in London’s Brick Lane. 
Institute of Community Studies working paper. 
 
Casanova, José. 2006. “Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective.” 
Hedgehog Review. 8. 7-22. 
 
— — —. 2007. “Immigration and the New Religious Pluralism: A European 
Union/United States Comparison.” In Thomas Banchoff (ed.). Democracy and the 
New Religious Pluralism. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Castells, Manuel. 1997. The Power of Identity. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. 
 
David Chappell. 2003. A Stone of Hope: Prophetic Religion and the Death of Jim Crow.  
Chapel Hill, NC. University of North Carolina Press. 
 
David Clingingsmith, Asim Ijaz Khwaja, and Michael Kremer. 2008. “Estimating the  
Impact of Hajj: Religion and Tolerance in Islam’s Global Gathering.” Harvard  
University John F. Kennedy School of Government working paper. 
 
Coleman, Simon. 2000. The Globalisation of Charismatic Christianity. Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Coleman, James. 1987. “The Relations between School and Social Structure.” In  
Maureen T. Hallinan (ed.). The Social Organization of Schools: New  
Conceptualizations of the Learning Process. New York: Plenum Press. 
 
Crick, Bernard and Alex Porter (eds.). 1978. Political Education and Political Literacy.  
London: Longman. 
 
Crockett, Alasdair and David Voas. 2006. "Generations of Decline: Religious Change in 
20th-Century Britain." Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 45 (4):567-584. 
 242
De Cordier, Bruno. 2009. “Faith-Based Aid, Globalisation and the Humanitarian  
Frontline: An Analysis of Western-Based Muslim Aid Organisations.” Disasters  
33 (4):608-228.  
 
DeHanas, Daniel Nilsson. 2010. “Broadcasting Green: Grassroots Environmentalism on 
Muslim Women’s Radio.” Nature, Society and Environmental Crisis. 
Sociological Review Monograph. March. Keele: Wiley-Blackwell. 
 
Dench, Geoff, Kate Gavron, and Michael Young. 2006. The New East End: Kinship, 
Race, and Conflict. London: Profile Books. 
 
Eade, John. 1997. "Identity, Nation, Religion: Educated Young Bangladeshis in London's 
East End." In John Eade (ed.). Living the Global City. London: Routledge. 
 
Eade, John and David Garbin. 2006. “Competing Visions of Identity and Space: 
Bangladeshi Muslims in Britain. Contemporary South Asia 15(2): 181-193) 
 
East London Mosque. 2010. East London Mosque & London Muslim Centre: Annual 
Report 2008 / 09. 
 
Ebaugh, Helen Rose. 2000. “Fictive Kin as Social Capital for New Immigrant  
Communities.” Sociological Perspectives. 43 (2):189-209. 
 
Eickelman, Dale F. and James Piscatori. 1996. Muslim Politics. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Fahmy, Eldin. 2006. Young Citizens: Young People’s Involvement in Politics and 
Decision Making. Farnham, UK: Ashgate. 
 
Flanagan, Constance. 2007. Mini-polities. 
 
Foley, Michael W. and Dean R. Hoge. 2007. Religion and the New Immigrants: How 
Faith Communities Form Our Newest Citizens. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Foner, Nancy and Richard Alba. 2008. “Immigrant Religion in the U.S. and Western 
Europe: Bridge or Barrier to Inclusion?” International Migration Review. 42 
(2):360-392. 
 
Gardner, Katy. 1996. Global Migrants Local Lives: Travel and Transformation in Rural 
Bangladesh. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
— — —. 2002. Age, Narrative and Migration: The Life Course and Life Histories of 
Bengali Elders in London. Oxford: Berg. 
 
 243
Gardner, Katy and Abdus Shukur. 1994. “I’m Bengali, I’m Asian, and I’m Living Here: 
The Changing Identity of British Bengalis.” In Roger Ballard and Marcus Banks 
(eds.) Desh Pardesh: The South Asian Presence in Britain. London: Hurst. 
 
Giddens, Anthony. 1991. Modernity and Self Identity: Self and Society in the Late 
Modern Age. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
— — —. 2008. House of Lords Debate. February 2: Column 352. 
 
Gifford, Paul. 1998. African Christianity: Its Public Role. Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press. 
 
— — —. 2004. Ghana’s New Christianity: Pentecostalism in a Globalising African 
Economy. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. 
 
Gilliat-Ray, Sophie. 2005. “Closed Worlds: (Not) Accessing Deobandi Dar ul-Uloom in 
Britain.” Fieldwork in Religion 1 (1):7-33. 
 
Gilroy, Paul. 1987. There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack. London: Hutchinson. 
 
Glynn, Sarah. 2002. “Bengali Muslims: The New East End Radicals?” Ethnic and Racial 
Studies 25 (6):969-988. 
 
Government Office for London. 2010. “Borough Information.” Available online at 
http://www.go-london.gov.uk/boroughinfo/ (accessed April 30 2010). 
 
Griffin, Christine. 2005. “Challenging Assumptions about Youth Political Participation: 
Critical Insights from Great Britain.” In Joerg Forbig (ed.). Revisiting Youth 
Political Participation: Challenges for Research and Democratic Practice in 
Europe. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing. 
 
Guardian, The. 1981. “How Smouldering Tension Erupted to Set Brixton Aflame.” April 
13. 
 
Hagan, Jacqueline Maria. 2008. Migration Miracle: Faith, Hope, and Meaning on the 
Undocumented Journey. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Hall, Stuart. 1992. “The New Ethnicities.” In James Donald and Ali Rattansi (eds.).  
“Race,” Culture, and Difference. London: Sage. 
 
Handlin, Oscar. 1951. The Uprooted. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 
 
Peter Hedström. 2008. “Studying Mechanisms to Strengthen Causal Inferences in  
Quantitative Research.” In Janet Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady, and David  
Collier (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology. Oxford: Oxford  
University Press. 
 244
Heelas, Paul and Linda Woodhead. 2004. The Spiritual Revolution: Why Religion is 
Giving Way to Spirituality. London: Wiley-Blackwell. 
 
Henn, Matt, Mark Weinstein, and Dominic Wring. 2002. “A Generation Apart? Youth 
and Political Participation in Britain.” British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations 4 (2):167-192. 
 
Herberg, Will. 1955. Protestant-Catholic-Jew: An Essay in American Religious 
Sociology. New York: Doubleday. 
 
Husain, Ed. 2007. The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw 
Inside, and Why I Left. London: Penguin. 
 
Hussain, Yasmin and Paul Bagguley. 2005. “Citizenship, Ethnicity and Identity: British 
Pakistanis after the 2001 ‘Riots’.” Sociology 39 (3):407-425. 
 
Independent, The. 2010. “Tweet Democracy: Who Are the Best Westminster Warblers?” 
January 11. 
 
Jacobson, Jessica. 1998. Islam in Transition: Religion and Identity among British 
Pakistani Youth. London: Routledge. 
 
Jenkins, Philip. 2007. God’s Continent Christianity, Islam, and Europe’s Religious 
Crisis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   
 
Kasinitz, Philip, John H. Mollenkopf, and Mary C. Waters. 2009. Inheriting the City: The 
Children of Immigrants Come of Age. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Kershen, Anne. 2005. Strangers, Aliens and Asians: Huguenots, Jews and Bangladeshis 
in Spitalfields 1660-2000. New York: Routledge. 
 
Kisby, Ben and James Sloam. 2009. “Revitalising Politics: The Role of Citizenship 
Education.” Paper presented at Revitalising Politics: Have We Lost the Plot? 
conference at Parliament. November 5. 
 
Klausen, Jytte. 2009. The Cartoons That Shook the World. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press. 
 
Lamont, Michèle. 2000. The Dignity of Working Men: Morality and the Boundaries of 
Race, Class, and Immigration. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Lawrence, Errol. 1981. “Common Sense Racism and the Sociology of Race Relations.” 
Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) Paper. Birmingham, UK: 
CCCS. 
 
 245
Levitt, Peggy. 2007. God Needs No Passport: Immigrants and the Changing American 
Religious Landscape. New York: The New Press. 
 
Lewis, Philip. 2007. Young, British and Muslim. London: Continuum. 
 
MacDonald, Robert. 1997. Youth, the ‘Underclass’ and Social Exclusion. London:  
Routledge. 
 
Marsh, David, Therese O’Toole, and Su Jones. 2007. Young People and Politics in the  
UK: Apathy or Alienation? Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Marshall, Thomas Humphrey. 1950. Citizenship and Social Class. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Martin, David. 2002. Pentecostalism: The World Their Parish. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
— — —.  On Secularization: Towards a Revised General Theory. Aldershot, UK: 
Ashgate. 
 
Doug McAdam. 1982. Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-
1970. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
McRoberts, Omar. 2003. Streets of Glory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Mead, Matthew. 2009. “Empire Windrush: The Cultural Meaning of an Imaginary 
Arrival.” Journal of Postcolonial Writing 45 (2):137-149. 
 
Meer, Nasar and Tariq Modood. 2009. Migration, Identity and Citizenship: Approaches  
for Addressing Cultural Diversity in 21st Century Britain. Project report for  
EMILIE program, European Commission. 
 
Modood, Tariq. 2005. Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity, and Muslims in Britain. 
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
— — —. 2007. Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Modood, Tariq, Sharon Beishon, and Satnam Virdee. 1994. Changing Ethnic Identities. 
London: Policy Studies Institute.  
 
Mooney, Margarita. 2009. Faith Makes Us Live: Surviving and Thriving in the Haitian 
Diaspora. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Morris, Aldon. 1986. The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities 
Organizing for Change. New York: Free Press. 
 
 246
Muir, David. 2010. “The Black Majority Churches: Political and Civic Engagement.” 
SUSA Paper. http://www.susa.info/resources/black-majority (accessed March 13 
2010). 
 
Naqvi, Ijlal. Forthcoming. Untitled Ph.D. dissertation. Chapel Hill, NC: University of 
North Carolina. 
 
Norris, Pippa. 2001. “Apathetic Landslide: The 2001 British General Election.” In Pippa 
Norris (ed.) Britain Votes 2001. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Office for National Statistics (ONS). 2002. General Household Survey, 1971-2007.  
 Colchester, UK. 
 
Office for National Statistics (ONS), General Register Office for Scotland, Northern  
 Ireland Statistics and Research Agency. 2004. Census 2001. London: The  
 Stationery Office. 
 
Ogbu, John. 1990. “Minority Education in Comparative Perspective.” Journal of Negro 
Education 59 (1):45-57. 
 
— — —. 1995. “Cultural Problems in Minority Education: Their Interpretations and 
Consequences-Part Two: Case Studies. The Urban Review. 27 (4):271-205. 
 
Ogongo, Stephen. 2010. “Umunna: Get Involved in Active Politics for Positive Change.” 
News Africa, March 1. Available online at http://www.africa-
news.eu/component/content/article/38-africans-in-uk/361-umunna-get-involved-
in-active-politics-for-positive-change-.html (accessed April 30 2010). 
 
O’Toole, Therese and Richard Gale. 2009. “Contemporary Grammars of Political Action 
among Ethnic Minority Young Activists.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 33 (1):126-
143. 
 
O’Toole, Therese, David Marsh, and Su Jones. 2003.  “Political Literacy Cuts Both 
Ways: The Politics of Non-Participation among Young People.” Political 
Quarterly 74 (3):349-360. 
 
Oxford English Dictionary. 2009. Available online at http://www.oed.com (accessed 
April 30 2010). 
 
Pattie, Charles, Patrick Seyd, and Paul Whiteley. 2004. Citizenship in Britain: Values, 
Participation, and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Pattillo-McCoy, Mary. 1998. “Church Culture as a Strategy of Action in the Black  
Community.” American Sociological Review 63 (6):767-784. 
 
Phillips, Melanie. 2007. Londonistan. New York: Encounter Books. 
 247
Peck, Andy. 2006. “What a Mega Church Can Teach You.” Christianity Magazine.  
August. 
 
Pew Research Center. 2006. “Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns  
about Religious and Cultural Identity.” Pew Global Attitudes Project. July 6. 
 
Pirie, Madsen and Robert Worcester. 1998. The Millennial Generation. London: Adam  
Smith Institute. 
 
Portes, Alejandro and Rubén G. Rumbaut. 2001. Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant  
Second Generation. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Portes, Alejandro and Min Zhou. 1993. “The New Second Generation: Segmented  
Assimilation and Its Variants.” The Annals of the American Academy 530:74-96. 
 
Power Inquiry, The. 2006. Power to the People: The Report of Power: An Independent  
Inquiry into Britain’s Democracy. Layerthorpe, UK: York Publishing  
Distribution. 
 
Purdam, Kingsley and Ed Fieldhouse with Virinder Kalra and Andrew Russell. 2002.  
Voter Engagement among Black and Minority Ethnic Communities. London: The  
Electoral Commission. 
 
Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA). 1998. Education for Citizenship and the  
 Teaching of Democracy in Schools: Final Report of the Advisory Group on  
 Citizenship (The Crick Report). London: QCA. 
 
Roy, Olivier. 2004. Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
 
— — —. 2006a. "Islam in the West or Western Islam? The Disconnect of Religion and 
Culture." The Hedgehog Review 8 (1 & 2):127-132. 
 
— — —. 2006b. “Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah.”  Transcript of 
presentation to the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, March 30. 
Available online: http://www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/5334.html (accessed 
April 30 2010). 
 
Rushdie, Salman. 1988. The Satanic Verses. London: Viking Penguin. 
 
Saggar, Shamit. 1998. The General Election 1997: Ethnic Minorities and Electoral 
Politics. London: UCL Press. 
 
 248
Sahin, Abdullah. 2005. “Exploring the Religious Life-World and Attitudes toward Islam 
among British Muslim Adolescents.” In Leslie Francis, Mandy Robbins, and Jeff 
Astley (eds.). Religion, Education and Adolescence: International Empirical 
Perspectives. Cardiff: University of Wales Press. 
 
Saunders, Clare. 2008. “Double-Edged Swords?: Collective Identity and Solidarity in the 
Environment Movement.” British Journal of Sociology 59 (2):227-253. 
 
Scarman, Lord Leslie George. 1981. The Brixton Disorders, 10–12th April (1981). 
London: HMSO. 
 
Sewell, William F. 1992. “A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation.” 
The American Journal of Sociology 98(1):1-29. 
 
Sewell, Tony. 1997. Black Masculinities and Schooling: How Black Boys Survive  
Modern Schooling. Stoke on Trent, UK: Trentham Books. 
 
Shah, Oliver. 2009. “Chuka Umunna: ‘It Would Be Spectacularly Awful If I Didn’t Get 
Elected for Streatham.’” www.olivershah.com. Internet blog, February 22. 
http://olivershah.wordpress.com/2009/02/22/chuka-ummuna-it-would-be-
spectacularly-awful-if-i-didnt-get-elected-for-streatham/ (accessed April 25 
2010). 
 
Sheikh, Christine Soriea. 2007. “Take the Best of Both Worlds: Segmented Assimilation 
among Second Generation Muslim Americans.” Journal of Social and Ecological 
Boundaries 3 (1):187-226. 
 
Sloam, James. 2007. “Rebooting Democracy: Youth Participation in Politics in the UK.” 
Parliamentary Affairs 60(4): 548-567. 
 
Smith, Christian with Michael Emerson, Sally Gallagher, Paul Kennedy, and David  
Sikkink. 1998. American Evangelicalism: Embattled and Thriving. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Smith, Christian with Melinda L. Denton. 2005. Soul Searching: The Religious and 
Spiritual Lives of American Teenagers. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Smith, Christian with Patricia Snell. 2009. Souls in Transition: The Religious and 
Spiritual Lives of Emerging Adults. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Smith, Greg. 1996. “The Unsecular City: The Revival of Religion in East London.” In 
Michael Rustin and Tim Butler (eds.). Rising in the East: Regeneration of East 
London. London: Lawrence & Wishart. 
 
Solomos, John and Les Back. 1995. Race, Politics, and Social Change. London: 
Routledge. 
 249
Song. 2009. “How Do ‘Mixed Race’ Young People Racially Identify in Britain?” Paper 
presented at the British Sociological Association Annual Conference 2009 in 
Cardiff. April 18. 
 
Starrett, Gregory. 1998. Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics, and Religious 
Transformation in Egypt. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Steele, Claude M. and Joshua Aronson. 1995. “Stereotype Threat and the intellectual test 
performance of African-Americans. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
69, 797-811. 
 
Swidler, Ann. 2003. Talk of Love: How Culture Matters. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
 
Tajfel, Henri and John Turner. 1979. “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict.”In 
William G. Austin and Stephen Worchel (eds.). The Social Psychology of 
Intergroup Relations. Monterey, CA: Brooks-Cole. 
 
Talmon-Heller, Daniella. 2007. Islamic Piety in Medieval Syria: Mosques, Cemeteries 
and Sermons under the Zangids and Ayyubids (1146-1260). Leiden: Brill. 
 
Taylor, Charles. 1992. The Ethics of Authenticity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Tilly, Charles. 1999. Durable Inequality. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Timmermans, Frans. 2009. Transcript of presentation to the Carnegie Council for Ethics 
in International Affairs, April 7. Available online: 
http://www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/0145.html (accessed April 30 2010). 
 
Toulis, Nicole Rodriguez. 1997. Believing Identity: Pentecostalism and the Mediation of 
Jamaican Ethnicity and Gender in England. Oxford: Berg. 
 
Tripp, Charles. 2006. Islam and the Moral Economy: The Challenge of Capitalism. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Turner, Bryan. 2008. “Revivalism and the Enclave Society.” In Amyn B. Sajoo. Muslim 
Modernities: Expressions of the Civil Imagination. London: I. B. Tauris.  
 
Umunna, Chuka. 2008. “Look Out for the Barack Effect.” The Guardian. November 10. 
 
Vine, Jeremy and Richard Watson (presenters). 2009. “Muslim First, British Second.” 
Panorama television program episode. BBC. Broadcast February 16. 
 
Walzer, Michael. 1982. The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical 
Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 250
— — —. 1989. “Citizenship.” In Terence Ball, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson (eds.), 
Political Innovation and Conceptual Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Warikoo, Natasha Kumar. Forthcoming 2011. Balancing Acts: Youth Culture in the 
Global City. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Waters, Mary C. 1990. Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
 
— — —. 1999. Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities. 
New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
— — —. 2003. “Optional Ethnicities: For Whites Only?” In Margaret L. Anderson and 
Patricia Hill Collins (eds.). Race, Class, and Gender: An Anthology. New York: 
Wadsworth Publishing. 
 
Watson, James L. (ed.). 1977. Between Two Cultures: Migrants and Minorities in 
Britain. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Weller, Paul. 2009. Mirror for Our Times: The Rushdie Affair and the Future of 
Multiculturalism. London: Continuum. 
 
Werbner, Pnina. 2002. Imagined Diasporas among Manchester Muslims. Oxford: James  
Currey. 
 
Werbner, Pnina and Tariq Modood (eds.). 1997. Debating Cultural Hybridity: Multi-
cultural Identities and the Politics of Anti-racism. London: Zed Books. 
 
Wesley, John. 1739. The Journal of John Wesley: June 11, 1739. Available online at A 
Vision of Britain Through Time. 
http://www.visionofbritain.org.uk/text/contents_page.jsp?t_id=J_Wesley 
(accessed April 30 2010). 
 
Whiteley, Paul. 2003. “The State of Participation in Britain.” Parliamentary Affairs 
56:610-615. 
 
Winchester, Daniel. 2008. “Embodying the Faith: Religious Practice and the Making of a 
Muslim Moral Habitus.” Social Forces 86(4): 1753-1780. 
 
Wood, Richard. 2002. Faith in Action: Religion, Race, and Democratic Organizing in 
America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Woolley, Simon. 2008. “Pillars of Our Community.” The Guardian. December 3. 
 
 251
Wuthnow, Robert. 2000. After Heaven: Spirituality in America Since the 1950s. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
